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This thesis examines Democratic and Republican party platforms over the 1980-2016
period in a content analysis to test claims of partisanship increasing on identity lines in American
politics. As a key issue facing democracies in recent years, polarization has coincided with
challenges for democratic governance. Cases of ‘pernicious’ polarization that extend partisan
rifts into social life, and especially those that feature an ‘existential’ or ‘formative rift' dynamic
as in the US case, may be prone to intractable partisan conflict and politics amenable to
democratic erosion. The tensions may also create space for democracy enhancements. The
findings of the content analysis offer support for increasing partisan-identity polarization in
American politics in recent decades. Republican party platforms seem to increasingly reproduce
a historical majoritarian appeal on religious-cultural or ethnic identity lines, in contrast to
Democratic party platforms that likewise increasingly contest the meaning of ‘American’ in
more identitarian albeit inclusive in a multicultural sense of community and belonging.
KEYWORDS: deconsolidation, democracy, democratic erosion, identity, nation, partisanship,
polarization

DEEPENING PARTISAN-IDENTITY POLARIZATION IN THE US: A CONTENT
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PARTY PLATFORMS, 1980-2016

NICHOLAS ALAN MULLINS

A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Politics and Government
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
2021

© 2021 Nicholas Alan Mullins

DEEPENING PARTISAN-IDENTITY POLARIZATION IN THE US: A CONTENT
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PARTY PLATFORMS, 1980-2016

NICHOLAS ALAN MULLINS

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Lane Crothers, Chair
Ali Riaz
Yusuf Sarfati

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am eternally grateful to my wife for her support and sacrifice of my time spent writing
this thesis. It is also an enormous debt of gratitude I owe to my chair for working with me. The
project would not have been a success without Dr. Crothers’ patience and constructive criticisms,
not to mention his time and efforts that have made me a better writer and thinker throughout the
process. Without the support of my committee members, Dr. Sarfati and Dr. Riaz, I could not
have completed this work. Their feedback likewise made the paper stronger. It was Dr. Riaz’s
seminar on Democracy in Crisis that helped to inspire the research topic. Lastly, I appreciate
Laura Severs for her time commitment as research assistant in the content analysis, no small task
to say the least.
N.A.M.

i

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

i

CONTENTS

ii

TABLES

iv

FIGURES

v

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1

Theoretical Approach

1

Thesis Outline

6

CHAPTER II: THE ISSUE OF PARTISAN-IDENTITY POLARIZATION
From Partisanship to Pernicious Polarization
Partisanship and Its Influence

7
7
9

Partisan Dynamics

16

Possible Positive or Negative Implications of Partisanship

20

Democratic Function Against Extreme Partisanship

34

Systems of Democracy in the Third Reverse Wave

35

Factors in Deconsolidation: Severe Polarization Into Partisan-Identity Blocs

43

Partisanship and Deconsolidation Trends

58

Methods

60

Content Analysis of Democratic and Republican Party Platforms, 1980-2016

61

Identifying Shifts in Party Messaging on Universal and Identitarian Bases

61

Managing and Reporting Intercoder Reliability

63

ii

CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS

65

Results in Numbers: Less Neutral, More Identity

67

Democratic Party Platforms (1980, 1992, 2004, 2016)

72

Republican Party Platforms (1980, 1992, 2004, 2016)

95

Deepening Partisan-Identity Polarization in Democratic and Republican Party Platforms 127
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

131

REFERENCES

141

APPENDIX A: CODING RUBRIC

151

APPENDIX B: INTERCODER RELIABILITY

156

APPENDIX C: DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CODER 1 AND 2 COMPARISOn

157

APPENDIX D: REPUBLICAN PARTY, CODER 1 AND 2 COMPARISON

158

iii

TABLES
Table

Page

1. Universal Civic Identity Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms

74

2. Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms

80

3. Identitarian Identity Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms

87

4. Universal Civic Identity Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms

97

5. Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms

106

6. Identitarian Identity Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms

114

iv

FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Grouped Bar

66

2. Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Grouped Bar

66

3. Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Line

68

4. Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Line

70

v

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines political party platforms from 1980-2016 as an empirical test of
claims that partisanship on identity lines has been increasing in American politics. As will be
seen, the issue is important for several reasons. For one, challenges in democratic governance are
evident throughout the world, including even in established democracies like the United States.
A recent period of historic growth in the total number of democracies has stalled in the early 21st
century and may be continuing a pattern of decline. This trend coincides with growth in mixed
regime types combining democratic and autocratic tendencies in governance. Moreover, liberal
democracies faced with increasing public disaffection and discontent have experienced growth in
populist politics from politicians answering to incentives of popular resentments. Accordingly,
polarization is a key issue facing democracies around the world today.
The thesis explores the issue through its analysis of US political party platforms. It uses a
content analysis to assess shifts in political party messaging in platform space devoted to
universal, narrowed, or hybrid universal-identitarian appeals over time. Its analysis contributes to
an empirical grounding of any such partisan dynamics by showing a growing rift between the
major parties. It thereby affirms claims of increasing party polarization in two broadly
contrasting partisan appeals to identity in American electoral politics. The findings inform a
concluding discussion of partisanship and potential trends ahead for liberal democracy in the US.
Theoretical Approach
Foremost, extreme partisan politics as understood in the concept of ‘pernicious
polarization’ is instructive for this thesis (e.g., LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019; McCoy,
Rahman, and Somer 2018). It is particularly useful in the analysis of American party platforms to
evaluate shifts in partisanship on identity lines from 1980-2016. Pernicious cases of partisanship

1

reflect a deep divide and alignment of politicized identities and interests to the extent that
mutually exclusive political groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ spills from politics into everyday social
relations (McCoy and Somer 2019). Such polarization rises to ‘pernicious’ intensity as parties
align around two poles of a cross-cutting social boundary (LeBas 2018). This approach
underscores the role of group identity as a “proxy or marker” for divisions “linking citizens to a
particular leader or partisan identity” (McCoy and Somer 2019, 236). I further adopt the notion
that sometimes, as in the US case, a ‘formative rift’ may underlie and thereby prolong and
intensify cases of pernicious polarization (McCoy and Somer 2019). These cases involve
longstanding historical debates over components of national identity and culture, citizenship
rights, identity and belonging in the polity, or else politicized differences between subgroups that
make polarized conflicts more difficult to resolve (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; McCoy
and Somer 2019; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Grievances around race and culture may
have a large part in the dynamics of severe party polarization in the US (Abramowitz and McCoy
2018; Kaufman and Haggard 2019; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
More broadly, partisanship guides political identification, affiliation, or attachment
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz and McCoy 2018; Barber and Pope 2019; Bartels
2000; Fiorina and Adams 2008; Goren 2005; Graham and Svolik 2020; Hetherington 2001;
Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Mason 2014; LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019;
Vegetti 2018). American partisanship is not historically new but has generally been increasing
over the last few decades despite earlier indicators of possible decline during the mid-20th
century (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001; Layman, Carsey,
and Horowitz 2006). The two major parties in American politics are becoming more polarized in
recent history, sorting into partisan-ideological alignment between blocs, and showing signs of a
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rift in polarized political identities of either liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans. Even
as this modern polarization has increased on all levels in American politics, together with mass
party identification including party leaners at elections, the divide may not be so far apart on
policy issues (Fiorina and Adams 2008; Mason 2014). Political preferences for partisans may,
indeed, be less tied to policy and more rooted in social and psychological forms of political
identity (Barber and Pope 2019; Mason 2014). As a typical manifestation in democratic
competition, partisanship may at times be advantageous or concerning for regimes. It is
frequently a positive influence on political participation and steering voter decisions. However,
at intensity, the dynamics may embolden political extremism (Lupu 2014). Negative effects can
prove dysfunctional at best and deleterious at worst for democratic governance (Levitsky and
Ziblatt 2018).
The increasing polarization in American politics is happening from elite levels down to
activists and mass identifiers. Elites disproportionately influence partisan dynamics though it is
an interactive relationship vis-à-vis party activists’ and mass demands (Abramowitz and
Saunders 2008; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). As elite cues frequently precede and
weigh on mass political behavior (Goren 2005), the analysis of party platforms in this thesis
evaluates for ‘pernicious’ dynamics of polarization from a top-down perspective. The influence
of party elites is crucial in constructing or intensifying cleavages in exclusive appeals to mobilize
electoral support (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Given the importance of partisanship as a
motivator of mass political views and participation, this thesis advances empirical work on
severe partisanship by testing claims around dynamics of party polarization in American
democracy over the last few decades. It is an effort to pinpoint the nature and intensity of
changes in competing value systems or narratives of belonging in American party politics
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underlying polarization. The results of such an approach may offer validation for theories around
US party polarization and otherwise clues for political outlooks ahead.
Features of partisanship under sharply polarized conditions could signal deeper problems
contributing to democratic deconsolidation. Spectacle events, like the January 6, 2021, proTrump and intensely partisan mass gatherings against the legitimacy of election outcomes
devolving into historic violent uprisings on the US capitol, are certainly less frequent; even more
rare are full democratic breakdowns like the Myanmar military coup on February 1, 2021, ending
a brief transition course of democratization. Gradual regime shifts away from liberal democratic
ideals are less obvious, though more frequent and measurable. Now formerly the “world’s oldest,
continuous democracy,” the POLITY scale of democracy recently dropped the US from full
democracy status to anocracy, that is, the regime now falls between the spectrum of traits in
autocratic and democratic governance (Center for Systemic Peace 2020). They point to actions
during the Trump administration, such as rejections of congressional oversight, purging nonloyalists from the administration, forceful response to protests, vilifying the opposition, and
casting doubts into American elections while attempting to circumvent legitimate electoral
outcomes (Center for Systemic Peace 2020). The US registered its lowest performance indicator
in the 2020 Freedom in the World annual report on equal treatment under law, policies, and
practices. The report cites a few examples, from Trump’s efforts to dismantle Obama
administration policies enacted in the same authority to protect sexual and gender minorities, to
hasty reversals under the executive on immigration with “blatantly discriminatory” bans on
travel from select Muslim-majority countries on claims of national security (Freedom House
2020). Still another study judging the nature of American democracy against a large dataset from
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1981-2002 suggests less majority rule in response to interests of citizens than a reflection of elite
or organized interests:
When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests,
they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S.
political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change,
they generally do not get it (Gilens and Page 2014, 571).
With several factors likely at work in contemporary problems for democratic governance, the
underlying trends in political dynamics that could give rise to undemocratic trends and spectacle
figures or events are important to emphasize. This thesis therefore underscores the dynamics of
severe partisan polarization on identity lines to build on the understanding of where things could
go from here for liberal democratic systems. For example, indicators of democratic health,
intense polarization and deep social mistrust are broadly affecting regimes in contemporary
deconsolidation trends (V-Dem Institute 2020). So long as ‘mutual toleration’ runs short, rivals
may stop viewing or tolerating one another as legitimate democratic opponents, unworthy of the
same respect and perhaps even unacceptable as family or friends (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; VDemo Institute 2020). Polarizing dynamics may still contribute to political mobilization for
democratic reforms (Layman, Geoffrey, and Carsey 2006; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy,
Rahman, and Somer, 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). They may be “generative” for democracy
through development of checks and balances from the tensions of polarization and/or stronger
political structures like party organizations that drive participation (LeBas 2018). Yet, deepening
polarization may be potentially unstable for democratic function. Two blocs who severely
distrust one another, from political elites to their loyal supporters, can “become less likely to
adhere to democratic rules in the struggle for power” (V-Dem Institute 2020, 22; see also, e.g.,
Graham 2020; LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). Of most direct consequence, accordingly,
scholars see a present risk of severe partisanship or ‘pernicious’ polarization in the unraveling of
5

democratic regimes at the agency of elected officials (Bermeo 2016; Cheeseman and Klaas 2018;
Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Foa and Mounk 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy and Somer
2019; Mietzner 2018; Waldner and Lust 2018).
Thesis Outline
This Chapter One introduces the thesis. It provides a synthesis of the literature and an
overview of the thesis chapters. In Chapter Two, I address why the issue of partisan-identity
polarization matters and how I approach it. I include brief examples that bridge the two subfields
of American Politics and Comparative Politics. I then present a thorough methodology using
content analysis of major party platforms to evaluate elite appeals in American politics for
dynamics of pernicious polarization that may have consequential influence on democratic regime
trajectory, for better or worse. This unique contribution extends rare studies of partisan-identity
polarization to a longer period and thereby supports theoretical development around suggestive
cases in severe polarization with similarities in partisan-identity rifts and contestation over
national belonging. Accordingly, the Chapter Two discussion sets up the content analysis of
Democratic and Republican party platforms, which I unpack in Chapter Three. Finally, I explore
the implications of this research in the concluding Chapter Four. The findings give some
direction for American politics as well as future projects involving pernicious dynamics and
partisan-identity polarization in liberal democracies.
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CHAPTER II: THE ISSUE OF PARTISAN-IDENTITY POLARIZATION
From Partisanship to Pernicious Polarization
The importance of this thesis is carving into a less explored empirical space within the
scholarly debate on growing divisions, partisanship and polarization in American politics. The
US case of increasing party polarization of masses preceded by elites over the last several
decades is well-established in the literature, but the dynamics and implications of partisanship I
address in this study remain fertile grounds for research. Partisanship, or party identification and
thereby loyalty to a political bloc, is a key motivator of political participation, mass voting
behavior, and political activism. Thus, changes in intensity of party attachment and polarization
on cross-cutting party lines may potentially influence changes in political outlooks and ideals
reflected in American politics, plus general political or economic stability for the US. In large
part, the literature establishes that elites play a key role in driving party polarization and its
implications through cues or political appeals intended to mobilize popular support to secure
power. Moreover, recent decades increasingly reflect extended partisan-ideological divisions
coupled with political identity alignment between the Democrats and Republicans, the two major
parties in American politics. In short, the US case of severe partisanship seems mired in racial
and cultural identity divisions, as argued by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018). It may
further reflect a political identity rift dynamic of ‘pernicious’ polarization, according to Jennifer
McCoy and Murat Somer (2019). Preexisting cleavages on the basis of group and citizens’
belonging, with deep historical roots in the American polity, may exacerbate the effects and
duration of party polarization (LeBas 2018). Although there are potential democracy-enhancing
reservations for partisanship, it remains possible for severe cases of party polarization to have
debilitative effects on democratic norms, such as eroding mutual tolerance and restraint, in
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addition to instability for the regime that could lead to democratic backsliding or breakdown. By
exploring partisanship in a rigorous analysis of major party messaging from 1980-2016, this
thesis lays bare any elite partisan appeals or party divergence in messaging along identity lines
that may contribute to ‘pernicious’ polarization on the basis of belonging and toleration in
American society and politics.
The overarching themes in the literature on partisanship address its influence on
democratic politics. Especially for extreme cases, the literature tends to highlight issues of
partisanship with respect to political polarization and deep divisions within a society. Three
themes emerge in the literature, somewhat chronologically. For one, a large body of earlier work
debates the decline of partisanship in the United States since roughly the 1950s, followed by
party resurgence. Scholars were trying to determine whether or not the impact of party
identification on political behavior had weakened. To the contrary, scholarship at the turn of the
21st century came to near-consensus that the ‘partisan decline’ thesis of older conventions was
wrong (see, e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001; Layman,
Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). American partisanship rebounded, if not crystalized, from earlier
signs of decline in effect on elites and voting behavior starting around the late 20th century
through today. Second, the dynamics and implications of partisanship thus increasingly became a
major influence and focus within the literature (see, e.g., Barber and Pope 2019; Brown,
Touchton, and Whitford 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Layman, Carsey, and
Horowitz 2006; LeBas 2018; Lupu 2014; Mason 2014). Third, most recently, the debate on
partisanship has turned to what increasing party polarization may mean for democratic
governance in the United States as well as other liberal democracies (see, e.g., Abramowitz and
McCoy 2018; Graham and Svolik 2020; McCoy and Somer 2019; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer
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2018; Tworzecki 2018; Vegetti 2018). The main themes I address in this review on the issue of
partisanship, including partisan influence, dynamics, and its positive and negative implications,
inform the empirical analysis of Republican and Democratic party platforms to follow.
Partisanship and Its Influence
Partisanship in the American political system has long been a focal point in social science
as well as media narratives given its influence in democratic politics. It is commonplace in many
analyses of American elections (e.g., so-called “red” and “blue” states in the American electoral
system to describe Republican party and Democratic party strongholds). This frequency comes
as a key dynamic of partisanship is its influence on political behavior and outcomes in electoral
politics. But what is partisanship, and what does it mean to be a partisan? Partisanship essentially
describes the political behavior or devotions of partisans. Conversely, acting as a partisan reflects
individual partisanship. The literature often discusses these concepts in modest terms when the
scope of partisanship is less intense or concerning, while more severe cases tend to have
emphasis on polarizing heights of far-reaching partisan behavior.
First, put simply, a partisan is an individual who identifies (see, e.g., Abramowitz and
Saunders 2008; Abramowitz and McCoy 2018; Barber and Pope 2019; Bartels 2000; Fiorina and
Adams 2008; Goren 2005; Mason 2014; McCoy and Somer 2019; LeBas 2018; Vegetti 2018),
affiliates (see, e.g., Graham and Svolik 2020), or attaches oneself to a political party (see, e.g.,
Barber and Pope 2019; Bartels 2000; Goren 2005; Hetherington 2001; Layman, Carsey, and
Horowitz 2006; LeBas 2018; Lupu 2014; Mason 2014; McCoy and Somer 2019). Such party
identification, affiliation, or attachment is both social and psychological (Barber and Pope 2019;
Mason 2014). Its varying levels in strength or intensity in terms of party influence and individual
loyalty is a recurrent characteristic in the literature. For example, Bartels (2000) adopted a
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measurement of partisanship to assess voting in American elections on a seven-point scale from
strong to weak party attachment, capturing Democratic and Republican leaners as a middle way
while excluding minor party voters and nonvoters. On the latter point, partisanship is distinct
from political independence insofar as nonpartisans are without “attachment to one side or the
other” in terms of political identification and predictable voting behavior (Hetherington 2001,
627). Partisans include the party elites, the parties’ mass coalitions, and activist bases (Layman,
Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). As for the masses, partisan identifiers are more likely subjects of
party influence in their attitudes on political issues, whereas independents are not as likely to
change issue attitudes on elite cues (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Layman, Carsey,
and Horowitz 2006). Moreover, partisan identifiers may have “a sense of emotional attachment
… rooted in the social images of the parties” (Goren 2005, 881). The relationship for partisans is
personal, one of loyalty, and inclined to produce close feelings vis-à-vis party-associated social
groups (Goren 2005). In government, partisanship is often visible in elite party members’ voting
records on party lines, perhaps even a sense of devotion to the effect of unwillingness to
compromise with political rivals (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Indeed, strong party
attachments may embolden political extremism (Lupu 2014). As a social identity with “powerful
effects,” partisanship often entails biases corresponding to its identification with the party
(Mason 2014, 128; see also, e.g., Barber and Pope 2019; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus
2013). A partisan, in other words, behaves “more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an
investment” (Mason 2014, 129). Partisans also “feel emotionally connected to the welfare of the
party; they prefer to spend time with other members of the party; and when the party is
threatened, they become angry and work to help conquer the threat even if they disagree with
some of the issue positions taken by the party” (Mason 2014, 129; see also, e.g., LeBas 2018).
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Partisanship is the “most prominent political identity” because it is the parties that directly
compete for political power (Mason 2014, 130). It manifests as a consequence of democratic
competition between leaders and organizations in ways that express public policy so masses can
participate in the political decision-making process (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013).
Lastly, as later discussed in detail but an important conceptual distinction to note,
political polarization characterizes severe partisanship with a deeper political and cultural divide,
including elites, activists, and masses (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). When partisan rifts
extend from political to everyday social relations, the ensuing polarization may be an
uncompromising and “totalizing system” of ‘us versus them’ political identities (McCoy and
Somer 2019; see also Vegetti 2018). Under polarized extremes, partisan competition may
resemble political ‘tribes,’ rather than more modest democratic party distinctions (Kaufman and
Haggard 2019). Norms of mutual tolerance and ‘forbearance’ between political opponents, in
other words, may be absent or run dry (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
Partisan influence is often a matter of extent and direction, whether resurgent or waning
and either elite- or mass-driven. Despite some signs of mid-to-late 20th century decline, it is clear
that party identification for American elites and the electorate persists. An earlier assessment of
voting in American national elections from 1952-1996 explored the extent of partisan influence
on voting behavior using a simple probit analysis to capture changes in its electoral distribution
and relevance. Larry Bartels (2000) showed that partisan influence on voting behavior increased
nationally over each of the presidential elections in review, although with lower intensity for
congressional elections on the same trajectory. By 1996, partisanship was higher than any
election spanning the previous 50 years (Bartels 2000). Voters were also consistently more
partisan than nonvoters (Bartels 2000), hinting at some advantage of partisanship for democratic
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regimes by enhancing voter turnout. In a similar assessment, the relationship between masses
and elites engaged in partisanship further explains partisan influence using individual-level data
from American National Election Studies (ANES) and an ideological scoring system between
members of Congress over the period of 1949-1997. Like Bartels (2000), the findings contradict
earlier conventions of the ‘partisan decline’ thesis after some waning from the late 1940s through
the 1960s (Hetherington 2001). Instead, a rise in elite party polarization began in the 1970s, as
mass partisanship trended closely behind (Hetherington 2001). A subsequent study using ANES
data likewise found that ideological polarization for both masses and elites has sharply increased
since the 1970s (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). The growing partisan divisions are vast
between outlooks of Democrats versus Republicans, both elites and voters, and the split spans
the American public rather than only a small segment of activists (Abramowitz and Saunders
2008). Even so, divisions are sharpest across partisan voters, who are also most interested,
informed, and active in politics (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). An extensive survey of the
theoretical and empirical literature on party polarization and partisan change, in which
researchers compare the recent period to earlier political eras, affirms these changes in American
partisan politics (Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006). For the two major political parties in the
US, they find increasing polarization in all major policy realms (Layman, Casey, and Horowitz
2006). A subsequent survey of literature on the concept of polarization and evidence of the
phenomena concludes elite polarization in the US is substantially empirically grounded (Fiorina
and Adams 2008). The same survey finds less support for increased polarization on policy
positions among masses in recent decades but concludes that mass partisan identification has
indeed increased (Fiorina and Adams 2008). Subsequent survey analysis continues to lend strong

12

support for increasing partisanship among the masses, while generally supporting the finding that
political preferences are less tied to policy issues (Mason 2014).
But what drives partisanship? Is it influenced by mass demands, or is the supply of elite
cues to blame? Although the literature tends to support both possibilities, the latter carries more
weight. Still others point to party activists for wielding particular influence, while some theorize
that crises stimulate both political and social polarization (see, e.g., della Porta 2017; McCoy,
Rahman, and Somer 2018). Based on ANES data, ascent of highly partisan, ideological leaders
and members of Congress may explain increased partisanship in voting behavior (Bartels 2000;
Goren 2006; Hetherington 2001). Such findings suggest partisan influence is directional, from
elites to masses. The political elites may, in other words, “activate latent partisan biases in the
minds of citizens, which in turn subtly affect their core political values,” based on models of
attitude stability and constraints on various political issues (Goren 2005, 894). In fact, recent
statements made by the then President Donald Trump allowed for tests of elite cues against
survey respondents. An experiment found that party loyalists are more likely to accept Trump’s
cues regardless of liberal or conservative leaning in messages (Barber and Pope 2019). This
pattern held for even self-described conservative voters, and this supports an elites-to-masses
causal lens for partisan influence (Barber and Pope 2019). Other research applying cross-national
and longitudinal survey data linked party polarization as a causal factor in increased partisanship
among the American masses. As citizens perceive parties more polarized, voters are more likely
to act as partisans (Lupu 2014). From the extensive survey of literature on partisanship already
mentioned, the broad picture of supply/demand in partisanship is that elites versus mass party
polarization is very much like a chicken-and-egg scenario about what first emerges in politics
(Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006). The paper ultimately concludes a middle way that the
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relationship is interactive, though more likely an elite-driven phenomenon since elites have
preceded mass polarization (Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006). The authors nevertheless
argue that party activists may fuel polarization given slanted participation in presidential
nominating processes after reforms allowed for more open selection of candidates. Party activists
are more ideologically extreme than the masses, and least likely to compromise; they are
“opinion leaders of their communities, shaping the electorate’s perception of the parties’ policy
positions” (Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006, 97). However, subsequent analysis of ANES
data tested such claims, finding vast partisan divisions between the outlooks of Democrats and
Republican voters in so-called red and blue states, and religious and secular voters across a large
segment of the American public—in other words, not only a small minority of activists
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Additional survey experiments provide further evidence that
party polarization is influencing decision-making among the masses, even boosting confidence in
political views untethered to substantive information by stimulating “partisan motivated
reasoning” (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013, 57).
More recently, the question of a directional relationship in partisanship between elites
and masses has turned to comparative country cases. In a single-country case study of Hungary,
drawing from a broad range of sources, it is mainly the elites fueling divisions between two poles
with little middle ground. Elite political rhetoric has been antagonistic and along mostly party
lines (Vegetti 2018). Likewise, a comparative study of Hungary, US, Turkey, and Venezuela
finds that the role of elites is critical because they construct and intensify existing cleavages or
resentments through political messaging (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). The divisive
strategy advances political causes by mobilizing masses in ‘us versus them’ terms (McCoy,
Rahman, and Somer 2018). In addition, a case study of Poland underscores the importance of
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elite cues on the question of democratic backsliding caused by polarization. The lack of any
strong underlying cleavages in the Polish case offers support to the argument that the extreme
party polarization was largely top-down from elite cues and political messaging, as opposed to
bottom-up from mass demands (Tworzecki 2018).
Other perspectives from the literature suggest more to the relationship of partisanship and
outlook than an interactive and influential relationship between elites and masses. As an alternate
perspective, from an analysis of ANES data, an important theoretical distinction is partisanship
as a social and psychological identity (Mason 2014). Rooted in this frame are characteristics of
partisan influence such as in-group bias and reactions to party threats with strong emotions. In
other words, partisans have greater likelihood to participate in politics and act especially on the
party’s behalf when identification is strong (Mason 2014). Moreover, earlier analysis of ANES
data lends support to this view of partisanship on identity lines to the extent that it is highly
stable and influential in shaping American citizens’ values (Goren 2005). This aspect of partisan
influence resonates to Michael Barber and Jeremy Pope’s (2019) work on links in partisanship
and liberal versus conservative ideology in an experimental survey of respondents against
Trump’s political statements. For example, group loyalty to the party leader’s cues trumped
ideology to shape the opinions of respondents (Barber and Pope 2019). In brief, partisanship is a
matter of identification, affiliation, attachment, or loyalty to a political party. The literature
supports an interactive relationship in partisan influence between elites and masses, though topdown cues and messaging from elites seems to carry the most weight versus mass demands in
driving partisanship and extreme cases of polarization. As a further matter, partisanship as a
political identity is a crucial motivator in political outlook and behavior of masses. Elites can use
partisan influence for purposes of mobilization around their political cause.
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Partisan Dynamics
As partisanship increasingly influences American elites and voters, the various dynamics
of the recent period are more salient in the literature. How are things polarized, and what are the
implications? To be sure, party polarization has existed in fact “on some set of issues for most of
[American] political history” (e.g., in the 1790s between Federalists and JeffersonianRepublicans over tariffs, a national bank, federal versus state and citizen power; in the 1830s and
1840s between Whigs and Democrats comparable to the 1790s; between Democrats and
Republicans over slavery in the 1850s, agrarian and currency in the 1890s, social welfare
programs around the New Deal in the 1930s, and over civil rights in the 1960s) (Layman,
Carsey, and Horowitz 2006, 85). Yet this history contrasts in ways with recent polarization, as
“party conflict has extended [emphasis added] from older issues to newer issues,” instead of
displacing interparty conflicts with new ones (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006, 87). In other
words, the idea of ‘conflict extension’ describes recent polarization similar to what Lilliana
Mason (2014) expounds as partisan-ideological sorting of the American electorate. According to
Mason’s (2014) later survey analysis, this trend has continued as mass partisan and political
identity alignment strengthens. Thus, the parties and their supporters are becoming more
polarized over the last few decades. Republicans are trending more conservative, and Democrats
are trending more liberal (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006).
Since the 1970s, divisions between the two major parties in American politics are
extending from former economic and social welfare agendas into issues around culture, religion
versus secularism, and moral issues like abortion and gay rights (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
2006). Scholars have offered that Southern realignment after collapse of electoral support for the
old Democratic party in the region may have sharply distinguished the two parties (see, e.g.,
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Bartels 2000). Others similarly found party realignment attributable to changes in civil rights and
racial equality, as white southerners fled the Democratic party, and African American voters
mostly coalesced behind it (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Until such political identity
alignment and partisan-ideological sorting over the last few decades, issues around race and
culture were more likely to inflame conflicts within parties (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
2006). Now, scholars contend they are tinder for fiery political conflicts between parties in a
polarized dynamic (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; see
also, e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). For example, a study using ANES survey data after the
2016 presidential election found that Trump’s campaign messaging around racial and ethnic
resentment aided his victory with support of white working-class voters, albeit deterring support
from college-educated white voters and most non-white voters (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018).
In a similar study albeit contrasting results, Christian nationalism was statistically significant and
highly predictive of voting for Trump in the 2016 presidential election (Whitehead, Perry, and
Baker 2018). For controls, the same study found no significant association between voting for
Trump and views on economic satisfaction, illegal immigrants, sexism, and racial prejudice.
Each study alludes to the salience of cultural, racial, and moral issues in contemporary American
politics.
Moreover, comparative research into democratic dysfunction and decline found parallels
of extreme polarization for the US and cases of Venezuela, Turkey, and Hungary. Each of the
cases shares similarities to “increasing polarization in American society around economic, racial,
and ethnic grievances” (Kaufman and Haggard 2019). The voters attracted to populist appeals in
all four countries share economic grievances that hinge on the impacts of globalization like wage
stagnation, increasing inequality, and specific crises like the Great Recession (Kaufman and
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Haggard 2019). For American politics particularly, characteristics of party realignment and
polarization are “intimately tied to identity politics” in ways that resemble polarization in at least
two out of the three other cases (Kaufman and Haggard 2019). For example, the authors point to
US cleavages on cultural-identity lines between the two major parties over the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s as well as issues like affirmative action, welfare, and immigration
policy, which all have “deep racial, ethnic, and cultural overtones” rooted in American history
(Kaufman and Haggard 2019). In parallel to the polarizing leadership of Donald Trump in the
US, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Viktor Orbán in Hungary each mobilized mass racial
and ethnic resentments with their top-down messaging and through the demonization of
minorities (Kaufman and Haggard 2019). By contrast in Venezuela, Chavez rose to power on
populist political appeals from the left by demonizing the ‘neoliberal’ elites, not unlike Trump’s
‘drain the swamp’ rhetoric during his 2016 presidential campaign (Kaufman and Haggard 2019).
Increasingly, it seems scholars studying the US case in partisanship are either assuming or
arriving at ideological, racial, and cultural divisions at the root of its extremes in recent decades
(see, e.g., Abramowitz and McCoy 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Indeed, the US case of
polarization may extend “beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and
culture” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 9).
The literature has started to flesh out a rift dynamic of polarization for the US as well as
elsewhere around the world. In a theory-building study involving four case studies in subSaharan Africa, Adrienne LeBas (2018) stresses party polarization as “realignment around a
single social boundary” splitting into two poles capable of strengthening intraparty or group
solidarity (LeBas 2018). This theoretical exercise leans heavily on the concept of ‘pernicious
polarization’ scholars are developing in regards to severe cases of political polarization. This
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kind of polarization is not necessarily between ideological distance of political parties and
candidates. Rather, these severe cases of polarization feature politicized identities and interests
aligning to create a mutually exclusive divide between groups, extending partisanship throughout
daily life and into social relations (McCoy and Somer 2019). Pernicious polarization can take on
different forms, which scholars have described in lucid terms:
The dividing line between the camps may be simply support of, or opposition to, a
personalistic political leader, such as pro- and anti-Trump in the United States, chavistas
and anti-chavistas (for and against former president Hugo Chávez) in Venezuela, or proand anti-Erdoğan people in Turkey. But that dividing line may also reflect competing
value systems (such as religious vs. secular), different visions of democracy (such as
representative vs. participatory), or different definitions of citizenship and what rights
should be afforded to immigrants. Group identity, which may act as a proxy or marker
for the other aggregated divisions, is the key, linking citizens to a particular leader or
partisan identity [emphasis added] (McCoy and Somer 2019, 236).
In other words, Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006) earlier reflected on whether longstanding
differences between subgroups in the US population were becoming more relevant, and possibly
damaging to political and cultural consensus. The ‘pernicious polarization’ as McCoy and Somer
(2019) have described above, or the ‘extreme partisan polarization’ as told by Levitsky and
Ziblatt (2018), each resonate with that earlier discussion. Extreme partisanship can develop into
mutual distrust aligning on two political poles in ‘us’ and ‘them’ terms (McCoy and Somer 2019;
McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). It is a political rift dynamic to the extent that political rivals
may no longer accept the other as legitimate (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Some cases may be
riper for development of such ‘pernicious’ rifts in polities where there are “unresolved historical
debates over what constitutes the core component of national identity or the basis of citizenship
rights” (McCoy and Somer 2019, 264). These cases involving a ‘formative rift’ may be “more
enduring and pernicious…precisely because they involve state identity and belonging,” thereby
making for intergroup disputes that are more difficult to resolve (McCoy and Somer 2019, 264).
The authors ascribe this rift characterization of severe polarization extended to identity and
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belonging in the state as likely for contemporary cases in Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Turkey, South
Africa, and the US (McCoy and Somer 2019). A comparable study recognized cleavages on
binaries of “globalist/cosmopolitan versus nationalist; religious versus secular; urban versus
rural; traditional versus modern cultural values; and participatory versus representative
democratic models” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 20). The contemporary polarizing
rhetoric as an electoral strategy is also increasingly populist in contrasting “the people versus
elites,” and accusing the latter of “frustrating” the interests of a collective identity of the people
(McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 20). I have so far explored the influence and dynamics of
partisanship in the literature, which increasingly refers to its important implications. I now turn
to the latter.
Possible Positive or Negative Implications of Partisanship
Certain aspects of partisanship may be beneficial or concerning. While more recent
literature may emphasize the latter, there are a few common and positive reservations about
partisanship. In any event, implications typically correspond to influence on democratic
governance. Some earlier hints gave ways for looking ahead, often in summary discussions on
growing partisan influence among elites or masses in American politics. For example,
Hetherington (2001) suggested a resurgence of partisanship might prove as beneficial if,
following earlier theories of democracy and parliamentary systems, voters perceive parties to
represent distinct ideologies that allow for simple rationale in the selection of candidates for
election. By contrast, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) suggested the possibility for political
divisiveness due to increasing ideological polarization between Democrats and Republicans in
the American political context. These seemingly incompatible ideas are clues to the range of
potential implications for the issue, as assessments in the literature are now more developed.
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To start, the beneficial aspects of partisanship are generally democracy-enhancing. It may
be fruitful for democratic governance, as supported largely in quantitative analyses of American
elections and survey data. For the masses, as hinted above, party polarization may improve
representation in the political process by clarifying differences between political parties for
voters to choose from candidates prudently as partisans (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus
2013; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Lupu 2014). Partisan candidates may more likely
reflect the views of their constituents and vice versa. As majorities in government, partisans
might also behave more coherently and unified to pursue policy agendas on which they have
campaigned (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). A flipside is that mass partisanship makes
for more ideological behavior to the effect of less frequent ticket splitting among voters
(Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Characteristic of such party-line voting behavior is a
greater likelihood for masses to turn out at elections as partisans (Bartels 2000; Lupu 2014). In
contrast, nonvoters are less likely to identify with either party (Bartels 2000). A stronger partisan
identity may also generate more political activism (Mason 2014). Since partisans have in-group
bias, strong party identity boosts the chances for political participation while acting on behalf of
the party (Mason 2014). Similarly, as partisans, voter choices may be more ideologically
coherent. A possible upside is that low-information voters in these conditions may follow the
lead of high-information voters based on partisan cues, thus making for more informed electoral
decisions (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). For developing democracies, party
polarization and mass partisanship may enhance electoral stability (Lupu 2014). The
institutionalization of party systems that comes with polarization may allow for more stable
elections and consolidation of new democracies by driving voter turnout and influencing mass
party loyalty (Lupu 2014).
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Potential advantages of partisan politics and polarization are likewise evident in crossnational survey data and comparative case studies. In fact, democracies around the world remain
lively in terms of political participation. Widescale voter turnout and party membership are each
trending upward, despite indicators of disillusionment with traditional parties and formal
political institutions as supported by data collected in the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer,
Latinobarómetro, and Afrobarometer (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Voter engagement
and political activism are up in countries around the world (The Economist Intelligence Unit
2019). As for the US in particular, indeed a longstanding democracy, the increasing political
polarization has coincided with historic levels of voter turnout and activism. The 2008, 2016, and
2020 presidential elections were highpoints for turnout over the last century of American
politics, and most recently just shy of the previous highpoint among the voting age population
that turned out in 1960. Moreover, the day after Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, after
sending shockwaves around the world with his surprise electoral defeat of Hillary Clinton in
2016 presidential elections, a sort of “counterinauguration” organized hundreds of thousands to
the Women’s March on Washington (Hartocollis and Alcindor 2017). A historic turnout, the
opposition demonstrators in the US as well as in parallel around the world united in opposition to
Trump, around issues like reproduction, immigration, and civil rights. By contrast, roughly eight
years earlier, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as the first biracial president sparked “a
counter-mobilization of White, conservative, and evangelical voters in the Tea Party,” a
movement against government spending in distributive programs (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer
2018, 30). Each of these distinct and mostly partisan (see, e.g., Bayagich 2017, in case of the
former, and Abramowitz 2011, in case of the latter) mass mobilizations in American politics
resonates to the turnout and participatory dynamics of increased polarization. In fact, the

22

increased civic engagement in recent years around issues like women’s rights, immigration, and
mass shootings improved democracy indicators for the US on freedom of assembly (Freedom
House 2019a).
Polarized politics may also have beneficial institution-building effects (LeBas 2018) or
impact that could lead to democratic reforms (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Of new
democracies, two case studies in sub-Saharan Africa show possible democracy-enhancing
aspects of party as well as general political polarization. From these developing democracies,
LeBas (2018) identifies that checks and balances emerge from tensions and conflicts of
polarization that can potentially reinforce the political accountability of those in power. In
addition, sustained polarization may produce incentives for political elites to improve structures
in the political system and mobilize their bases to turn out at elections, i.e., strengthening party
organizations and democratic participation (LeBas 2018). For example, polarization in Burkina
Faso drew lines between the government and anti-government blocs, absent any ‘formative rift’
around identity and belonging as earlier described of potentially augmenting dynamics of severe
partisanship. Peak polarization opened the door for democracy in 2014, when hundreds of
thousands of protesters took to the streets against President Blaise Compaoré after he tried to
remove constitutional term limits to secure power. This opposition led to his exile in an effective
check on political power (LeBas 2018). A similar incident occurred in 2015 elections when
protesters organized against a Compaoré loyalist guard’s coup attempt. The political polarization
was democracy-enhancing to the effect that it twice mobilized a strong opposition that held
political power to account. In Ghana, party polarization served to strengthen and institutionalize
the country’s two-party system (LeBas 2018). President Jerry Rawlings was first to win elections
at Ghana’s founding in 1992. However, he had earlier seized power twice in military coups.
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When he won elections in 1992, an opposition party coalesced and grew enough strength to win
48% of the presidential vote by 2000. The opposition then split the parliamentary vote with the
ruling party. Elections since have all been highly competitive between the two major parties,
thrice turning over power (Le Bas 2018). These accounts compare well to cross-national panel
data supporting ideological polarization as predictive of corruption perceptions (Brown,
Touchton, and Whitford 2011). The dynamics of political polarization may control corruption
through legislative and executive oversights and forced political compromise (Brown, Touch,
and Whitford 2011).
Negative implications of partisanship, on the other hand, may stem from the fact that
“issues at the heart of partisan change are those on which people are least likely to change their
minds” (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006, 92). The concerning aspects of partisanship tend
to be debilitative effects on democratic regimes. Media narratives and some political leaders in
the 21st century have certainly portrayed increasing party polarization in the US as harmful in
terms of American democracy. For example, the Washington Post earlier worried over gridlock
in Congress as well as citizens’ alienation from government (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
2006). The 2004 GOP chairman viewed party polarization as deleterious for political balance and
foreboded stalemate in policymaking (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Studies tend to
support these depictions of contemporary American politics. Lupu (2014) points to various
research linking American party polarization to legislative gridlock, elite incivility, income
inequality, and disengagement from politics, plus democratic breakdown, corruption, and
economic decline in other countries. Political cleavages between major factions may produce
policy volatility and harm economies, such as the case of ex-communists and anti-communists in
the post-communist world with divergent views on economic structure (Frye 2002).

24

With increasing alignment of partisan-ideological identities, Mason (2014) suggests the
possibility for major political changes. Political thought, behavior, and emotions may become
untethered from policy preferences, steering away from democratic ideals. Settling a score or
redressing grievances on partisan bases could drive politics (Mason 2014). Party polarization
increasingly drawn on identity bases may produce more activism, but it might also encourage
biases and anger, just as survey data suggests voters remain relatively close on policy issues
(Mason 2014). In other words, motivated reasoning from stronger partisan identities may
influence less informed, more dogmatic political opinions to the extent of “extreme inflexibility
and intolerance,” irrespective of the strength of arguments (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus
2013, 75). A recent study involves two experimental methods, including a natural experiment in
Montana’s 2017 special election for US House of Representatives. The results bode poorly for
US democracy under increasing party polarization by exposing that only a subset of Americans
prioritize democratic principles in electoral decision-making (Graham and Svolik 2020).
Americans may be willing to tradeoff democratic ideals for considerations of partisan loyalty,
political ideology, and policy preferences (Graham and Svolik 2020). In the US, Levitsky and
Ziblatt (2018) have similarly labelled a key challenge of extreme partisan polarization as erosion
of the unwritten democratic norm of “mutual toleration” in rejection of political opponents as
legitimate rivals. These accounts underpin possible ‘pernicious’ dynamics of partisanship and
political polarization at extremes and its important implications for democratic governance.
Notably, polarization may be more concerning where there exists a ‘formative rift’
dynamic of partisanship in mutually exclusive narratives of citizenship and group belonging
(LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). The trouble in political bargaining under such dynamics
exacerbates the difficulties to resolve conflicts, particularly involving exclusionary notions of
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citizenship (LeBas 2018). Each building on similar ideas, LeBas (2018) and McCoy and Somer
(2019) arrive at slightly different viewpoints for how historical identity cleavages might affect
the implications of severe partisan polarization. The former distinctly argues that preexistence of
identity-oriented rifts involving exclusion or inequality of rights for citizens makes it more likely
for political polarization to result in large-scale violence and democratic breakdown (LeBas
2018). As a further matter, presence of a substantial power imbalance between poles may raise
chances that polarization is short-lived, concluding with the preservation of those in power if not
permanent exclusion of opposition or marginalized groups (LeBas 2018). If neither a preexisting
identity cleavage nor power imbalance are present in polarized conditions, LeBas (2018) posits
that such dynamics may have the reverse effect of institution-building, accommodation, and
compromise for new democracies in reform (e.g., Burkina Faso and Ghana as discussed).
McCoy and Somer (2019) differ from LeBas (2018) in the way they find the ‘formative
rift’ dynamic of polarization as not necessarily to blame, even if the preexistence of such identity
cleavages may influence longer term costs of severe political divisions. They argue that
polarization arises as a consequence of political entrepreneurs making polarizing political
appeals in pursuit of their political objectives (McCoy and Somer 2019). Specifically, they
identify that concerning implications of polarization stem from the use of divisive, demonizing,
and exploitative appeals to existing popular grievances as a basis for political mobilization. In
turn, ‘pernicious polarization’ arises when elite political opponents either reciprocate using
similar strategies or fail to neutralize polarizing messages (McCoy and Somer 2019). Like LeBas
(2018), they contend that negative implications of polarized blocs worsen in a power imbalance,
which increases the possibility for democratic erosion (McCoy and Somer 2019). Moreover,
polarizing parties’ use of harsh rhetoric may delegitimize opponents in addition to the political
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system, even if real policy differences between parties are minimal (McCoy and Somer 2019).
The polarizing rhetoric may amplify prevalence of disinformation and high levels of confidence
among the masses in unsubstantiated opinions (McCoy and Somer 2019). In matters of political
outlook, McCoy and Somer (2019) imagine that gradual democratic erosion is a more likely
consequence of political polarization than violence or democratic breakdown. Because intense
party attachments can be uncompromising and encourage political extremism rather than
deliberation, polarized settings that influence strong partisan identities have potential to weaken
democratic institutions (Lupu 2014). Elite cues may thus drive partisanship and its consequences.
Several case studies shed additional light on severely polarized politics. It is often in
these extremes where partisanship may be most concerning from the standpoint of democratic
ideals in governance as well as general political stability. Foremost for this study is the case of
US democracy, which the 2019 Freedom House report on democracies around the world found
straining in ways starting before Donald Trump’s 2016 election to the presidency. Indeed,
growing political polarization, including partisan media increasingly displacing fact-based
reporting, plus eminence of special interests in American politics in contrast to low economic
mobility are all factors “afflicting the health of American democracy well before [Trump’s
inauguration]” (Freedom House 2019a,17). Surveillance programs that began under George W.
Bush continuing into the Obama administration and crackdown on press leaks for the latter are
two prime examples of a longer trend (Freedom House 2019a). However, under President Trump
essential democratic institutions such as “separation of powers, a free press, an independent
judiciary, the impartial delivery of justice, safeguards against corruption, and most disturbingly,
the legitimacy of elections” are under duress (Freedom House 2019a, 17). Though the US
remains in the ‘Free’ category on aggregate for the 100-point scale Freedom in the World report,
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measurable decline in political rights and civil liberties is clear from about 2010, beginning
before Trump (Freedom House 2019a). The score for equal treatment before law particularly
worsened under Trump’s leadership, given the administration’s improper restrictions on rights of
asylum seekers, discrimination in refugee resettlement policies, and harsh immigration
enforcements like separation of immigrant children from families (Freedom House 2019a).
Longer term, general democratic dysfunction and electoral manipulation, such as partisan
gerrymandering, are among other concerns for American democracy (Freedom House 2019a).
Further democracy indicators on societal-level polarization and respect in public deliberations,
too, show notable declines for the US in recent years (V-Dem Institute 2019). These features
may be part of a larger trend. For about a decade, polarization indicators show growing intensity
in 33 countries around the world, in conjunction with a rising trend of political parties in at least
30 countries deploying hate speech targeting specific groups (V-Dem Institute 2019). For the
US, Trump may have worsened preexisting polarization through his “attempts to undermine the
legitimacy of elections [most notably in claims of rigging and refusal to accept results of his loss
as legitimate in the 2020 elections], repeated calls that all media are the enemy of the people, and
vilification of political opponents” (V-Dem Institute 2019, 20).
The impact on democratic institutions under intense polarization and leaders like Trump
greatly depends on whether elite party members defend democracy or act as loyal partisans. If
loyalists publicly defend controversial behavior or otherwise continue to show passive support
for the executive through congressional inaction and votes on party lines, there is potential for
institutional erosion (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Another key factor is public support, which, if
high, could blunt critics and make judges loath to rule against the government, as political rivals
worry about staking an unpopular position (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Lastly, a major security
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crisis may embolden a political entrepreneur like Trump by relaxing institutional constraints
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Yet, even with the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly a historic crisis,
there was no such power grab under Trump and loyalist Republicans (in contrast, see, e.g.,
Gebrekidan 2020). Trump’s norm breaking may nevertheless contribute to gradual democratic
erosion (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), a case in point echoing theories on the negative implications
under severe dynamics of partisanship. The fact that the Republican party mostly tolerated
Trump’s deviance spills into the Republican electorate and influences mass attitudes determining
what is politically acceptable (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Partisan loyalties from elites to the
masses may have enabled political leadership under Trump to push against the boundaries of
American democratic norms.
Polarization in the US “feeds off a formative rift” around questions of citizenship and
enjoyment of rights dating back to American origins (e.g., African slavery, Native Americans,
women, race, religion, birthright and naturalized citizenship) (McCoy and Somer 2019, 240).
Rival narratives of belonging in American politics once led to the Civil War as well as continued
legal and informal discrimination up through the 1964 Civil Rights Act, then “repolarization”
near the end of the 20th century and aggravating under Obama and Trump administrations
(McCoy and Somer 2019, 239). Besides frequently anti-establishment, Trump’s rhetoric and
actions on the campaign trail and as president have certainly been polarizing. His political
appeals have drawn lines between ‘us,’ in terms of a romanticized past of American industry tied
to upward mobility and traditional cultural predominance, and ‘them,’ as immigrants, minorities,
and elites together thwarting American greatness (McCoy and Somer 2019). From Obama’s
second-term election through the end of Trump’s first and only term as a political outsider,
research has found racial resentment, ethno-nationalism, and prejudice play a large role in voting
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behavior of white Americans (McCoy and Somer 2019). Moreover, the Trump administration
made frequent policy directives by executive order to dismantle Obama administration policies
enacted under the same authority meant to protect sexual and gender minorities against
discrimination (Freedom House 2019a). The Trump administration similarly responded to the
Obama tenure using executive authority to act on immigration policy, sometimes in ways plainly
discriminatory, in blunt partisan reversal from his predecessor (Freedom House 2019a).
Another longstanding democracy may be experiencing similar dynamics over Brexit
stemming from 2016 referendum results against European Union (EU) membership (Hobolt,
Leeper, and Tilley 2020; McCoy and Somer 2019). Though political polarization in the United
Kingdom (UK) does not appear to fall on party lines, the case is informative. Instead, group
identification and mass polarization may be emerging on the basis of opinion among voters who
identify with either side of the consequential vote for the UK to remain or leave the EU (Hobolt,
Leeper, and Tilley 2020). Survey analysis with over a million respondents, using mostly YouGov
data, supports the notion of political identities arising out of the Brexit vote (Hobolt, Leeper, and
Tilley 2020). The results suggest more people in Britain are claiming an identity of Leaver or
Remainer on the Brexit question than identifying as either Conservative or Labour members
(Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020). As a novel phenomenon, attachment to Brexit identity in a
polarized dynamic may indicate a similar ‘formative rift’ (McCoy and Somer 2019), or notions
of belonging in the ‘nation’ or British community along an “underlying fault line between social
liberals with weak national identities…and social conservatives with stronger national identities”
in Britain (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020, 9). Age and education have been main predictors for
either side of this UK rift, with younger and more educated voters likely to identify as Brexit
Leavers compared with older and less educated Britons likely to identify as Remainers (Hobolt,
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Leeper, and Tilley 2020). Similar to party attachment and polarization in the US, the salience of
Brexit ‘leave’ versus ‘remain’ identity tends to cross-cut into social life. For example, Remainers
and Leavers are each more likely to show bias in preference for their in-groups in choice of
public leaders, even for non-partisan matters, as well as social settings like marriage and talking
politics (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020). Severe polarization may not be a strictly partisan
phenomenon, though the US and UK cases are similar in that they point to underlying rival
narratives of belonging for matters formulating political as well as social identities. In case of
Brexit, issue attachment has, for now, beaten partisan identities in a tense political polarization
that “has still not been fully subsumed into normal lines of party competition” (Hobolt, Leeper,
and Tilley 2020, 15). In contrast for the US, party attachment and group narratives of citizenship
and belonging tend to go hand in hand.
Nevertheless, comparative survey data from 20 western democracies on ‘affective’
polarization, or mass-level hostility across party lines, suggests things in the US may not be so
intense after all. In comparative perspective, surveys on positive or negative feelings of
respondents towards political parties in their country finds the US as relatively middle ground in
terms of hostility against rivals among the masses (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2019). The
country registering highest for affective polarization in the study was Switzerland. Interestingly,
their most influential political party, the Swiss People’s party, is similar to right-wing American
politics under Trump’s party leadership insofar as opposition to mass immigration and support
for other populist right issues. The multiparty parliamentary system in Switzerland compared
with the American two-party system may contribute to the differing reports of affective
polarization as negative sentiments towards radical right-wing parties in the former averages
more intense than other political opponents (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2019). Fearing loss of

31

national or local identity and thus sense of control in an era of globalization—including ascent of
transnational political and economic institutions, mass mobility and migrations, multicultural
proliferation, and newly transnational ‘communities’ developing over the internet—may be
influencing the salience of modern cultural nationalisms linked with traditional ethnic and
religious identities (Juergensmeyer 2018; see also the ‘cultural backlash’ thesis and evidence
from 31 European countries linking cultural values to rising support for populist parties in
Western societies, e.g., Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Kaufman and Haggard 2019).
As for newer and developing democracies, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Kenya are
two cases involving ‘pernicious’ polarization, where negative implications include the prospect
for hardened group divisions, absolutist politics, and violent scapegoating (LeBas 2018). Each of
these cases feature political appeals to group belonging or citizenship as key narratives driving
polarized politics. In Côte d’Ivoire, elites were largely responsible for shaping country divisions
along religious and regional lines in appeals to their constituencies for popular mobilization
purposes. Consequently, an ‘us versus them’ narrative against non-indigeneity led to regime
breakdown and violence, with civil war erupting 12 years after transition to multiparty rule in
1990 (LeBas 2018). A political ideology around belonging influenced doubts about loyalty to the
nation for citizens with non-native parents as well as Muslims (LeBas 2018). With new forms of
identity around which to mobilize, the 2000 and 2010 elections each produced violent clashes
and spread of civil war as “party competition centered entirely on the issue of Ivorian national
identity” (LeBas 2018, 68). By contrast, although the Kenyan case similarly involved political
appeals to indigeneity and belonging to the nation, its group conflict and ethnic salience
prevailed before polarization (LeBas 2018). Kenyan political elites began using exclusionary
rhetoric around ethnicity and violent displacement for political mobilization starting in the
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1990s. Their electoral strategy has influenced high ethnic segregation, mass voting chiefly along
ethnic lines, and widespread distrust between ethnic groups (LeBas 2018).
Still alternate theories on ‘pernicious’ aspects of polarization look to other case studies
for guidance on political implications. For example, in Poland, even absent any preexisting
identity cleavages, the Law and Justice Party reflected anti-establishment and populist sentiments
as it gained popular support to win elections before rewriting constitutional rules to the party’s
benefit (Tworzecki 2018). Hence, a second key challenge of severe party polarization against
underlying democratic norms according to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) is political restraint of
elected leaders from using temporary powers to maximize partisan advantage. In other examples,
a case study of Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela in comparison to US polarization finds elites
are central in constructing or intensifying existing cleavages in partisan extremes (McCoy,
Rahman, and Somer 2018). Often in times of economic or state crisis, the elites in these
countries have used divisive messages along mutually exclusive lines of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to
mobilize sectors of the population perceived as marginalized or disunited from the whole
(McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Under polarizing dynamics in Hungary, Turkey, and
Venezuela, new groups in power enacted measures to consolidate political control, including
constitutional changes, increasingly majoritarian electoral systems, and less constraints on
executive power through appointment of political or party loyalists (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer
2018). In all four cases, there has been backlash to new or previously marginalized groups
reaching political power (e.g., US election of Barack Obama and subsequent Tea Party
mobilization in opposition). Some strategies of political opposition include polarizing rhetoric,
mass protests, or even coup attempts in pursuit of power (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). In
rhetoric, the US case echoes counterparts in Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela insofar as Trump
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“evoked the same majoritarian contempt” through demonization of racial and ethnic minorities
as a key theme of his 2016 presidential campaign (Kaufman and Haggard 2019). Drawing from
these comparative cases, three potential trajectories for democracy under severe partisan
dynamics include: Gridlock and policy ‘careening’ from one party in power to another;
democratic erosion or collapse under new elites or dominant groups; and democratic erosion or
collapse under old elites or dominant groups (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). For the US,
however, support for Trump during his tenure remained relatively weak with robust opposition
(Kaufman and Haggard 2019). It nevertheless remains possible for extreme polarization to turn
gainful by way of democratic reforms (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018).
Democratic Function Against Extreme Partisanship
The problems of partisanship may be a factor in democratic deconsolidation. It is an
important issue concerning the function of democratic regimes. To that effect, this thesis
emphasizes one issue among many possibilities influencing apparent crises among democratic
regimes around the world. While democratic systems vary in concept and practice, there are
broad trends in the challenges facing democratic governance in conjunction with rising
authoritarianism, including even long-established regimes like the United States. Several
prominent annual reports on the state of democracy indicate a ‘reverse wave’ of democratization
may be ongoing over the last few decades (see, e.g., The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018; VDem Institute 2019; V-Dem Institute 2020; Freedom House 2019b; Freedom House 2020b).
Here, I explore democracy in concept to lay the groundwork for addressing dynamics of severe
partisanship that could be pernicious for democratic function of government. I explain the
present state of democracy in nation-states throughout the world for context, drawing from
literature including annual democracy reports showing a historically recent rise of ‘illiberal’
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democracies, hybrid regimes, or electoral authoritarianism. Scholars identify several factors in
undemocratic trends, from economic grievances to cultural backlash fueling electoral change. To
situate my analysis of Democratic and Republican party platforms as a test of partisan-identity
polarization in American politics from 1980-2016, I underscore possible concerns for democratic
regimes mired in socio-political divisions hardening on identity lines.
Systems of Democracy in the Third Reverse Wave
The concept of democracy and context within which it resides as a state system are
essential groundwork for any analysis dealing with deconsolidation. More countries than any
time in history now hold elections but tend to have defects including poor representation of
citizens’ interest in governance, low political participation other than casting a ballot, abuse of
laws and powers by public officials, shaky legitimacy of elections, low public confidence in
government, or poor performance of state institutions (Carothers 2002). These problems in
democratic governance allude to the current period some label a ‘third wave’ of autocratization
(see, e.g., Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; V-Dem Institute 2020) or, inversely, a ‘third reverse
wave’ of democracy (see, e.g., Huntington 1991).
Free and fair elections are often a bare minimum for democratic systems (see, e.g.,
Carothers 2002; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Cheeseman and Klaas 2018; Collier and Levitsky
1997; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018; Freedom House 2020; Huntington 1991; Linz and
Stepan 1996; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; Schmitter and Karl 1991; V-Dem Institute 2019).
Yet as scholars have observed in recent decades, with the rise of so-called pseudo-democracies,
hybrid, illiberal, or competitive/electoral authoritarian regimes, holding elections is insufficient
alone to distinguish a democracy from autocratic regimes or grey area in between (see, e.g.,
Bogaards 2009; Cassani 2014; Cheeseman and Klaas 2018; Diamond 2002; Mietzner 2018;
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Levitsky and Way 2010; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; Waldner and Lust 2018). As a start,
citizens in a democracy hold rulers accountable for their actions and channel interests in
competitive, regular, and fair elections (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Fairness of elections means
they are equal and open for matters of competition between political parties, without government
restrictions or harassment of opposition groups (Huntington 1991). These features are part of
notable requisites in Robert Dahl’s seven procedural democratic conditions, including (1) elected
officials controlling government and policy; (2) frequent, free and fair elections without
coercion; (3) virtually universal adult suffrage; (4) virtually universal eligibility among adults to
run for elected office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) freedom to seek alternative information;
and (7) freedom of association (Schmitter and Karl 1991; see also, e.g., Luhrman and Lindberg
2019). Two supplemental criteria are (i) elected leaders must not be subject to overriding vetoes
from unelected officials and (ii) the regime is self-governing without external constraints such as
from another political system (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Others specify fully contested elections
without fraud, held under universal suffrage and with guaranteed civil liberties like free speech,
assembly, and association (Collier and Levitsky 1997). In other words, it requires “free elections,
broad protection of civil liberties, and a reasonably level playing field” to distinguish it from an
authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2010, 7). As focal points in recent literature relative to
‘crisis’ in democratic systems of governance, some simply refer to regime types like liberal
(Hobson 2018) or representative (Ercan and Gagnon 2014) democracies. Others differentiate
functioning democracy from hybrid regimes as satisfying key criteria of freedom, equality, and
checks on political power (Bogaards 2009). A fully authoritarian regime characteristically holds
no elections whatsoever. Some regimes falling short of functioning democracy might administer
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elections but have severe-to-moderate constraints on political rights and civil liberties or rigging
in contested albeit unfair and undemocratic electoral competition (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018).
Democracy functions by societal and political consensus. It operates in principle on the
consent of the people and “contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded
uncertainty” in elections (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 10). Key to democracy is that representatives
informally agree that those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy
will not use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting
influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity to keep competing for
power and place, momentary losers will respect the winners’ right to make binding
decision (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 10).
Political elites, in other words, must “believe, at a minimum, that democracy is the least bad
form of government for their societies and themselves” (Huntington 1991, 33-4). This means not
sacrificing democratic consensus in society and politics for partisan gain. Citizens are likewise
informally bound in a democratic system to accept results of an election, assuming all is fair
(Schmitter and Karl 1991). In this sense, democratic practice is rooted in political culture (The
Economist 2014). Of the US case lately in particular under the Trump administration, Levitsky
and Ziblatt (2018, 147) underscore two foundational norms of democracy in American society
they say are “unraveling,” which I elaborate in factors below. As a matter of functioning
democracy, (i) mutual toleration of political rivals and (ii) institutional restraint from using
temporary powers to maximize partisan gain are vital norms and reinforcers of democratic
governance (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). A democracy is hard work that requires “negotiation,
compromise, and concessions,” where “setbacks [are] inevitable, victories always partial”
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 77). Limits in power may cause frustrations but underlie the political
culture and consensus of stable democracies (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). A consolidation or full
democratic transition is thus satisfactory agreement over political procedures and nature of
democracy for free and popularly elected government to determine state policies, without which
37

breakdowns are possible (Linz and Stepan 1996). If functioning properly, the system is routine;
internal to the social, institutional, and psychological life of its citizens in a shared identity with
the state (Linz and Stepan 1996). In short, democracy is not only institutional insofar as central
tenets of a political system in protection of political rights, but attitudinal and behavioral among
actors within the polity to believe in the system (Linz and Stepan 1996). Weak commitment to its
values and practices in leadership can be a “serious impediment” (Huntington 1991, 22).
However, democracy varies in practice and over time (Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Linz and
Stepan 1996; Schmitter and Karl 1991). Samuel Huntington (1991) identified three periods of
democratization and two reversals from roughly 1820-1990. He highlights in the first period or
‘wave’ an expansion of suffrage for much of the American male population. The total number of
democracies over a stretch of regime transitions first peaked in 1926 (Huntington 1991). After a
trend of decline, a second wave of democratization reached its high in 1962 with a total of 36
democracies, followed again with a second trend of decline until around 1975 (Huntington
1991). At the time of writing, he was within an upswing period of democratic transitions or a
“third wave of democratization in the history of the modern world” and briefly mused a
subsequent reverse trend to come (Huntington 1991, 12). Huntington’s (1991) analysis is a
minimalist conception of democracy, primarily concerning equal and open electoral competition
without restrictions on opposition groups.
Other measures allow a more robust view of the ‘third reverse wave’ period. For
example, the Freedom House Freedom in the World annual report evaluates countries and
territories of the world on political rights and civil liberties. They distinguish “electoral
democracy” from “liberal democracy” as the former reflects minimum standards while the latter
signifies higher scores on a range of criteria-based questions on democratic ideals (Freedom
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House 2021). The indicator also assigns free, partly free, or not free status to regimes, covering a
breadth of regime characteristics. It accounts for electoral processes (i.e., free and fair elections);
political pluralism and participation (i.e., rights to organize in political parties or other coalitions,
free of undue obstacles in political competition or external influence, and full political rights for
all groups within the population); function of government (i.e., elected representatives determine
policies, safeguards against corruption, and openness and transparency); and political rights (i.e.,
civil liberties, association and organization, rule of law, and individual rights and personal
autonomy). Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) likewise offers a rich indicator on the yearly state
of democracy worldwide. Their approach emphasizes political liberalism foundations in
“Enlightenment principles of rights, reason, and tolerance,” which have “led the world from
societies governed by repression and prejudice to open societies based on merit and freedom”
(V-Dem Institute 2020, 4). The Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) operationalizes these values by
measuring democracy using more than 3,000 world country-experts’ combined judgements.
Liberal and electoral components comprise the LDI in 71 total indicators assessing regime traits
(V-Dem Institute 2020). Like the Freedom in the World indicator, it differentiates electoral
components as a base level of democratic features in free and fair elections, including freedoms
of association and expression, clean elections, suffrage, and an elected government. The liberal
components of the LDI also extend democratic components to capture checks on political power
like guaranteed individual liberties, equality before law, and institutional checks and balances
(V-Dem Institute 2020). Together they reveal degree shifts in regime traits on a sliding scale
from closed or electoral autocracies to electoral or liberal democracies (V-Dem Institute 2020).
Accordingly, Huntington’s (1991) earlier musing on a ‘third reverse wave’ now seems
prescient. The V-Dem Institute (2019) annual reporting identified an ongoing ‘third wave of
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autocratization’ after 2018, as democratic regime traits in the LDI declined in 24 countries. Over
the next year, there were “intensifying” trends with deterioration of liberal democratic
institutions in 26 nation-state systems (V-Dem Institute 2020, 4). Since 2001, autocratic regimes
now surpass democracies over a majority of state systems around the world (V-Dem Institute
2020). Attacks on freedom of expression and media in 31 countries, the decline of clean
elections in 16 countries, and repression of civil society including censorship in 37 countries are
all trending signs of democratic regime deterioration. In addition, civil society indicators reflect
13% average decline in academic freedom and 14% average decline in rights to peaceful
assembly and protest over the last 10 years among de-democratizing trends. They recently report
‘toxic polarization,’ ‘pro-autocracy’ protests, and political violence as growing threats to
democracy, even as a wave of pro-democracy protests in resistance or demands for more
democracy throughout the world may at times permit some optimism (V-Dem Institute 2020).
Total liberal and electoral democracies in the world tallied at 45 (peak) and 55 state systems in
2010, and fell to 37 and 50, respectively, by the end of 2019, according to indicators (V-Dem
Institute 2020). The 2019 Freedom in the World data tracks 14 consecutive year of overall
decline since 2005, owing to fraying political rights and civil liberties in 64 countries, as 37
countries showed improvements (Freedom House 2020). Pluralism may be “under assault” by
elected leaders who show disregard for democratic institutions and respect for the rights of critics
and minorities in pursuit of their political agendas (Freedom House 2020, 1). Even in the US,
liberal democracy may have “lost its way” (V-Dem Institute 2020, 4).
Deconsolidation trends may be inflicting established as well as politically influential
regimes and major economies of the world (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014; Freedom
House 2019; V-Dem Institute 2020). A key figure in American politics in recent years is Donald
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Trump. His actions as a candidate and president in American politics have undermined
democratic norms of electoral integrity, independent judiciary, abuse of powers, equal treatment
under law, and rhetorical attacks on media (Freedom House 2020). For example, in what led to a
failed impeachment attempt by Congress, Trump unsuccessfully sought aid from Ukrainian
president Volodymyr Zelenskyy to investigate his potential political rival to bolster his reelection
chances. He further abused his powers to temporarily block military aid allocated by Congress to
Ukraine to pressure the then president, and then in orders to “current and former officials to defy
all congressional subpoenas for documents and testimony on the matter” (Freedom House
2020b). Still, as discussed in detail in the above section, some argue the trends began decades
prior to “serial norm breaker” Trump’s electoral rise, particularly in dynamics of intensifying
partisan polarization around issues of race and culture (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 146).
Meanwhile in the world’s largest democracy of India, Hindu nationalism threatens a secular and
inclusive political system, by implementing undemocratic practices such as restrictions on the
rights of some segments of the Muslim population and exclusive citizenship registration laws
(Freedom House 2020). In Israel, the then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu oversaw bans on
foreign activists and enactment of discriminatory policy reserving rights of self-determination
strictly to Jewish people (Freedom House 2020). Like elsewhere in Europe, centrist parties in
Spain have lost ground in elections to radical right-wing nationalists in recent years (Freedom
House 2020). Poland’s Law and Justice party in 2016 took measures in power to erode judicial
independence, dominate media, and stifle opponents. Over the last decade under Viktor Orban’s
populist-nationalist leadership, Hungary became the first European Union member state whose
status in the Freedom in the World report fell to partly free (Freedom House 2020).
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In particular, Western societies are facing more unpredictable elections, more antiestablishment and populist challenges to the liberal democratic establishment, and potential
shakeups in longstanding patterns of electoral competition (Inglehart and Norris 2016; see also,
e.g., Foa and Mounk 2017; Mietzner 2018). The 2007-2008 financial crisis and resulting global
economic recession may have driven disillusionment to be a feature in current trends (The
Economist 2014). In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement and nationwide protests against
economic inequality made a spectacle of unrest. More recently, from a global pandemic to mass
discontent, protests and riots in cities throughout the US after the police killing of a black man in
custody, American democracy may be more divided on partisan lines as ever in modern history.
President Trump faced a historic second impeachment in early 2021 on charges of “incitement of
insurrection” after rejecting the November 2020 election as fraudulent. Notably, Trump’s
baseless claims of election rigging culminated in a Washington rally speech after which loyal
supporters staking one side of a deep partisan divide apparently took his cues in the resulting
Capitol Hill riots and masses ‘storming of the capitol’ on January 6, 2021. The large pro-Trump
gathering-turned-riots or ‘insurrection’ temporarily paused congressional hearings to certify
election results (BBC News 2021). This precarious moment for American democracy may
exemplify a “potent ideational mix of populism, ethno-nationalism, and authoritarianism [that]
has rallied large numbers of supporters in established democracies behind a radical-right agenda”
(Bonikowski 2017, S182). In other words, the nativist drift in US and European politics may be
“a passive consequence of macro-level socioeconomic development,” in which there is “cultural
content and structural context of political preferences” (Bonikowski 2017, S183). Trends may be
rational responses to local historical and international incentives, but their context is ambiguous
in terms of democratic erosion since institutions of democracy backed by popular support often
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legitimate them (Bermeo 2016). In other words, there is a façade of democratic governance even
if trends push the boundaries of a democratic regime.
In sum, regimes that mix democratic and authoritarian characteristics are more common
in recent years (Bogaards 2009; Cassani 2014; Diamond 2002; Carothers 2002; Levitsky and
Way 2010). Defects in freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections, in
other words, distinguish hybrid from democratic regimes (Diamond 2002). Despite more
elections, democratic functions are increasingly dubious, e.g., due to gerrymandering, votebuying, repression, election hacking, ballot stuffing, or threading external actors to favor one
party or candidate at the expense of others (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). More often, political
elites are influencing a gradual shift away from democratic regimes (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018;
Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The patterns are usually “incremental rather than sudden” (Bermeo
2016, 14) and lawful unlike past iterations (Bonikowski 2017; Luhrman and Lindberg 2019; VDem Institute 2019; Waldner and Lust 2018). Scholars using V-Dem indicators recently found
autocratization trends are now “almost global and more in democracies than anywhere else,” in a
protracted subversion of democratic attributes while maintaining a façade of electoral choice in
modern ‘illiberal’ regimes (Luhrman and Lindberg 2019, 1104). Since deconsolidation in the
‘third reverse wave’ is occurring through gradual deterioration of liberal democratic ideals,
political dynamics like polarization may be instructive.
Factors in Deconsolidation: Severe Polarization Into Partisan-Identity Blocs
While recent problems of democratic deconsolidation appear as multicausal according to
surveys of literature on the issue (see, e.g., Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Hobson 2018), this thesis
zeroes on specific dynamics that may influence trends in the shift away from liberal democratic
regime characteristics towards more authoritarian governance. Principally, extreme and
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intensifying polarization in societies might create space for direct challenges to democracy by
undermining key norms of a functioning system. If divisions extend to produce feelings of
mutual hostility and encourage support for actors willing to bend democratic rules for political
advantage, they might especially contribute to problems that deteriorate democratic regime
characteristics (LeBas 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). As mentioned,
elected officials may be fraying two fundamental and reinforcing values of democracy in recent
years, in part due to dynamics of severe partisanship. Mutual toleration of political rivals as
legitimate opponents, as opposed to existential enemies, and institutional forbearance in restraint
from abuse of temporary powers in elected office are two essential “unwritten rules of the game”
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 104). I clarify below how extreme polarization—to the extent in US
context that being a Democrat or Republican “has become not just a partisan affiliation but an
identity” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 168)—can potentially fuel democratic deconsolidation, or
sometimes lead to democratic reforms. With brief examples, I suggest the potential role of
intensifying polarization of group or national identity politics as influential in recent trends. The
possible issues suggest why growing partisan divisions along identity lines and belonging in the
US could be consequential and therefore important for the longstanding American democracy.
Dynamics of severe polarization are different from conventional understandings of
ideological distance between political parties and candidates (McCoy and Somer 2019; Vegetti
2018). These possibly de-democratizing trends instead involve alignment of identity and political
interests along a single polarizing divide (LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). Divisions grow
‘pernicious’ to the extent that a “Manichean, moralizing character” dominates political discourse
in society, and partisans favor their in-group while unfavorably stereotyping the out-group
(McCoy and Somer 2019, 244). The two sides in a socio-political divide may come to view
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matters in tribal terms. Devotion to in-group members may come at the expense of bias and
prejudice for others in ways that dehumanize and personalize politics inconsistent to mutual trust
(McCoy and Somer 2019). The tendency for alienation from out-groups and concentration with
in-groups could entrench divisions to leave little-to-no middle ground (Vegetti 2018).
The cases of ‘pernicious’ polarization deviate from “healthy pluralism in democratic
society” on the basis of prominent features, including the following from 11 comparative studies:
(i) mutually hostile, exclusive and antagonistic electoral blocs, along which multiple partisan
cleavages collapse into a dominant binary; (ii) “political identity of the two camps becomes a
social identity in which members feel they belong to a ‘team’ and demonstrate strong loyalty to
it” in matters of “good” and “evil,” and with us or against us mentality (246); (iii) the two
identity blocs drive political demands and interests for members in between-group antagonisms
that undermine potential common interests; (iv) presence of extensive “[s]tereotyping and
prejudice” on account of negligible social interaction between groups; (v) institutional
dominance including media “by one bloc or the other through discursive changes as well as
changes in ownership, management, and staff, weakening the middle ground in public and
political discourses” (247); and, not least, (vi) antagonism in both physical and psychological
separations between groups in a broadly polarized society (McCoy and Somer 2019). In brief,
when polarization encloses social interactions in sharp lines of “us vs. them identity politics,
interactions along all other planes diminish considerably, channels of communication between
groups break down, and intragroup solidarity increases at the expense of intergroup cohesion”
(McCoy and Somer 2019, 247). At such extremes, dynamics may be “totalizing” (McCoy and
Somer 2019, 247). Party and rival distinctions may harden in unintentional but reinforcing ways
for problems of democratic function (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; McCoy and Somer
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2019; Vegetti 2018). Erosion of key norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance
may thereby turn ordinary democratic rivalry into existential conflict above policy differences
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
In that sense, sharp partisan polarization in the US may reflect intensifying cleavages
around conflicting narratives that involve race, culture, and belonging in political representation
(Abramowitz and McCoy 2018; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018;
McCoy and Somer 2019). Indeed, “the basic question of citizenship and who enjoys the rights
espoused by the founding fathers…has been debated since the founding of the republic and its
differentiated citizenship for African slaves, Native Americans, and women” (McCoy and Somer
2019, 239). These sorts of contending narratives were present leading up to civil war, then a
century thereafter in formal and informal modes of discrimination, and again from the late 21st
century into bittering polarization under Obama and Trump administrations (McCoy and Somer
2019, 239). Features of extreme polarization between “incompatible worldviews” as such may
develop into “perceptions of mutual threat” that incentivize partisan actors to seek absolute ends
using temporary powers of elected office (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 116). Still, within
potentially democracy-debilitating dynamics of deep polarization, there may be space for
democratizing reforms, e.g., the obvious case of slavery abolition after years of polarization
leading up to US Civil War. Democratizing possibilities may underlie one of a few patterns of
political utility in polarizing elite tactics. Elites in competition may use polarizing strategies for
general self-interest to mobilize electoral support, although not necessarily for democratizing
ends (McCoy and Somer 2019). By contrast, they might seek transformative ends in one of two
other patterns in recent years. The “progressive-inclusionary” strategies that seek to lift marginal
populations could potentially influence democratizing reforms, while “exclusionary-reactionary”
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strategies might contradict liberal-democratic norms by appealing to “exclusive impulses of
masses who feel they have suffered loss of status and resources” to the status quo (McCoy and
Somer 2019, 248). Still, incumbents or opposition could influence regime trajectories either way.
Hence, polarizing politics “can sometimes serve useful democratic ends and should not be
regarded as a necessarily bad feature of governance” (McCoy and Somer 2019, 257).
Accordingly, political elites tend to act as agents of severe polarization through strategies
and discourse tactics that build on existing cleavages and salient discursive grievances in society
(McCoy and Somer 2019). Contemporary rifts might include populist ascriptions of elites versus
people; religious/secular or church/state; cosmopolitan/nationalist; cultural value bases of
traditional/modern, conservative/liberal, or communitarian/universalist; place- or status-based
values and interests; economic ideology or class; political ideology, including concept of
democracy and sources of legitimacy; or citizenship rights and national identity in ‘formative’
rifts of the state (McCoy and Somer 2019). As political and media discourse channel popular
anxieties (Bonikowski 2017), tactics of political elites may aggravate extant societal cleavages or
grievances if they stoke “fears, anxieties, and resentments that then become expressed as
hostility, bias, and eventually enmity” on course to ‘pernicious’ polarization (McCoy and Somer
2019, 240). As a case example in deconsolidation trends (Foa and Mounk 2017), a political rift
between Democrats and Republicans in the US cuts deep on social, ethnic, and cultural bases of
community (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The ‘formative’ rift dynamics of severe polarization are
thus important to this thesis especially; when preexisting historical rifts around belonging are
salient and feature exclusionary narratives of citizenship, there may be greater potential to fuel
undemocratic behavior (LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer
2018). At extremes, appeals within formative polarizing dynamics on grounds of belonging may
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serve as grounds for violence or exclusion (LeBas 2018). Many democracies persist in some way
at contesting the ‘nation’ in political communities, though not always actively except for recent
popular nationalist mobilizations (Bonikowski 2017). While differences “may be associated with
an ascriptive identity, insofar as political narratives built around pluralism or regional autonomy
might be attractive to ethnic or religious minorities,” split ideological conceptions of the state in
“foundational debates can be cross-cutting and generate polarization even if they have little
association with pre-existing identity-based cleavages” (LeBas and Munemo 2019, 210; see also,
e.g., McCoy and Somer 2019). Foundational debates either way tend to sustain polarizations and
partisan loyalties (LeBas and Munemo 2019). Still, some contextual factors might offer a
resonant backdrop for similar ‘pernicious’ polarization to develop (McCoy and Somer 2019),
including appeals of various populist, authoritarian, and ethnonationalist politics of resentment
gaining recent popular support (Bermeo 2016; Bonikowski 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2016). On
the one hand, features in recent decades may be economic such as sharp growth in inequality,
stagnant middle-class wages as top incomes rise, loss of traditional manufacturing industries in
global trade, and collapse of union memberships (Bonikowski 2017). In other words, these
factors may be possible context drivers of ‘economic grievance’ politics around which elites may
emphasize polarizing strategies (McCoy and Somer 2019). On the other hand, and like historic
‘formative’ rifts an important focus of this thesis, political elites might deploy polarizing
discursive tactics with resonant ‘cultural grievances’ and ‘political grievances or crisis of
representation’ (McCoy and Somer 2019).
Between “progressive-inclusionary” and “exclusionary-reactionary” patterns of
polarizing strategies (McCoy and Somer 2019, 248), national cultural rifts in recent years
typically feature political appeals between advocates and opponents of progressive changes in
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egalitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and multiculturalism (Bonikowski 2017; Inglehart and Norris
2016). As the latter blocs adhere to “previously stable and valued collective identities, rooted in
class position and national belonging,” some members could perceive an evolving cultural or
ethnic landscape as “antithetical to their way of life” (Bonikowski 2017, S203). In other words,
severe polarization around cultural grievances may develop in societies from perceptions of
declining social or economic status by members of a once dominant group (Bonikowski 2017;
McCoy and Somer 2019). Competing narratives of political community and cultural belonging
as well as attitudes towards others might thereby incentivize political tactics evoking nationalist
appeals, including potential “exclusionary understandings of the nation…as a confluence of
grievances associated with economic, social and cultural change has increased the salience of
nationalist beliefs” (Bonikowski 2017, S204). Evidence from 2002-2014 European Social Survey
data suggests cultural ‘backlash’ to modern progressive values may, indeed, carry greater weight
for masses in recent electoral developments than economic appeals (Inglehart and Norris 2016).
More prominent in Western societies since the 1970s are post-materialist and self-expressive
issues of “[s]ocial liberalism” like women’s and minority rights, LGBT issues, gender fluidity,
open borders, and “tolerance of social, intellectual, and political diversity” (Inglehart and Norris
2016, 8). There is now more social acceptance of “diverse lifestyles, religions, and cultures,
multiculturalism, global cooperation, democratic governance, and protections of fundamental
freedoms and human rights” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 29). Against conflicting narratives of
belonging, some segments of past majorities in Western politics and culture may feel resentful
and “marginalized within their own communities” in reaction to “being told that traditional
values are now ‘politically incorrect’” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 29). Donald Trump may be a
case in point through political appeals favoring “older, religious white traditionalists who find
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themselves left behind by growing support in America for such issues as same-sex marriage,
rights for transexuals [sic], gender equality for women in politics, and immigration rights.” These
views are rooted in the Republican base (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 31).
Lastly, polarizing actors may strategize to use rhetoric around political or representational
grievances (McCoy and Comer 2019). These cleavages are like cultural grievance or formative
rift dynamics on grounds of inclusion or exclusion. In particular, some populations may
experience or actually lack representation in society, like cases of exclusion in apartheid South
Africa or pre-civil rights era American South (McCoy and Somer 2019). Other times, some
voters may turn away from unrepresentative political parties they feel are either “corrupt (i.e.,
too little polarization) or unresponsive technocrats divorced from the people” (McCoy and
Somer 2019, 240). These cases, like polarization influencing mobilization for an eventual end to
apartheid South Africa, suggest how severe partisanship of political grievance cleavages may at
times contribute to a political climate amenable to democratic reforms or struggle (McCoy and
Somer 2019). Across virtually all cases of severe polarization, hence, the democratic regime
trajectories rest largely on political strategies and agency of elites. While “both supply and
demand factors are important,” it is political leaders who generally bring intensity of pernicious
dynamics in polarization to the fore of national interests and mass demands, thereby potentially
destabilizing regimes for better or worse (McCoy and Somer 2019, 263). Power struggles in elite
political and party competition may thus underlie extreme cases of polarization, in which actors
may respond to incentives by capitalizing on popular anxieties in ways that influence further
enhancement or erosion of democratic regime traits (McCoy and Somer 2019). However,
entrenchment of extreme partisanship may develop into a Manichean binary of exclusive “us”
versus “them” terms that could undermine democratic norms of mutual tolerance among political
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opponents turning into cross-cutting, hostile and antagonist socio-political identity camps (LeBas
2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). Notably, foundational debates
including formative rift dynamics over national belonging or state purpose may make for longerlasting and more pernicious outcomes (LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). For cases
involving backlash to new political inclusion of formerly excluded or marginalized segments of a
population, results may still vary such as through “a) gridlock and/or instability, with alternating
governments failing to achieve governability; b) removal of the new group from power; or c)
increasing authoritarian behavior by the incumbent to stay in power” (McCoy and Rahman 2016,
2). Furthermore, if partisan identities cut through society into social space, polarization may
preclude beliefs of national coexistence among citizens, and less social interaction typically
means sharper polarization (McCoy and Rahman 2016). In any case, potentially destabilizing or
transformative dynamics of polarization are worth our attention.
Several cases might offer insights into possible concerns for democratic or democratizing
regimes when political polarization hardens on partisan-identity lines. Specifically, democracydeteriorating possibilities may suggest why pernicious polarization in the otherwise longstanding
US democracy could lead to problems for the regime. It may also be that polarization of identity
issues like inclusion and representation can influence democratic enhancements or reforms
(LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019; Southall 2019). Severe partisanship and polarization are
not sole causal factors in contemporary challenges to democratic governance, without a doubt,
but the dynamics may sometimes make ripe for elites or outsiders to act on partisan demands at
the expense of ordinary democratic functions in pursuit of power.
Murat Somer (2001) describes polarization in the former Yugoslavia as “the division of a
people into mutually exclusive and distrustful ethnic categories” (128). History between ethnic
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groups shows a mix of cooperation as well as conflict, in both inclusive as well as compatible
terms pre-polarization before exclusive portrayals in polarized society were dominant. A
“snowballing or bandwagon” effect of cross-cutting divisions may have influenced ethnic
polarization in Yugoslavia, as relations from one ethnic identity to another split to the extent that
“separate feelings of belonging reinforce[d] each other and lead to the growth of negative and
hostile images” (Somer 2001, 131). Depictions of problems around political disintegration of
Yugoslavia range from “historic animosities” between exclusive notions of ‘us’ against ‘them’
(although historical accounts indicate cooperation and peace more than violent periods), to
“strategic decisions of the country’s elites, who exploited ethnic sensitivities to consolidate their
own power” (Somer 2001, 135). Polarizing dynamics may have allowed elites to leverage
ethnonational incentives in their efforts to capture or hold power. The case is ultimately an
unsuccessful transition to liberal democracy as a result of many factors, among which potential
“dynamics of rapid and massive polarization were in play” from elite strategies to a “large and
responsive audience” of masses (Somer 2001, 135). As with other cases, the United States differs
from Yugoslavia as a longstanding and mature regime, including a fairly robust political culture
according to survey evidence (see, e.g., Touchton, Klofstad, and Uscinski 2020; Carey et al
2020), which could help to sustain regime durability. Somer (2001) argues that severe dynamics
of polarization were paramount in generating interethnic hatreds in the Balkans, which
underscores the importance of the issue if similar dynamics were to develop elsewhere.
On another case in severe partisan divisions, David Moshman (2007) argues that normal
identity processes in political matters may sometimes have extreme results, such as genocide.
According to Moshman, Hutu and Tutsi distinctions in pre-colonial Rwanda began on bases of
ancestry and socioeconomic status, but relations for many years were such that they still
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“intermarried, shared religious beliefs, and were integral parts of a single society—Rwanda”;
that is, until colonial Belgium in the early 20th century “reified and exploited the Hutu/Tutsi
distinction to control the country by enabling the Tutsi, operating within Belgian parameters, to
solidify and enhance their traditional domination of the Hutu” (Moshman 2007, 119). The sharp
Hutu-Tutsi distinction persisted through independence, when the Hutu majority rose to power
despite Tutsi beliefs that “authority in Rwanda had always rightly been theirs, and should be
regained” (Moshman 2007, 119). Media outlets, especially radio, elevated Hutu ideology seeking
to recapture power. As “middle ground collapsed, you had to stand on our side or theirs” amid
dynamics of a dehumanizing dichotomization of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ splitting Rwandan society
(Moshman 2007, 119). There were “moralizing” patterns in pernicious polarizing political
discourse (McCoy and Somer 2019, 244). Narratives of elimination of Tutsis swept popular
discourse as if morally imperative to elevate Hutu power. It remains common among perpetrators
of the 1994 genocide to identify their actions as righteous, “given the existential threat posed by
the Tutsi to the Hutu and Rwandan nation” (Moshman 2007, 129). The US in contemporary
context again differs as a consolidated democratic regime, in contrast to post-colonial, newlyindependent Rwanda under a fledgling democratizing regime. Political violence to the extent of
genocide is less likely a concern for the longstanding US regime than subtle democratic erosion
(McCoy and Somer 2019). Still, preexisting identity cleavages over group belonging or inequal
rights for citizens might raise the odds for dynamics of political polarization to influence events
of political violence (LeBas 2018). Years later the Rwandan government continues to work
towards construction of a national identity that stitches “back together the social fabric” of
national citizenship untethered to ethnicity (Moran and Samso 2019).
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The case of Zimbabwe may be most different in its historical context in comparison to
the US. The former is a landlocked post-colonial state without yet a full century of establishment
in its independence, and the latter has longstanding general stability despite its pitfalls. These
differences could produce different outcomes. For example, two episodes of party-based
polarization in 1980-1987 and 2000-2008 each feature elites in a shared-power settlement but
with key differences. The later period more closely fits McCoy, Rahman, and Somer’s (2018)
theory of pernicious polarization. It is “marked by deeper societal penetration and segregation”
and may thus be “less amenable to resolution” (LeBas and Munemo, 2019, 212). The earlier
episode of partisanship had intense ethnic conflict between two nationalist parties turning violent
and contributing to many deaths, although ending abruptly in a pact between elites (LeBas and
Munemo 2019). In contrast, the later period persists, with features of “foundational myths about
the nation and the state’s purpose” (LeBas and Munemo 2019, 210). While a power-sharing
settlement stemmed intensity of peak polarization and partisan violence, a penetrating two-party
split continues to leave party members “in separate worlds in terms of public opinion and civic
space” (LeBas and Munemo 2019, 212). Partisan lines cut across all aspects of social and
political life, from friendships to church and a “segregated” civil society, with ongoing breakouts
of violence and polarizing language between ruling elites and opposition (LeBas and Munemo
2019, 212). Curiously, a study of partisan sorting in the US involving 180 million voters recently
found comparable geographic segregation across regions and within cities between Democrats
and Republicans (Brown and Enos 2021). Durability of the second episode of polarization for
Zimbabwe may be attributable to rival parties sharply contesting foundational beliefs, from
Zimbabwe’s liberation war to conceptions of the state (LeBas and Munemo 2019). Its pernicious
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dynamics endure, such as in military fire on opposition protesters, allegations of election rigging,
and both sides using “language of warfare and confrontation” (LeBas and Munemo 2019, 223).
From “tumultuous street violence” to “a deep divide between two opposing political mass
movements,” Prajak Kongkirati (2019) argues that Thailand fits the profile of cases in pernicious
polarization (24). After a new constitution and 1997 economic crisis, a populist party rose to
prominence starting in 2001. As party founder, Thaksin Shinawatra led electorally through
appeals to grievances of the urban and rural lower class and lower middle class. He gained
support in his “strong and decisive leadership” and with policies that were “highly popular and
admired by the poor” (Kongkirati 2019, 27). The party “fundamentally transformed the
relationship between state and citizen, with a slew of innovative policies targeting rural areas and
the poor politically awakening long-ignored parts of the Thai nation” (Selway 2020). However,
Thaksin’s “domineering power and popularity made him a real threat to the old network of
elites,” stirring “fear and perturbation among opponents” after electoral victories in 2005 won a
supermajority (Kongkirati 2019, 28). The old-elite opposition feared for their status in Thai
society, losing a social and economic position to a more inclusive political system (Kongkirati
2019). Protests against the government grew into a movement known as Yellow Shirts, whose
supporters allied with the opposition “royal-military-bureaucratic elites” and “comprised mainly
of urban middle- and urban-classes as well as big business groups” (Kongkirati 2019, 25).
Things grew more intense in 2006 after Thaksin sought to bolster political legitimacy through a
snap election, which left his party largely unopposed as opposition mostly boycotted (Kongkirati
2019, 28). With support of the monarchy, military ultimately staged a coup in 2006 to regain
traditional authority, prompting the Red Shirts counter-movement and further polarization in the
country (Kongkirati 2019; Selway 2020). Many people in the Red Shirt movement, supporters of
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Thaksin, reported lower levels of education, income, and economic security, and were often from
rural and poorer regions where migrant workers concentrate (Kongkirati 2019). Yellow and Red
Shirt political identities are now signifiers of mutually exclusive interests in Thai society, on
anti- and pro-Thaksin lines as well as in regional and rural-urban disparities (Kongkirati 2019).
Elites and media increasingly segment between the two camps, leaving little room for differences
in “political contestation with fervent emotions of love and hate, as if they were watching sports
or reality TV” (Kongkirati 2019, 37). Rivals-turned-enemies experience “different political
realities” and live in “two different worlds” (Kongkirati 2019, 37). Like other cases, political
leaders may have “activated the existing social cleavages, and ideological framing exacerbated
and deepened the polarization to the extent that it spiraled out of the elites’ control” (Kongkirati
2019, 37). Politics in Thailand are increasingly moralistic matters of ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ or deep
lines of ‘us’ against ‘them’ between traditional elites and a populist democracy with more
egalitarian values. Lack of democratic consensus around “rules of the game” made Thai politics
“dysfunctional and unstable,” plus now under strong military rule (Kongkirati 2019, 37). The
polarization over Thai nationalism continues between those who prefer traditional military and
monarchic control, and opposition who “define themselves as part of a broader Asian democratic
movement” (Selway 2020).
South Africa under apartheid, with white oppression over the black majority, became a
severely polarized society over extreme problems of political inclusion and representation
(Southall 2019). The political grievances of black racial oppression fueled a movement under the
leadership of the African National Congress in popular revolt that eventually won democratizing
concessions between opposing elites. Roger Southall (2019) argues that the dynamics of political
polarization over apartheid may have created space for democratic reforms, despite persistent
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socioeconomic inequalities. The process of negotiation over a democratic political settlement in
elite transition “was crucial in defusing distrust and allowing mutually exclusive political
identities to give way to a broader sense of South Africanism” (Southall 2019, 198). In short, the
“political polarization under apartheid [may have] provided the platform for a democratic
settlement” (Southall 2019, 203).
In Chile as a final example, dynamics of extreme partisanship may have created space
amenable for the US to succeed with sponsoring a coup. It was once Latin America’s “oldest and
most successful democracy,” with “vibrant democratic norms” and compromise as a political
culture across an ideological spectrum from Marxists to reactionaries for most of the 20th century
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 113). Cold War politics strained Chile with polarization beginning in
the 1960s, with Cuban Revolution inspiration on the left, and the right wing fearful of the left
gaining power in response (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). When left politician Salvador Allende
won the presidency in 1970, right-wing partisan panic cut through any sense of mutual toleration,
even if Allende was a committed democrat. While left allies referred to opposition as fascist
“enemies of the people,” the right wing in turn saw Allende and the left in the opposite frame as
a “communist threat” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 115). Partisan tensions grew through 1973
midterms. Neither side won a legislative majority nor accepted compromise. Allende’s attempts
at policy by executive decree sparked calls for impeachment. In response, an opposition senator
appealed that he was an “illegitimate head of state,” and in August 1973 the Chamber of
Deputies declared Allende’s government unconstitutional before the military seized power
(Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 117).
As the cases suggest, extreme polarization may undermine democratic function by
making tolerance between partisans more difficult to sustain (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).

57

Societies split in political identity camps may become mutually exclusive in us versus them
terms along strict in-group versus out-group antagonisms (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy
and Somer 2019). Partisan-identity divisions may come to seem irreconcilable (Levitsky and
Ziblatt 2018; Mason 2014), rigid and intolerant (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). The
dynamics may still at times be fruitful for democratic development. From deep divisions over
slavery to its abolition in early American democracy, norms of mutual tolerance and institutional
forbearance wore down through frequent violent episodes on the US House and Senate floor
between 1830-1860. One third of American states refused to participate in 1864 elections,
leaving almost half of the Senate seats and over a quarter House seats vacant. Civil War broke
after President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus and freed American slaves by executive order
at the height of divisions (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The “partisan animosity” endured after
Union victory, but eventually ebbed as Democrats and Republicans “grudgingly accepted one
another as legitimate rivals” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 123). Today, the consolidated US
democracy under severe partisan-identity polarization may be vulnerable to deconsolidation
trends. Though large-scale violence like Civil War or genocide are less likely for the now deeply
ingrained regime, consequences may include gradual decline in quality of governance with
creeping authoritarianism, or eventual democratic reforms.
Partisanship and Deconsolidation Trends
In sum, this thesis analyzes American party platforms to evaluate any changes in
partisan-identity polarization and emphasize possible areas of concern for the longstanding US
democratic regime. Therefore, I largely adopt framing of ‘pernicious polarization’ as in cases
like the US that have underlying dynamics of a ‘formative rift’ around conceptions of the nationstate and matters of national belonging in the political community as possible fuel for politics
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amenable to democratic erosion (LeBas 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019; McCoy, Rahman, and
Somer 2018). While economic factors may be of importance in broad de-democratizing trends,
they are not the focus of this thesis (e.g., see Bonikowski 2017; Ercan and Gagnon; Hobson
2018; Waldner and Lust 2018). In particular, I adopt how severe partisan polarization in US
politics may configure around “existential” rifts in matters of race and culture (Levitsky and
Ziblatt 2018, 9), as well as possible tensions over national identity and belonging, religion and
secularism, or likewise salient discursive dimensions involving cultural values, cosmopolitanism
and nationalism, and notions of citizenship (McCoy and Somer 2019). In general, recent cases
including the US tend to involve populist leaders who leverage polarizing themes as electoral
and political strategies, and frequently influence the mobilization of counter-movements (McCoy
and Somer 2019).
Regime trajectories in severe polarization may hinge on the approach of opposing elites
in either failing or succeeding to neutralize polarizing political appeals (McCoy and Somer
2019). For example, the Indonesian case of President Jokowi responding to Islamist-populist
mobilization in late 2016 shows how elites might respond in deleterious ways despite goals to
protect democratic institutions. Within key context that “religious polarization of elections in
Indonesia, long believed to be on the decline, had reached new heights,” the president chose to
criminalize violators of established legal norms and pursue patronage policies towards aggrieved
Muslims as ways to quash or accommodate radicals (Mietzner 2017, 272). The country is now
arguably in the process of democratic deconsolidation. Political opponents whose responses to
polarizing actors reciprocate rather than strategize with expressly pro-democratic reforms might
aggravate problems. A ratchet response may drive political instability and “autocratizing
tendencies” (263) under a hegemonic party, or regime conditions may turn to “alternation of
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power with diminishing quality of democracy, until one side gains the upper hand through court
appointments and electoral law changes to enhance their electoral advantage” (McCoy and
Somer 2019, 264). Granting the American democratic regime is more stable than other examples
in the long view of history, this thesis highlights in its analytical approach the potentially
destabilizing and therefore important dynamics in cases of polarization that may turn
‘pernicious’ along cross-cutting identity lines.
Methods
This thesis uses a qualitative methodology for its assessment of partisan-identity
polarization, in part, because recent problems for democracies are typically “fine-grained”
phenomena (Waldner and Lust 2018, 95). After two decades in scholarship on hybrid regimes,
Mariam Mufti (2018) also encourages qualitative research driven by single case studies as well
as comparisons based on in-depth field research and complimentary large-sample statistical
analyses. While the latter may advance more generalizable findings, this thesis answers Mufti’s
(2018) call to contextualize deconsolidation trends and support mid-range theory building on
possible influences. In addition, Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk (2017) support the US case
selection in this thesis, since it offers fresh grounds for studying deconsolidation trends in
advanced liberal democracies. Accordingly, I present a content analysis of American party
platforms. The aims of this methodological choice are thus twofold: First, it is to test theories of
partisan-identity polarization as the issue may have consequential influence on the US
democratic regime (see, e.g., LeBas 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; McCoy, Rahman, and
Somer 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019). Secondly, it is an effort to establish ‘pernicious’
polarization in the US case through examining qualitative data and then consider possible effects
on democratic governance.
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Content Analysis of Democratic and Republican Party Platforms, 1980-2016
Over the period of 1980-2016, I use content analysis as a primary research tool to
systematically assess changes in partisan emphasis on narrow cultural- or identity-based issues in
contrast to universalist or common messaging in national politics. This timeframe is important
because it generally overlaps with trends of increasing party polarization in American politics
(see, e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001; Layman, Carsey,
and Horowitz 2006), and broader trends of democratic erosion or stall over the last few decades
(see, e.g., The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014; Freedom House 2019; Levitsky and Ziblatt
2018; V-Dem Institute 2020). The American Presidential Project is the chief archival resource
for Democratic and Republican party platforms. These two major parties published 20 platforms
over the 1980-2016 period, all on presidential election years. For the sake of resources against
exhaustive and often lengthy party platforms, this content analysis spotlights changes from four
12-year increments, including 1980, 1992, 2004, and 2016. My choice of these four years in
particular is meant to extend the content analysis from 1980-2016 coinciding with trends in
increasing party polarization in American politics and democratic erosion to capture changes
over a longer period. In total, eight party platforms comprise the research sample, four for each
major party. I organize the content analysis of these voluminous texts to show whether partisan
appeals may have diverged into a political-identity rift between Republican and Democratic
party messages, then offer an assessment for how the dynamics might influence ‘pernicious’ or
possibly gainful consequences for the American democratic regime.
Identifying Shifts in Party Messaging on Universal and Identitarian Bases
Under thematic consideration, the content analysis codes for ‘universal’ and ‘identitarian’
messaging to establish shifts in partisan attention towards or away from universal or narrower
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identity bases. Specifically, paragraphs in the party platforms are units of analysis in this thesis.
There are 3,435 paragraphs or units of analysis in the sample. With involvement of two coders,
the primary researcher and an assistant independently evaluate each paragraph in the eight party
platforms to identify messages including appeals to one of three substantive themes, plus a fourth
category for ‘none of the above’ or neutral messaging on any partisan-identity bases. Paragraphs
with ‘universal’ expressions around a common purpose or collective identity of the American
polity fall under category one. Category two covers party platform appeals to narrower political
or ‘identitarian’ bases. The party platforms may sometimes reflect a common identity with
concurrent appeals or messaging towards narrower identities or a subset rather than the collective
polity, which is the basis for the third discrete category of universal-identitarian, hybrid partisan
appeals. Most paragraphs are likely boilerplate or carryovers from past years, without regard to
any of the discrete categories of universal, identitarian, or hybrid expressions that this thesis
spotlights in its content analysis. Those paragraphs are a fourth category, coded ‘none’ for none
of the above. In sum, the content analysis contains altogether four categories, with a table of
definitions for coders in Appendix A.
I developed the content analysis after my initial review of the literature and survey of
party platforms. Its four categories of analysis meet important criteria. They are exhaustive,
mutually exclusive, and relevant to the theoretical grounding of this thesis (Benoit 2011). The
categories are distinct, covering (1) universalist, (2) identitarian, (3) a combination of universal
appeals and messaging to narrower identities, sub-groups or individual over collective or civic
interests, and a final option for (4) none of the above. In other words, category one addresses
party appeals to a common purpose or collective identity; two is the inverse as far as racial,
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religious, ethnic, socially specific or otherwise narrower appeals; and three captures an inclusive
or universal message with simultaneous appeal to a narrower population(s) or sub-group(s).
The content analysis approach for this thesis is similar to the one used by Frank
Baumgartner, Suzanna De Boef, and Amber Boydstun (2008) to the extent that it relies on
subject categories (x4) rather than computer processing keywords. In this way, the content
analysis exhaustively captures its sample. It likewise follows suggestions in the Manifesto
Coding Instructions for the Comparative Manifesto Project in content analysis for design and
coder training (Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015). Additionally, the approach is summative
to the extent that the content analysis interprets context of units of analysis during data collection
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005). I organize the data into graphical representations of coded text from
Democratic and Republican party platforms, tracing any changes in universal and identitarian
platform messaging between the two major parties from the 1980-2016 period. My contribution
is thus uniquely establishing an empirical grounding for any changes to partisan-identity lines of
polarization between Democratic and Republican party messages in recent decades.
Managing and Reporting Intercoder Reliability
Using content analysis as a research tool requires some way to address intercoder (or
interrater) reliability. As such, the coding rubric in Appendix A develops the four categories for
the thesis, with examples. The two coders use the coding rubric as key research participants.
Involvement of multiple coders ensures a check on intersubjective analyses of content within the
sample of party platforms for category judgements. The primary researcher has trained an
assistant using the coding rubric as a guidepost. Both the researcher and assistant independently
reviewed and coded every unit of analysis in the sample. Afterwards, using Cohen’s Kappa, I
calculated intercoder reliability of the content analysis to assess agreement between the two
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coders while accounting for agreement by chance (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2010;
Benoit 2011). This reliability test reflects the “extent to which two or more coders agree in their
analysis of a common pool of texts” (Benoit 2011, 273). I calculate and report Cohen’s Kappa
for each sample of party platforms in the content analysis and use Richard Landis and Gary
Koch’s (1977) Kappa scale for interpretation. Their scale ranges from 0 for poor agreement to 1
for almost perfect agreement. This reliability measure is useful in combination with percent
agreement but goes further by accounting for agreement by chance and/or human error.
As a final assurance on intercoder reliability, Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken
(2010) argue that all research strategies utilizing a content analysis should have more than one
coder and report intercoder reliability among them. The content analysis follows these principles
in addition to their six steps by (i) choosing a reportable reliability index (i.e., Cohen’s Kappa);
(ii) performing the reliability calculation after data collection, in this case by hand due to the
nature of content and a summative approach based around categories instead of key words; (iii)
establishing an appropriate minimum acceptable reliability, i.e., a Kappa score of at least 0.41 for
“moderate agreement” (Landis and Koch 1977) to establish general patterns in partisan-identity
or universal expressions; (iv) assessing reliability informally during training and test runs; (v)
addressing coding disagreements; and (vi) carefully and clearly reporting intercoder reliability of
the analysis (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2010).
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CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS
This content analysis finds increasing salience of partisan-identity messaging in platform
text from the two major parties over the last several decades in American politics. Both
Democratic and Republican parties’ share of hybrid or identitarian appeals peaks most recently
in the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis (i.e., 1980, 1992, 2004, and 2016). At
the same time, neutral themes from the parties are at their lowest point in a pattern of decline
since 1980, a trend that the content analysis reveals as more intense in numbers for Democratic
party platforms than Republican party counterparts. Identitarian themes in the Democratic party
platforms grew in proportion of paragraphs over the sample from 10.62% in 1980, although
dipping in 1992 and 2004, to 32.36% in 2016. Republican party platforms remain relatively
consistent in proportion of identitarian themes from 1980 (7.90%), 1992 (7.05%), and 2004
(5.82%), until spiking in the same year as Democratic party platforms in 2016, although at a
lower ratio (10.64% for Republicans vs. 32.46% for Democrats). Hybrid messaging from
Democratic party platforms overall increases from 2.09% in 1980 to 14.37% by 2016. Hybrid
messaging from Republican party platforms, like party appeals in the identitarian category, is
relatively consistent, but remains in single digits from 1980 (2.66%), 1992 (1.45%), 2004
(3.16%), and then similarly peaking in 2016 (5.18%) in the same year that identitarian themes
are highest from both party platforms. Neutral messaging in Democratic party platforms overall
declines from a highpoint at 78.70% in 1980 to its lowest point at 36.57% in 2016 (-42.13%).
For the Republicans, neutral messaging to questions of American identity and belonging
similarly declines in paragraph units of analysis from 73.47% in 1980 to 59.38% in 2016
(-14.09%). See Figures 1 and 2 for a visual of these patterns. Importantly, as this chapter shows,
party messages coinciding with these trends diverge between the Democratic and Republican
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party platforms for years in the content analysis. The findings suggest a polarizing dynamic that
affirms claims of a deepening partisan-identity rift over the 1980-2016 period in American
politics.
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This chapter unpacks the content analysis. It begins with a summary of changes in
proportionate percentages of universal, hybrid, or identitarian appeals in the party platforms.
Secondly, key language and phrases from the content analysis help to identify common patterns
and variations in party messaging in the substantive categories of universal, hybrid, and
identitarian themes in the content analysis. In general, the findings suggest increasing partisanidentity polarization in American politics, at least between the two major party platforms, with
less neutral messaging to identity considerations over time. In other words, a clear finding is
reduction in neutral themes from both party platforms in a consistent trend across the four
election years, as universal, hybrid, and identitarian messaging is variable but peaks most
recently in 2016. From close examination of party platforms, the content analysis supports
theories on ‘pernicious’ polarization and dynamics that advance severe partisanship in the US
case. The trends may be consequential for the American democratic regime according to the
framework of ‘pernicious’ polarization and comparable theories on cases involving partisanidentity rifts that have deep contestation over national values, identity, and belonging.
Results in Numbers: Less Neutral, More Identity
To start with the Democrats, the content analysis of party platforms suggests an overall
decrease in political messaging neutral to identity considerations in the American community. 1
In other words, the ratio of Democratic Party platform content agnostic to the makeup of the
American polity, i.e., not specifically addressing either a common or subgroup identity interests,

Data collection for this thesis began in a test run to evaluate the coding rubric in Appendix A. Successful testing
gave a greenlight to continue this analysis after coders had moderate agreement. Appendix B shows a summary of
intercoder reliability measures for the content analysis. For some years, Cohen’s Kappa measures below the
established minimum acceptable level of reliability (i.e., 0.41), with fair to slight agreement between the two coders
in four of eight platforms in the thesis sample. There are nonetheless parallels in the coders’ data output. They each
find shifts in ratios of platform space between both major parties in the direction of either universal or narrower
identity groups in appeals to the American polity. From the Democratic party platforms, there were 1,462 units of
analysis (i.e., paragraphs); from the Republican party platforms, there were 1,973 units of analysis of the years in
review, 1980, 1994, 2004, and 2016.
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falls markedly from 1980 to 1992 (~20% decrease), remains stable, and then again falls from
2004 to 2016 (~20% decrease). In context of this trending decline in neutral messaging to
identity from the Democrats, the party gives more prominence to messages with universal
emphases in years 1992 (34.18%) and 2004 (33.55%), which is more than threefold that of 1980
(8.59%). Universal messaging from Democratic party platforms about halves from 2004 to 2016
(33.55% vs. 16.60%, respectively), still roughly double from 1980 (8.59%). Identitarian themes
from 2004 to 2016 grow considerably from 5.56% to 32.36% in paragraph units of analysis.
There is meanwhile a steady rise from 1980 through its peak by the 2016 Democratic party
platform in the hybrid ‘both’ category of universal themes in combination with appeals to subgroup or narrower interests. 2 For example, figure 3 shows the average between coders 1 and 2.

Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average,
Coders 1 and 2
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Figure 3. Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Line

It is important to note that data output from coders 1 and 2 in the content analysis varies by degree of intensity with
which they exhibit changing proportions of appeals for the Democrats, as well as for the Republicans, since
intercoder reliability is imperfect and subject to human error in a manual coding process. There are nevertheless
resemblances between patterns of data output that may help to ground assumptions of increasing partisan-identity
appeals in Democratic party platforms over the 1980-2016 period. For example, see Appendix C for coder 1 and 2
comparisons for the Democratic party messaging.
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In short, Democratic party platforms overall decline with respect to neutrality in
messaging on ideas of American nation or community belonging. Universal themes are second to
neutral messages in 1992 and 2004 (34.18% and 33.55%, respectively). By 2016, the Democratic
party platform gives most weight to identitarian themes, nearly as much as neutral messaging
(32.46% vs. 36.57%, respectively). In comparison, Universal and hybrid themes are at highpoints
over the 1980-2016 period but still less than half by 2016 (16.60% vs. 14.37%, respectively).
By contrast, trends from the content analysis of Republican party platforms are not as
drastic as far as intensity of changes across the four election years in the 1980-2016 period.
However, like the Democrats, the ratio of platform messaging with ideas in one of the three
identity categories grows over time but fluctuates—notably as neutral themes are in clear
decline for both parties. The latter finding from both parties suggests that there may be
contestation over identity issues in increasing prominence for platform messaging.
The results in numbers for Republican party platforms are similar to Democratic party
counterparts, except in their intensity. Beginning from 73.47% in 1980, Republican party
platform weight to neutral themes decreases an average of roughly 5% for each period in the
sample. In other words, by 2016, the percentage of neutral messages in Republican platforms is
down to 59.38% (-14.09% since 1980). Meanwhile, the three identity categories of the content
analysis increase accordingly for Republican platform messaging. Comparing start and end years
in the sample, i.e., 1980 and 2016, universal themes in Republican party platform messaging rise
by 8.82% in paragraph units of analysis, from 15.97% in 1980 to 20.80% in 1992, and to 27.18%
in 2004, before leveling off to 24.79% in 2016. Interestingly, identitarian themes in Republican
party platforms start as a somewhat higher percentage of content space in 1980 and 1992 at
7.90% and 7.05%, respectively, before a dip in 2004 to 5.82% and subsequent spike to 10.64%
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by 2016. Hybrid, universal-identitarian, themes from Republican platforms follow a similar
trajectory, although marginally. In 1980, for example, the Republican platform includes 2.66%
hybrid messaging in paragraph units of analysis, which shrinks slightly by 1992 to 1.45%, rises
to 3.16% in 2004, and then reaches a relative high point by 2016 at 5.18%. Figure 4 shows the
averages in identity categories between coders for Republican party platforms in sample years. 3

Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average,
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Figure 4. Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Average, Coders 1 and 2, Line
One notable difference in numbers for Republican party platforms, unlike Democratic
party platforms in the sample, is that the proportion of messaging with hybrid themes remains
fairly marginal across all years. For Republicans, this category fluctuates before a growth pattern
from 1992 to 2004 (1.45% increasing to 3.16%). It then peaks (5.18%) by 2016 like their party
counterparts. Although both parties have variance for years in review, trends of decline in neutral
messaging against positive trends for identitarian, universal, or hybrid messaging around identity
are generally consistent results that suggest increasing salience of partisan-identity politics.
3

See Appendix D for coder 1 and 2 comparisons for the Republican party messaging.
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Another clear difference in numbers from the content analysis is in changing ratios from
the two major parties by 2016. The Democratic party platform’s emphasis on identitarian appeals
around American identity increases nearly sixfold between 2004 and 2016 from 5.56% to
32.46%. Overall Democratic party platform messaging in the identitarian category roughly
triples from 1980 (10.62%) to 2016 (32.46%). Hybrid themes from Democratic party platform
messaging likewise spike in the most recent period of the sample, with an increase from 4.27%
in 2004 to 14.37% by 2016. Since the starting year in the sample of 1980 (2.09%), a slow and
variable increase in hybrid messaging through 1992 (4.59%) and 2004 (4.27%) spikes by 2016
(14.37%). The Republican party platform’s identitarian and hybrid messaging increases more
modestly. It begins from 7.90% in 1980 and reaches a highpoint at 10.64% by 2016, with
marginal dips in 1992 (7.05%) and 2004 (5.82%). This pattern of variability from Republican
party platform messaging is similar for the hybrid category, which begins at 2.66% in 1980 and
peaks in 2016 at 5.18%, with a small dip in 1992 (1.45%) as the start of an upward trend evident
by 2004 (3.16%).
Furthermore, in contrast to Democratic party platforms, the Republican party platforms
are generally more consistent in relative proportion of universal messaging over all four years in
the 1980-2016 period. However, later years still show more prominence in the category than
earlier years (e.g., 15.97% in 1980 and 20.80% in 1992, then 27.18% in 2004 and 24.79% in
2016). Democratic party platforms by comparison roughly double in the universal category from
1980 (8.59%) to 2016 (16.60%), while middle years of 1992 (34.18%) and 2004 (33.55%) are
more prominent in universal identity themes from the sample of years in the 1980-2016 period.
Both Republican and Democratic parties with respect to platform content have patterns of
relative decline in neutral content while messaging more to identity across the 1980-2016 period.
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Much like Democratic party platforms even if more gradual, there is an overall drop in
proportion of neutral messaging from the Republican party with regard to American community
or ‘nation’ and belonging in matters of either composition or emphasis on universal versus
specific subgroup interests. 4 With declining neutral party messaging on American identity or
subgroup considerations, the results suggest shifts in party messaging towards partisan-identity
appeals in recent decades for American politics.
Accordingly, this thesis next evaluates keywords and phrases from the texts for partisanidentity polarization to better appreciate the importance of these changes in relative proportion of
identity messaging from the two major parties’ platforms. With increases from both parties in
platform attention to identity considerations, plus the important finding of common trends in
decline in neutral messaging between the parties, I assess variations and common themes in
messaging across universal, hybrid, and identitarian categories for each party across the 19802016 years in the sample. Findings of contrasting party messages tracking with growth in
partisan-identity themes may indicate a growing rift or polarization along partisan-identity lines. 5
Democratic Party Platforms (1980, 1992, 2004, 2016)
Without a doubt, both parties underwent many changes over the 1980-2016 period with
differing social and political contexts. Themes in party platforms move with such vagaries. As
follows, I trace categories of universal, hybrid, and identitarian messaging on American identity
across the two major parties’ platforms in the content analysis for years 1980, 1992, 2004, and

Despite lower agreement in data classification between coders against the sample of Republican party platforms
than for the Democratic party platforms, trends from Republican appeals have similarities over the 1980-2016
period. One difference between the coders is clear, however. In the hybrid ‘both’ category for Republican platforms,
coder 1 finds relative consistency in the ratio of hybrid messaging from Republicans, while coder 2 finds modest
growth reaching a highpoint in 2016, like the Democrats. The average between the coders reflects a trend of modest
growth from the small dip in 1992 through 2004 and 2016 election years in the sample.
5
These examples in keywords and phrases offer an exhaustive, yet practical attempt to convey fine details of themes
within the party platforms over the sample of election years in the 1980-2016 period from Democratic and
Republican parties.
4
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2016, starting with the Democrats. The Democratic party in 1980 gave the preponderance of
platform space to messaging absent of appeals to American identity, nation, or community. It
was largely neutral (e.g., 78.70% of paragraphs), next to identitarian, universal, and hybrid
themes, which are correspondingly lower. All identity categories in the content analysis are
higher by 2016, though universal phrases peak in 1992 and 2004. As neutral framing declines
since 1980, universal themes vary somewhat as hybrid and identitarian messages grow in breadth
of themes as well as prominence in the texts by 2016.
Universal
In universal messaging on “the American people,” the 1980 Democratic party platform
emphasizes “equality for all citizens.” It rejects a “deeply divided” nation in favor of one that is
“stronger” and meets the “basic needs of all the American people” and “all sections of the
nation” (see Table 1). The “ideals of the American people” are analogous to the “aspirations of
mankind.” American “values” include people around the world associating the US with
“widespread human aspirations.” Twelve years later, the 1992 platform stresses universal notions
of American identity, community, and national interests conspicuously more than 1980, as
reflects a leap from ~9% to ~34% of paragraphs. In universal appeals to the “American people,”
the platform stresses the “spirit of the American Revolution,” and “citizen activism that has
always been the touchstone of a free and democratic society.” In other words, appeals to civic
identity underscore a universal “common good” with interests of all Americans tied to a “social
contract” and “mutual dependence.” The 1992 Democratic party platform even criticizes
Republicans for their identity politics: “by playing racial, ethnic and gender-based politics they
have divided [Americans] against each other, created an atmosphere of blame, denial and fear,
and undone the hard-fought battles for equality and fairness.”
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Table 1. Universal Civic Identity Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms*
1980 (9%)
1992 (34%)
2004 (34%)
American people, all
American people, our
all those who live under our
Common
Americans’ interest, every
country, every American
flag
American
[rejecting a nation] deeply
spirit of the American
needs of our people, our
divided, complete equality
Revolution, our land
place in the world, values of
for all citizens has yet to be reverberates with a battle
a strong American
achieved, stronger nation,
cry of frustration that
community, ideal of a
more just nation, not only
emanates from America’s
people united in helping one
meet the needs of many,
very soul—from the
another …as old as the
commitment to improve the families in our bedrock
faiths we follow and as
conditions of the least
neighborhoods, from the
great as the country we
fortunate in our society,
unsung, workaday heroes of love, one nation, under God,
bring the greatest benefits to the world’s greatest
indivisible, [America] born
the nation as a whole,
democracy and economy,
in pursuit of an idea …a
balanced and shared growth spirit of citizen activism, the free people with diverse
in all regions, improve the
touchstone of a free and
beliefs could govern
Variations
healthcare provided to all
democratic society, meet the themselves in peace, love of
Americans, [against schools nation’s pressing human
country, uphold our finest
that] racially discriminate,
and social needs, bond
traditions as a nation,
meet the nation’s need
between the American
[America] cherishes
[access to affordable
people and their
freedom, safeguards our
housing], needs of people
government, fair and shared people, protect our people
everywhere, [MLK
sacrifice of all Americans
and our way of life, help
reference] nation’s efforts to for the common good, the
build a more peaceful, more
provide all of its citizens
people’s responsibility,
prosperous, more
with civil rights and equal
social contract, our common democratic world, promote
opportunities, basic needs of load, [Republicans]
democracy and freedom
all the American people,
undermined the spirit of
around the world, human
needs of all sections of the
mutual dependence and
rights, rule of law, together
(Table Continues)

2016 (17%)
American people, all
Americans, every
American, our country
hard work and
determination, stronger
together, mobilize common
action, stronger and safer
when America brings the
world together and leads
with principle and purpose,
[this election is about] who
we are as a nation and who
we will be in the future,
[American Revolution]
revolution of ideas and
action that continues to this
day, unerring belief that we
can make it better, build a
more just economy, a more
equal society, a more
perfect union, when we are
bold and ambitious,
[innovation] one of our
country’s greatest strengths,
our nation’s heritage,
pushing beyond the
boundaries of what we
know is core to who we are
as Americans, a beacon of
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(Table Continues)

1980 (9%)
nation, American values,
our values, our support for
the aspirations of mankind
…rooted in the ideals of the
American people, American
people longed to see their
country once again
identified with widespread
human aspirations, values
for which the United States
has always stood …beacon
of liberty, strongest power
on earth, more decent world
by once again living up to
our own values, sense of
Variations
common purpose [with
allies], our traditional
concern for peace and
human rights, America’s
abhorrence of the denial of
freedom, strongest nation in
the world, nation which is
the champion of human
justice and freedom

Table 1. Continued
1992 (34%)
obligation that binds us
together …urged Americans
to turn inward, to pursue
private interests without
regard to public
responsibilities …by
playing racial, ethnic and
gender-based politics they
have divided us against each
other, created an
atmosphere of blame, denial
and fear, and undone the
hard-fought battles for
equality and fairness

2004 (34%)
[with European allies]
…ensured that democracy
and free markets prevailed
against all challenges,
shared values and mutual
commitment to democracy
[with Israel], promote our
values around the world, a
strong America [does not]
rely on the cooperation of
regimes that do not share
our values, protect citizens
from harm, values of
freedom and justice for all,
great promise of America is
simple …better life for all
who work for it, no matter
who you are, where you
come from, or what you
believe, as an American, a
land that offers you all the
possibilities your hard work
and God-given talent can
bring, opportunity for all,
special privileges for none,
America we believe in,
equal chance for all our
people, American
competitiveness, smartest,
toughest competitors in the

2016 (17%)
hope for people seeking
safety, freedom, and
security, a nation in which
all people...can participate
in the political process and
can run for office without
needing…large
contributions from the
wealthy and the powerful,
we cannot leave our
children a planet that has
been profoundly damaged,
actively engaging all
Americans, all people, our
military must be the
strongest in the world,
prosperous and safe...by
staying true to our
principles and core values,
our ingenuity unparalleled,
our military unrivaled, our
economy the largest, most
dynamic, and innovative,
our values an enduring
source of strength and
inspiration in the world
over, lead with purpose, not
a country that cowers
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1980 (9%)

1992 (34%)

2004 (34%)
2016 (17%)
world, compete and win
anywhere [given a fair
chance], time-honored
values of equal-opportunity,
fair play, good rewards for
hard work, [family] center
of everyday American life,
strong families, blessed
with opportunity, guided by
faith, filled with dreams
…heart of a strong
America, [education]
Variations
essential to a strong
America, strong America
begins at home with strong
families, promise of
opportunity, our nation’s
tradition of equal justice
under law, a better America,
more equal, more free, more
American, common service
to our commonwealth,
commitment to ethics in
government
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with Variations in Universal American identity themes from Democratic party
platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of units of analysis (i.e., paragraphs) in the
platforms of the Universal category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together with consistency or variations
in party messaging. The italics in Variations indicate some common but inconsistent messaging across the platforms. Source: Archives
of the American Presidential Project.

Table 1. Continued

By 2004, written only a few years after 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Democratic party
platform in its universal civic themes reflect a patriotic message, including around democracy
and freedom as American ideas as well as promotion of such values as American tradition. The
2004 platform emphasizes the “ideal of a people united in helping one another” and “a strong
American community,” in addition to one where “a free people with diverse beliefs could govern
themselves in peace.” With “love of country,” the Democratic party platform further appeals to
“an America that cherishes freedom.” America’s path is to “help build a more peaceful, more
prosperous, more democratic world,” to “promote democracy and freedom around the world,” as
well as human rights and rule of law for the sake of ensuring that “democracy and free markets
prevailed against all challenges.” The phrasing speaks to “American competitiveness,” smart and
tough Americans who “compete and win anywhere” if given a fair chance and equal opportunity.
Accordingly, appeals to conceptions of American community, identity or nation are mostly
universal around a civic identity, not unlike Republican counterparts in most years. In contrast to
earlier years in the content analysis, the 2004 Democratic party platform is more ideological by
way of democracy promotion in conjunction with free markets, both inwardly as well as abroad,
i.e., a global project rather than one kept to the local or national community. This framing comes
in the context of roughly a year after the US-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of the
government of Saddam Hussein, when a ‘rally around the flag’ patriotic wave was noticeable in
opinion polls and war dominant headlines.
In 2016, universal themes around American community remain present in the Democratic
party platform’s recurrent emphasis on “hard work and determination of the American people,”
and likewise, with American “innovation” as a great strength. Phrases like “our nation’s
heritage,” with roots in actions and ideas of the American Revolution, culminates in a “belief
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that [Americans] can make it better,” that Americans can “build a more just economy, a more
equal society” and “a more perfect union.” With regard to immigration, the 2016 platform further
distinguishes America as “a beacon of hope for people seeking safety, freedom, and security.” In
contrast to 2004 messaging, language of democracy and free market promotion is absent. Neither
does the 2016 Democratic party platform articulate presence abroad as clearly as 2004, although
it sustains “always coming together to stand up to terror” as a matter of “who we are as
Americans” in appeals to values, strength, inspiration, dynamism, and prosperity in American
identity.
To summarize, phrases in the universal civic identity category are mostly consistent in
presence, but only sparingly have commonalities across Democratic party platforms from 19802016. These common messages include references to “the American people,” “our country,” and
“every” or “all” Americans “who live under our flag.” Variations in universal phrases are plenty.
In 1980, “nation” is frequent in rejection to one that is “deeply divided.” The platform pushes for
a “stronger nation” to “meet the needs of many,” to “reaffirm…commitment to improve
conditions of the least fortunate,” and achieve “complete equality for all citizens.” The universal
phrases shift the emphasis to the “spirit of the American revolution,” and “spirit of citizen
activism…the touchstone of a free and democratic society in 1992.” It further speaks to the
“soul” of America and its “social contract” of “fair and shared sacrifice of all Americans for the
common good,” from “families” to “workaday heroes of the world’s greatest economy.” By
2004, language move towards patriotism in “love of country,” a “great” country because of its
ideals—i.e., “values of a strong American community,” as “one nation, under God, indivisible.”
The universal civic identity emphasis in 2004 is an America “born in pursuit of an idea.” It is
that “a free people with diverse beliefs could govern themselves in peace.” Alluding to the onset
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Iraq war in 2003, the 2004 platform accentuates protecting American people and their way of
life, including democracy, freedom, and free markets, as well as promoting “our values around
the world.” The variations by 2016 underscore an America “stronger together,” and “safer when
America brings the world together and leads with principle and purpose.” These facets, it states,
are “who we are as a nation and who we will be in the future.” The 2016 platform emphasizes
American values and ideas—a universal civic identity of “purpose” and “principles” as a “source
of strength,” while continuing an outward message, like 2004, as “beacon of hope” for the world.
Hybrid
The least weight from the 1980 Democratic party platform is to the hybrid, universalidentitarian phrases and appeals. For example, it addresses “equal opportunity and full voluntary
participation in the military regardless of sex.” It reiterates the party goal of “eliminating
discrimination in education because of sex,” and “embraces a recognition of the right of every
citizen—Black and Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian/Pacific Americans, and
the majority who are women.” The 1980 platform also pleas to end discrimination against
“language minorities,” and describes American society as “analogous to a beautiful mosaic,”
mentioning the same “mosaic” descriptor in 1992. A hybrid theme for the 1980 Democratic party
platform, which is increasingly prominent over the 1980-2016 period, incorporates universal
appeals to American community as well as subgroup interests or identity(ies) (see Table 2).
Like in 1980, the 1992 Democratic party platform stresses rejection of discrimination and
an assurance of equal rights for all Americans without exception for “race, gender, language,
national origin, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to
ability.” Within such framing, the platform maintains a civic identity notion of shared values not
unlike that in its universal language except for the stress on anti-discrimination among various
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Table 2. Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms*
1980 (2%)
1992 (5%)
2004 (4%)
must help all Americans
value of cultural diversity
understand the diversity of
in education, American
our cultural heritage,
society is analogous to a
essential that we preserve
rejoices in diversity,
beautiful mosaic …[e]ach
and pass on to our children
American history is the
Common
separate part retains its own the common elements that
story of diverse people
integrity and identity while
hold this mosaic together
striving …realize our ideals
adding to and being part of … make our country a land
the whole
of freedom and opportunity
for all
All [older] Americans,
ensure that no Americans
best education to all our
Equal opportunity and full
suffer discrimination or
children …whatever their
voluntary participation in
deprivation of rights on the background, [securing
the military regardless of
basis of race, gender,
achievement for all as]
sex, eliminating [sex]
language, national origin,
nearly half of American,
discrimination in
religion, age, disability,
Latino, and American
education, no able student
sexual orientation, or other Indian youth don’t graduate
should be denied a college
characteristics irrelevant to high school, common
education [including] low
ability, future as a nation
dream of equality,
and middle income
depends upon the daily
opportunity, freedom and
Variations
families, older students,
assumption of personal
community, toward equality
and minorities, [family] in
responsibility by millions
and inclusion, breaking
all diverse forms, society
of Americans from all
down the legal barriers to
open to women on an equal walks of life—for the
equal citizenship for
basis with men, human and religious faiths they follow, African-Americans, civil
constitutional rights of all
the ethics they practice, the rights laws for all our
within our borders …end to values they instill, and the
people, diversity from
[discriminatory] practices
pride they take in their
which all Americans
affecting Hispanic,
work, America’s special
benefit, a nation of
Caribbean, and Asia/Pacific genius has been to forge a immigrants, from Arab(Table Continues)
out of many, we are one,
stronger when the economy
works for everyone
…rewards the common
interest over the selfinterest, equal pay for
women …every
American’s right to retire
with dignity, inclusion,
respect differences of
perspective and belief,
work together, break down
all barriers holding
Americans back, everyone
deserves the chance to live
up to his or her God-given
potential …from the
enduring scourge of
systemic racism to our
deeply broken immigration

diversity is not our
problem—it is our promise

2016 (14%)
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(Table Continues)

Variations

1980 (2%)
American communities,
recognition of the right of
every citizen—Black and
Hispanic, American Indian
and Alaska Native,
Asian/Pacific Americans,
and the majority who are
women, end discrimination
against language minorities

Table 2. Continued
1992 (5%)
community of shared
values from people of
remarkable and diverse
backgrounds, party of
inclusion, our country’s
emergence as the world’s
largest and most successful
multiethnic, multiracial
republic, condemn
antisemitism, racism,
homophobia, bigotry and
negative stereotyping of all
kinds

2004 (4%)
Americans in California to
Latinos in Florida, we
share the dream of a better
life in the country we love,
full inclusion of gay and
lesbian families in the life
of our nation, diversity of
views as a source of
strength

2016 (14%)
system to discrimination
against people on the basis
of sexual orientation or
gender identity, end
institutional and systemic
racism in our society,
challenge and dismantle the
structures that define
lasting racial, economic,
political, and social
inequity, racial justice, a
country of immigrants from
throughout the world,
[national service] bringing
people of all backgrounds
together in common
purpose, basic rights for all
Americans …[climate
change] disproportionately
affect low-income and
minority communities,
tribal nations, and Alaska
Native villages, ensure that
Americans of all
backgrounds will be
prepared, our values of
inclusion and tolerance
inspire hope around the
world and make us safer at
home …values upon which
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1980 (2%)

1992 (5%)

2004 (4%)

2016 (14%)
our country was built, our
belief that that all people
are created equal, safeguard
Variations
vulnerable minorities,
including LBGT people
and people with disabilities
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with Variations in Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ American identity themes from
Democratic party platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of units of analysis
(i.e., paragraphs) in the platforms of the Universal category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together
with consistency or variations in party messaging. The italics in Variations indicate some common but inconsistent messaging
across the platforms. Source: Archives of the American Presidential Project.

Table 2. Continued

subgroup categories. The 1992 platform underscores the diverse background of Americans, a
nation of “the world’s largest and most successful multiethnic, multiracial republic,” and the
party’s vision to “condemn antisemitism, racism, homophobia, bigotry and negative stereotyping
of all kinds.” Moreover, it appeals to the individual as an integral part of the American
community to the extent that “a nation depends upon the daily assumption of personal
responsibility by millions of Americans from all walks of life—for the religious faiths they
follow, the ethics they practice, the values they instill, and the pride they take in their work.”
Hybrid messaging in the Democrats’ 2004 platform continues similar themes as earlier
years in the content analysis. It highlights American opportunity while stressing that the nation
“rejoices in diversity”—that “American history is the story of diverse people striving.” These
appeals are comparable to hybrid, universal-identitarian themes of the 1992 party platform,
which might suggest changes coming about in globalization and the de facto diversifying
American ‘community’ comprising the US population and American citizenry. For example, it
describes America as “a nation of immigrants,” together “from Arab-Americans in California to
Latinos in Florida.” The platform frames a hybrid identity of Americans as including immigrants
as part of a common “dream of a better life in the country we love,” in addition to “full inclusion
of gay and lesbian families in the life of our nation,” unlike earlier years in the content analysis.
In other words, the 2004 Democratic party platform frames belonging for “all Americans” as
specifically including diverse backgrounds and identity subgroups in American culture. It is
similar to language in the 1980 Democratic party platform, which describes “American society”
as “analogous to a beautiful mosaic,” although more expansive and prominent themes in the text.
More common than past years, the 2016 Democratic party platform features hybrid
themes invoking identitarian appeals that describe American oneness, such as “out of many,” of
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“everyone,” and including “Americans of all backgrounds.” In other words, it distinctly stresses
social inclusion, diversity, and anti-discrimination in hybrid, universal-identitarian themes. The
platform pleas to “break down barriers,” in phrasing that continues from 2004, as an American
promise to eliminate anything holding them back. However, this theme by 2016 adds new
language of an “enduring scourge of [institutional and] systemic racism,” plus lamenting “our
deeply broken immigration system.” The 2016 Democratic party platform explicitly invokes the
word ‘identity’ in terms of subgroup appeals for the first time for years in the content analysis.
Since 2004, it further presents a message in rejection of “discrimination against people on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.” It stresses America not as a ‘nation’ necessarily
but a place “bringing people of all backgrounds together in common purpose,” and as a guarantor
of “basic rights for all Americans.” Language of American values in “inclusion and tolerance”
are central themes in 2016 Democratic party platform messaging in the hybrid category. Such
values are foundational beliefs underpinning why Americans must “safeguard vulnerable
minorities, including LGBT people and people with disabilities.” Growth in hybrid themes trails
identitarian trends for the 1980-2016 period in the content analysis, though both peak by 2016 at
14.37% and 32.46% of paragraph units of analysis in the platforms, respectively. Their growth
comes at the expense of neutral and universal messaging, which have steep declines from 2004
to 2016 (decreasing from 56.62% to 36.57% for the former, and from 33.55% to 16.60% for the
latter).
In short, hybrid language and phrasing have subtle growth in prominence for Democratic
platform space, beginning at the margins (2.09%) before peaking (up to 14.37%) most recently
from the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis. Diversity is a common phrase in
terms of American culture and identity from hybrid language. It is a theme that grows more
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expansive and prominent as most evident by 2016 in its breadth and salience in the platform text.
In particular, diversity and inclusion messaging, with laments against “systemic racism,” a
“deeply broken immigration system,” and discrimination towards subgroups, is key to the
Democratic party platform’s hybrid, universal-identitarian appeals by 2016. These themes are
less prominent in 1980 (2.09%), while subtle in the texts from 1992 (4.59%) and 2004 (4.27%).
The variations of hybrid wording noticeably change in 2004 with the inclusion of “gay and
lesbian families in the life of our nation,” which expands by 2016 to “sexual orientation” and
“gender identity.” Throughout, the platforms maintain anti-discrimination sentiments in ethnic or
racial terms for the 1980-2016 period. In 1980, messaging against discrimination in the
Democratic party platform is more frequently for issues of sex and women’s rights. The
subgroup languages in 1992 are less specific for the “party of inclusion.” There are mentions of
persons of a “diverse background” and differing “sexual orientation” as part of shared American
values, as well as stances against “homophobia” and “racism.” The 2004 platform is suggestive
for paving the way for a stronger message along similar terms in 2016, as subgroups in Latino,
African, gay, lesbian, immigrants, American Indian youth, and others are features in appeals to
“equality” and eradicating “barriers” for “all Americans.” A key variation by 2016 in the
Democratic party platform, besides peaking for years in the content analysis (increasing from
2.09% in 1980 to 14.37% by 2016) is language of “systemic racism” in its emphasis on subgroup
identity and the various issues regarding minority inclusion in the de facto American community.
Identitarian
Identitarian messaging from the 1980 Democratic party platform (10.62%) is second to
neutral themes (78.70%) for phrases or language regarding American civic identity, community
or belonging. There are appeals to American subgroups and minorities, including women and the
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disabled, in large part around job growth and training, disproportionate burdens of economic
downturn, and representation issues such as trial juries and jobs in the federal government. By
comparison, there is less in relative proportion of text in the 1992 Democratic party platform
messages in the identitarian category (decreasing to 3.06%). There are still some appeals to
American subgroups, particularly to the “people of” US territories relating to “just and fair
treatment under federal policies,” in addition their “rights and self-determination.” Besides this
one narrow and infrequent theme, the 1992 platform also stresses the cultural issue of abortion.
For example, the text asserts “the right of every woman to choose” whether or not to have the
procedure, while conceding the “goal of our nation must be to make abortion less necessary.”
The framing of abortion issues develops over later years. For example, in 2004, the platform
advises that abortion should be “safe, legal, and rare.” In 2016, it expands on the issue of “safe
and legal” abortion with regard to judicial appointments influencing the direction of the
country’s policies, in addition to “Securing Reproductive Health Rights and Justice” by
supporting a reproductive healthcare organization, Planned Parenthood. The 2016 platform
frames such issues as against Republican efforts to oppose them. It supports access to such
facilities for women “regardless of where she lives, how much money she makes, or how she is
insured,” including “legal abortion throughout the developing world.” The issue garners more
attention in the 2016 platform relative to earlier years, as the platform now further explains that
similar issues of “family planning” will “thereby also reduce the need for abortions.” This trend
in the text mirrors changing numerical ratios. The proportion of text in 1992 with identitarian
themes is the low point for the content analysis. By 2004, it grows slightly (from 3.06% to
5.56%) as other categories are relatively stable in proportion of Democratic party platform text
from 1992-2004. Identitarian text is prominent by 2016 (32.46%) (see Table 3).
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Table 3. Identitarian Identity Phrasing and Language in Democratic Party Platforms*
1980 (11%)
1992 (3%)
2004 (6%)
including Black, Hispanic,
Asian/Pacific Americans,
Native Americans and
…millions of African
other minorities, a woman
Americans, Latinos, Asian
has a right to choose
right of every woman to
Americans, Pacific
Common whether and when to have a
choose
Islanders, American
child, …including
Indians, woman’s right to
American Indians/Alaska
choose
Natives, rural Hispanics,
rural Blacks, and other
minorities
[policies for new jobs] held people of Puerto Rico
helping seniors, people
by Blacks …Hispanics
[support for either US
with disabilities, ensure
…more men, more women, statehood or independent
that seniors …no longer
more minorities, more
nation], pledge to the
suffer from geographic
young people, must
people of American Samoa, discrimination, ensure that
recognize that Blacks,
Guam, the Northern
elderly Americans and
Hispanics, minorities and
Mariana Islands, and the
people with disabilities can
older workers bear the
Virgin Islands just and fair live in dignity, [eliminate
brunt of recession,
treatment under federal
health disparities for]
Variations
[opposing cuts] which
policies, [respect rights and millions of African
impose unfair burdens on
self-determination of]
Americans, Latinos, Asian
the poor and the aged…on
people of Palau, goal of our Americans, Pacific
women, on children and on nation must be to make
Islanders, American
minorities, [oppose] subabortion less necessary,
Indians, cultural and
minimum wage for youth
District of Columbia
language barriers remain a
and other workers, increase [support statehood]
particular problem for
opportunities for minority
immigrant communities,
businesses …minorityfight racial and ethnic
(Table Continues)
racial wealth gap, our
nation’s long struggle with
race is far from over, our
heritage as a nation of
immigrants, today’s
immigrants are...pillars of
our community, LGBT
rights, rights for people
with disabilities, equal pay
for women...benefit all
women and their families,
particularly women of
color, [address housing]
especially in communities
of color, [prevent predatory
lending] especially
important …[for] families
in communities of color,

women’s rights, African
Americans, Latinos, Asian
Americans and Pacific
Islanders, and American
Indians

2016 (32%)
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1980 (11%)
owned banks …minority
ownership of radio and
television stations, advance
minority businesses,
support of women-owned
businesses, wage gap
between men and women,
[jobs and programs for]
those who have special
problems …young,
veterans, older workers,
minorities, those with
limited fluency in English,
and the handicapped, needs
of minorities, women and
Variations
children, educational
opportunities for women,
minorities, American
Indians and other native
Americans, the
handicapped, and students
with lingered Englishspeaking ability and other
special needs, especially
women and minorities,
quality of life for all rural
Americans including
American Indians/Alaska
Natives, rural Hispanics,
rural Blacks, and other
(Table Continues)

Table 3. Continued
1992 (3%)

2004 (6%)
health care disparities,
breaking down barriers,
encourage and support
enabling more minority
students to enter the
sciences, ensure that
women have access,
privacy and equality of
women, racial and religious
profiling is wrong,
disenfranchised American
citizens residing in Puerto
Rico, full self-government
for the people of Guam,
American Samoa, and the
Virgin Islands, honor the
sovereignty of American
Indians, strengthen the role
of faith-based organizations

2016 (32%)
women who are widowed
or took time out of the
workforce to care for their
children, nurture the next
generation of scientists,
engineers, and
entrepreneurs, especially
women and people of color,
self-sufficiency for people
with disabilities, targeted
funding and support for
entrepreneurship and small
business growth in
underserved communities
…as engines of opportunity
for women, people of color,
tribes, and people in rural
America, unemployment
rates for African American,
Latino, Asian American
and Pacific Islander
…American Indian
teenagers and youth with
disabilities are far too high,
racial and ethnic
disparities in wealth and
income, disparities …stark
for American Indians,
certain Asian American
subgroups …[perhaps]
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(Table Continues)

1980 (11%)
minorities, cultural needs of
minorities, particular
concern for women, Ethnic,
racial, and other minorities
continue to be victims of
police abuse, persistent
harassment and excessive
use of force, opportunity
for minorities to be
adequately represented on
trial juries, highest
priorities …to increase
significantly the number of
women, Blacks, Hispanics
Variations
and other minorities in the
federal government

Table 3. Continued
1992 (3%)

2004 (6%)

2016 (32%)
even more significant when
considering other
characteristics such as age,
disability status, sexual
orientation, or gender
identity, racial wealth and
income gaps are the result
of policies that discriminate
against people of color and
constrain their ability to
earn, African Americans
and Latinos …lost jobs at a
much faster rate than white
workers and because they
were disproportionately
targeted [by bankers during
housing crisis], close this
racial wealth gap,
eliminating systemic
barriers to wealth
accumulation for different
racial groups and
improving opportunities for
people from all racial and
ethnic backgrounds to build
wealth, greater diversity in
federal and state
contracting practices, [war
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(Table Continues)

Variations

Table 3. Continued
1980 (11%)

1992 (3%)

2004 (6%)

2016 (32%)
on drugs impacting]
disproportionately people
of color, [marijuana] arrest
rates for African Americans
…far outstrip arrest rates
for whites, inspired by the
movements for criminal
justice that directly address
the discriminatory
treatment of African
Americans, Latinos, Asian
Americans and Pacific
Islanders, and American
Indians, quota system
discriminates against
certain immigrants,
including immigrants of
color, immigrants already
living in the United States
…are assets to their
communities and contribute
so much to our country,
should be incorporated
completely into our society
through legal processes that
give meaning to our
national motto, immigrant
communities, vulnerable
communities within our
immigration system,
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(Table Continues)

Table 3. Continued
1980 (11%)

1992 (3%)

2004 (6%)

2016 (32%)
[protect from persecution
abroad] LGBT families,
full equality for women,
end gender discrimination,
specific challenges facing
women of color, promote
LGBT human rights and
ensure America’s foreign
policy is inclusive of
LGBT people around the
world, discrimination based
on disability status,
profound moral and legal
responsibility to the Indian
tribes, restore tribal lands,
recognize and honor the
contributions and the
sacrifices made in service
of our country by the
Americans living in the
territories of Guam,
American Samoa, the US
Virgin Islands, and the
Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands,
statehood for the District of
Columbia, government
services should be
culturally and linguistically
appropriate, address their

92

1980 (11%)

1992 (3%)

2004 (6%)

2016 (32%)
needs, our nation’s public
and private Historically
Black Colleges and
Universities,
Predominantly Black
Institutions, HispanicServing Institutions, Asian
American and Native
American Pacific IslanderServing Institutions, Tribal
Colleges and Universities,
Alaska Native and Native
Hawaiian-Serving
Institutions, Native
American-Serving
Nontribal Institutions, and
minority-serving
institutions, schools must
reflect their communities,
strong advocate for the
rights and opportunities of
women and girls around the
world …[raise] their status,
LGBT rights are human
rights, protect religious
minorities [abroad]
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with possible Variations in Identitarian American identity themes from
Democratic party platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of paragraphs (i.e.,
units of analysis) in the Identitarian category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together with consistency
or variations in party messaging. The italics in Variations messaging indicate some common but inconsistent messaging across the
platforms. Source: Archives of the American Presidential Project.

Table 3. Continued

Moreover, along with women’s issues, from 1992 to 2004 the Democratic party platform
expands identitarian themes on minority subgroups. For example, the 2004 platform speaks to
elimination of health disparities for “millions of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans,
Pacific Islanders, and American Indians,” and how “cultural and language barriers remain a
particular problem for immigrant communities.” It further appeals to “breaking down barriers”
for women and minorities in education, jobs, and health. From 1992, 2004, and 2016 years in the
content analysis, the platforms reiterate a “woman’s right to choose” over abortion, while in
1980 the platform acknowledges as much but qualifies that it “fully recognize[s] the religious
and ethical concerns which many Americans have about abortion.”
Identitarian themes in the Democrats’ 2016 party platform are most expansive of all years
in this category from the content analysis, as it recites various subgroups throughout its political
messaging. The 2016 platform largely draws on group disparities and discrimination, diversity
and inclusion, and “our nation’s long struggle with race,” which it laments as “far from over.”
Reiterating “our heritage as a nation of immigrants,” the 2016 Democratic party platform affirms
“today’s immigrants…are pillars” of the American community. Particularizing the basic rights of
“all Americans,” it further develops political issues to narrower subgroups within the American
community; in messages to “women’s rights,” “particularly women of color,” “LGBT rights,”
“rights for people with disabilities,” “families in communities of color,” “especially in
communities of color,” “people in rural America,” “immigrants, including immigrants of color,”
“LGBT human rights…LGBT people around the world,” in unemployment rates for various
ethnic identities, African Americans and Latinos with lost jobs compared to “white workers,”
racial and social disparities in wealth accumulation, government contracting, and arrest rates,
…etc. The takeaway message is primarily rectifying social inequalities for racial, ethnic, sex, and
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gender minorities, appealing to inclusion, non-discrimination, and equalizing subgroup
disparities. In short, the extent of issues the 2016 platform devotes to narrower identities within
the US is noticeably more prominent and throughout the text than any of the prior Democratic
party platforms in the analysis, as also seen in ratios (from 10.62% in 1980 to 32.46% in 2016).
On the whole, Democratic party platform language and phrasing shifts away from neutral
messaging towards identity framing in the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis.
Neutral messaging has clear decline in salience for proportional text by paragraph units of
analysis (78.70% in 1980, 58.16% in 1992, 56.62% in 2004, 36.57% in 2016). While universal
themes show overall growth (8.59% in 1980 to 16.60% in 2016), they peak in 1992 and 2004. By
contrast, hybrid messaging start at the margins (2.09%) and rise to salience most notably by 2016
(14.37%). The identitarian category becomes more expansive in phrases and language while
increasing overall from 10.62% in 1980 to 32.46% by 2016. The years 1992 and 2004 are
likewise exceptional for the identitarian category as the phrases and language are less prominent
in 1992 (3.06%) and rising slightly by 2004 (5.56%), before a substantial rise by 2016 (32.46%).
Universal messaging remains somewhat consistent, varying in word choices and proportion of
text with emphasis on “diversity,” which is especially the case for 1980 and 2004, then most of
all by 2016. The 1992 Democratic party platform is lesser in identitarian messaging and,
interestingly, rejects Republican counterparts for “playing racial, ethnic, and gender-based
politics” for its divisive political strategy. This lowest year for the identitarian category from
Democratic party platform messaging is exceptional in that sense. Moreover, hybrid themes that
increase steadily from 1992-2004, and then peak in 2016, parallel changes in messaging in the
identitarian category. While the latter has the most expansive messaging and proportional text,
both show language and phrases of increasing importance to women, LGBT, inclusion of
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immigrants and minorities or subgroup interests, as well as appeals to belonging in the de facto
American community over the 1980-2016 period. Lastly, in 2016, the Democratic party platform
goes further to identify “systemic racism” and issues of social disparity and inequalities. These
themes are central in intensifying identitarian themes expressive of ideas in American identity.
Republican Party Platforms (1980, 1992, 2004, 2016)
The Republican party platform trends are similar to their counterpart insofar as changing
appeals over the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis. However, the two parties
have different underlying narratives in the texts. Unlike Democratic party appeals, Republican
party platforms across the four categories are relatively consistent. Still, ratios of different
categories of appeals between the parties similarly show general decline in neutral messaging
from the content analysis. Universal, hybrid, and identitarian categories become more expansive
and salient. For Republican platforms, changes are more mixed and gradual. Unlike Democratic
party platforms, aside from similarities in neutral messaging decline, Republican party platforms
devote most text among categories in the content analysis to universal themes (from 15.97% in
1980 to 24.79% in 2016, peaking in 2004 at 27.18%), second to the identitarian category (7.90%
in 1980, 7.05% in 1992, dropping to 5.82% in 2004, and up to 10.64% by 2016), with little for
hybrid appeals except marginally and light peaking in 2016 (from 2.66% in 1980, down to 1.45%
in 1992, up to 3.16% in 2004, and then rising to 5.18% by 2016). Accordingly, Republican and
Democratic party platforms seem to increasingly diverge in partisan-identity appeals. Both party
platforms emit gradually more contestation in messaging on American nation, community or
identity considerations of interests and belonging. As Democratic party platforms increasingly
stress a pluralistic message around various forms of minority inclusion and against “systemic
racism,” appeals from Republican counterparts are divergent in historical majoritarian appeals as
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far as identity and group interests, cultural and religious belonging in the American nation or
community. The Republican party platforms nevertheless maintain a universal, civic identity
message of American values. They repeat themes of “optimism,” equal rights before law, and
“hopes and aspirations” of “the people” or “nation.” Still, the recounting of subgroups in identity
interests and non-discrimination increasingly contrast with Democratic party platforms.
To preface, the 2016 Republican party platform is noteworthy because the party readopted it for the 2020 presidential election. The exceptional resolution reaffirms that the
“Republican Party has and will continue to enthusiastically support [then-President Trump’s]
America-first agenda” (Republican National Committee 2020). The party leader may thus be
more important now than party principles. With that said, a declining ratio of ‘neutral’ platform
text, i.e., political messaging impartial to contestation or framing of American civic identity,
community or belonging continues over the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis.
Moreover, modest decline in universal appeals coincides with the highest ratio of identitarian and
hybrid messaging among Republican platforms in the content analysis by 2016.
Universal
While the 1980 Republican party platform appeals are mostly neutral (73.47% compared
to 78.70% for the Democratic party platform in the same year), the category of universal
language or phrases (8.59%) begins second to identitarian themes (10.62%). The former is
expressive of American identity in mutual “hopes and aspirations,” as well as in shared “talents
and resources” that are imperatives to realize. The 1980 Republican party platform further
expounds universal ideas of American identity with its calls to “restore the family, the
neighborhood, the community, and the workplace as vital alternatives in our national life to ever
expanding federal power.” As Table 4 displays in common versus variations in messaging, the
platforms reliably express a civic identity basis in universal appeals to American community.
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Variations the neighborhood, the
(Table Continues)

Common

hopes and aspirations of
our people, as a people
…restore the family,
American people,
optimism, our people’s, our
free enterprise system, a
prosperous, growing nation
where dreams can still
come true, proven
American values of
individual enterprise,
optimism, traditions that
gave vitality and strength,
free institutions of our
nation …[where] freedom,
democracy, and justice may
flourish, inspire, focus, and
unite the national will and
determination to achieve
peace and freedom,
national

an opportunity society, a

our core principles, our
Nation, commitment to
individual freedom and
market forces, shared
vision of hope, optimism,
an America of families,
…to all our people,
American dream, equal
rights for all, force of our
ideas…democracy and free
enterprise, our country,
prosperous future for our
Nation, American people,
the people, our people,
commonsense aspirations
of the American people,
vigilant protection of
private property rights
safeguards for citizens
everything of value, free
world, ideals of liberty, our
Nation’s power and
principles

2016 (25%)
exemplar of liberty, the
people, our country’s,
American people are
optimistic, American
country, …guaranteed
people, “The American
equal rights and the
Dream”...expresses the
opportunity to pursue their
aspirations of all our
dreams, our country, the
people, our principles of
American people, strength,
responsible and limited
optimism, national, our
government, natural,
nation, American people,
inalienable rights...ensures
cause of liberty, peace, and
that all Americans stand
our own security, our
equal before the law,
people, hope of democracy,
world’s freest and most
development, free markets,
prosperous nation,
and free trade to every
individual liberty, law,
corner of the world,
national, the people,
America’s political and
institutions holding our
economic ideals …open
society together
markets and open societies,
…reinvigorate the privatefree trade and the free flow
sector institutions under
of information, and the
citizen control, our nation,
development of new ideas
stress the integrity and p,
and private sectors, law,
reservation of the family
liberty, American dream,
unit, all Americans,
private property rights,
determined United States,
free world, [veterans] our
nation’s strength …natural
resource, beacon of hope
united and free, all people, American exceptionalism,

Table 4. Universal Civic Identity Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms*
1980 (16%)
1992 (21%)
2004 (27%)
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1980 (16%)
community, the workplace
as vital alternatives in our
national life to ever
expanding federal power,
…hardly begun to marshal
their talents and resources
or realize the
accomplishments and
dreams that only freedom
can inspire, [no limit to
Americans’] capacity for
work, creativity, faith
…enhanced by strong and
responsive political
leadership and ideals,
Variations
balance is found at
society’s vital center
…where we find the family
and the neighborhood and
the workplace, our dreams,
for society as a whole,
measure of a country’s
compassion is how it treats
the least fortunate, …true
sense of compassion and
charity, our republican
form of government, truths
we hold and values we
share affirm that no
individual should be
(Table Continues)

Table 4. Continued
1992 (21%)
shining city on a hill, last
best hope for man on earth,
unity to the American
purpose, opportunity,
strong families and strong
communities make a strong
America, importance of
honesty, work,
responsibility, and respect
for others, friends,
communities that care about
one another, maintain her
preeminence [America],
traits of ingenuity and
ambition, [ambition in
education] a crusade the
American people have
joined, culture of our
Nation has traditionally
supported those pillars on
which civilized society is
built: personal
responsibility, morality,
and the family, great
promise of America,
equality of opportunity
…to all Americans,
tradition of Lincoln, protect
the public security, our way
of life, bigotry and

2004 (27%)
united by a common
purpose …defending
freedom at home and
promoting it abroad, our
citizens, greatest values
…freedom and opportunity
for all, results, opportunity,
freedom, forward, our
nation’s cause has always
been larger than our
nation’s defense, free and
open societies on every
continent, American people
have risen to the occasion
by acting on a bold new
statement of America’s
place and purpose in the
world, spirit of courage and
optimism of the American
people, triumph of our
cause, Americans will not
be intimidated, cause of
freedom, [America’s
calling] to make the world
safer and better, union of
our values and our national
interests, quest for peace
and prosperity, stability,
and democracy, extend the
benefits of freedom across

2016 (25%)
unlike any other nation on
earth, our historic role...as
refuge, defender, all
created equal, inalienable
rights of life, liberty,
pursuit of happiness, the
people …not the
government …best
stewards of our country’s
God-given natural
resources, making America
great and united `again, our
society, faith in the future,
American ingenuity,
preeminence in space, Godgiven, purposes and limits
of government,
Constitution’s fundamental
principles …limited
government, separation of
powers, denounce bigotry,
racism, anti-Semitism,
ethnic prejudice, and
religious intolerance
…oppose discrimination
based on sex, religion,
creed, disability, or
national origin, rule of law
is the foundation of our
Republic, consent of the
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1980 (16%)
victimized by unfair
discrimination, family is the
foundation of our social
order …the school of
democracy... daily lessons,
cooperation, tolerance,
mutual concern,
responsibility,
industry…[all] fundamental
to the order and progress of
our Republic, American
ethic of neighbor helping
neighbor …this great
tradition, together as a
people, neighborhoods are
Variations
a place of familiarity, of
belonging, of tradition and
continuity, intent of our
Founders, our system and
its accommodation to
diversity, traditional
American principle that the
best government is the one
closest to the people,
residence in the United
States is one of the most
precious and valued of
conditions …traditional
hospitality …strongest in
the world [regarding
(Table Continues)

Table 4. Continued
1992 (21%)
prejudice have no place in
American life, spirit of our
people …economic and
political liberty in the
pursuit of happiness, truths
the Nation keeps coming
back to …the simple,
spiritual truths about our
family, our world, wellbeing of every American, a
pioneer people, …created a
miracle …a system of
government, rounded on
limited authority and the
rule of law, a system that
made government the
servant of the people, our
heritage from the past, our
legacy to generations to
come, our country’s ideals,
a commonwealth of
freedom, supremacy of an
idea …a common
conception of how to make
freedom work for all the
nations, American
opportunity

2004 (27%)
the globe...by actively
working to bring the hope
of democracy, human
spirit, middle class, hard
work of the American
people, increasing health
coverage for all Americans,
facing the nation, our
nation is a land of
opportunity for all, our
communities must represent
the ideal of equality and
justice for every citizen,
courage and compassion,
reverence and integrity,
respect for differences of
faith and race …the values
we live by never change,
common goals and beliefs
that unite us, values worthy
of a great nation …worth
fighting for

2016 (25%)
American people, our
national government
derives power from the
governed …all powers not
delegated to the
government are retained by
the people, our federal
system, honest elections are
the foundation of
representative government,
best in the world, “people
are the masters of
government,”
[immigration] natural home
for those who come in
search of freedom and
justice, a haven for refuge
and asylum, [adoptive
families] strengthen our
communities and ennoble
our nation, American
preeminence, “common
defense,” confident and
determined United States,
our ideas and principles as
a nation give us a unique
place of moral leadership
in the world, natural
position as leader of the
free world, [a military] with

100

1980 (16%)
1992 (21%)
2004 (27%)
2016 (25%)
immigration and refugee
vast superiority over any
policy], willingness …to
other nation or group of
nation’s] self-respect, selfnations in the world, a
confidence, national pride,
resurgent America
Variations
national attitude of pride
and gratitude for our men
and women in the armed
forces
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with Variations in Universal American identity themes from Republican party
platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of units of analysis (i.e., paragraphs) in
the platforms of the Universal category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together with consistency or
variations in party messaging. The italics in Variations messaging indicate some common but inconsistent messaging across the
platforms. Source: Archives of the American Presidential Project.

Table 4. Continued

For example, the Republican party platform in 1980 roots a universal idea of American
identity in “our republican form of government,” in which power is local and freedom is the
means to bolster the family, i.e., “the foundation of our social order.” It affirms that American
“truths we hold and values we share” include non-discrimination, “our free enterprise system”
and “our sense of compassion and charity.” They enshrine the “school of democracy” as part of
American identity, including “cooperation,” “tolerance,” “mutual concern,” “responsibility,” and
an accommodative system of diversity. The 1980 Republican party platform further refers to a
“great tradition” as well as “continuity” of the American people. It underscores the “intent of our
Founders” as a source of American values binding “the people.” Ideas of an American dream are
evident throughout the 1980 platform, from a government at its “best” when closest to the people
to reiterating “neighborhoods” as places of “familiarity” and “belonging” as part of meaning in
America. Its “free institutions” and “freedom” and “democracy” are all chief to the universal
civic identity conception of America from the 1980 Republican party platform, together with
local emphasis of neighborhood and family comprising American nation and social order.
By 1992, the content analysis finds little movement in Republican party appeals as a
proportion of messaging with considerations of American identity, subgroup interests, or ideas of
community belonging. Exceptions are the universal and neutral categories, where the former
increases in proportion from 15.97% to 20.80%, and the latter declines from 73.47% to 70.71%.
The ideological foundations to universal notions of American identity continue in the 1992
Republican party platform in its “commitment to individual freedom and market forces.” It
describes America as “an opportunity society” and as “the last best hope for man on earth,” with
its “purpose” in the “supremacy of an idea… [as well as] a common conception of how to make
freedom work for all the nations.” Its message of American identity pushes “hope, optimism, and
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opportunity.” Such features bind Americans together in “preeminence,” with its “strong families
and strong communities,” plus its “honesty,” strength, and “democracy and free enterprise” in
“limited government.” The latter appeals to liberal democracy and free markets are more overt in
contrast to the 1980 Republican party platform appeals to its ideological civic identity of
American community in the universal category from the content analysis. Like the 1980
Republican party platform, a free market system and democratic government are prominent in
1992 universal themes of American community, except more stress to “American opportunity,”
economic liberty, and private property rights that altogether “safeguards for citizens everything
of value” in the “free world.” In 1992, the Republican party platform again highlights family as
part of “truths the Nation keeps coming back to…the simple, spiritual truths.” Moreover, it adds
that American life has no place for “bigotry and prejudice.” Indeed, the platform stresses that
American life is about both equality of rights and “opportunity” to all.
In 2004, not unlike the Democratic party platform in the same year soon after the 2003
onset of the US-led invasion of Iraq, wartime patriotism in rhetoric from the Republican party is
salient in the universal category according to findings in the content analysis. The 2004
Republican party platform appeals to “a country united and free” are similar to their Democratic
party counterpart. Recurrent from earlier years are appeals to civic identity on the bases of
America as “united by a common purpose,” where “all people are guaranteed equal rights and
opportunity to pursue their dreams.” In context, the ideal of unity in common purpose is defense
of “freedom at home and promoting it abroad.” Republicans and Democrats each generally agree
in their respective 2004 platforms on this sentiment. Furthermore, the 2004 Republican party
platform notion of “American people” is one of “strengths,” “results,” “optimism,” “opportunity”
and “freedom.” It repeats in slight variation from the 1992 Republican party platform in 2004
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that the “nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense,” which includes “free
and open societies on every continent” as a feature of “America’s place and purpose in the
world.” This message of American resolve goes further to describe a ‘nation’ of values, and a
calling “to make the world safer and better.” In short, America’s aims are pursuant to its
“political and economic ideals… [of] open markets and open societies.” The 2004 platform
appeals to American destiny as a matter of bringing democracy together with “free trade to every
corner of the world.” Universal themes from Republican party platforms peak in 2004 for years
in the sample (from 15.97% in 1980 to 20.80% in 1992, 27.18% in 2004 then dropping slightly
to 24.79% by 2016). In other words, the universal appeals to American identity in 2004 are much
more prominent than hybrid (5.82%) or identitarian (3.16%) categories as a ratio of content in
the Republican party platform. Still, both of the latter categories rise to peak levels by 2016
(respectively to 10.64% and 5.18%) as neutral language and phrases follow a gradual decline
(from 73.47% in 1980, 70.71% in 1992, and 63.84% in 2004, to 59.38% by 2016).
Most recently for years in the content analysis, the 2016 Republican party platform
reiterates a belief in “American exceptionalism” and limited government each as key to the
“American Dream” in universal appeals to ‘nation’ or American identity. As a place “unlike any
other nation on earth,” it stresses the United States as serving a “historic role…as refuge,
defender, and exemplar of liberty.” It also repeats appeals to “limited government” in echoes to
the 1980 Republican party platform’s disparaging of “expanding federal power.” Moreover, in
addition to the “hopes and aspirations” and “opportunity” of Americans, a key characteristic of
the American people in the 2016 platform is “optimism.” Through language of “making America
great and united again,” it steeps universal messages to American community in having “faith in
the future.” Like earlier years, it stresses an “American Dream” as a mutual expression of the
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people, which like past years includes “our principles of responsible and limited government,”
and “God-given” and “natural…inalienable rights” that ensure equality before law for all
Americans. In a universal appeal comparable to that of 1992, the 2016 Republican party platform
message proclaims to “denounce bigotry, racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic prejudice, and religious
intolerance,” and “oppose discrimination based on sex, religion, creed, disability, or national
origin.” It further emphasizes rule of law as foundational to the US republic, a government under
the “consent of the American people.” Indeed, the “people” are frequently subject of universal
appeals in 2016, e.g., as “masters of government.” The 2016 Republican party platform repeats
ideas from past texts in the content analysis like American “preeminence,” and stresses “integrity
and preservation of the family unit.” It also emphasizes universal appeals to American
exceptionalism again through importance of “ideas and principles as a nation” in a form of civic
identity for universal themes from 2016.
In short, universal appeals from Republican party platforms overall rise in prominence by
2016 (from 15.97% in 1980 to 24.79% of paragraph units of analysis by 2016), but peak in 2004
(27.18%). As the universal language and phrases are somewhat consistent in the Republican
party platforms for years in the 1980-2016 years in the content analysis, the messages grow more
expansive over time with rising emphasis on a universal, civic identity ideal of American
community and belonging. In 1980, the words “neighborhood” and “national” appear frequently.
The “people” and “nation” are common in 1992. By 2004, “freedom” is recurrent next to
American “nation,” “values,” and “people.” The “nation” and limits on government are
prominent by 2016. Republican party platforms maintain a tailored universal message that
contrasts with Democratic party platforms, especially with emphasis on civic identity around

104

freedom and democracy as “institutions holding our society together,” above counterpart appeals
to equality in “our nation’s heritage” as a common theme in the 2016 Democratic party platform.
Hybrid
Considering the 1980 Republican party platform message as a whole, hybrid as well as
identitarian appeals may be implicit in a typical or majoritarian type of family from ostensibly
universal messages like “traditional family values.” However, this inference is circumstantial.
For example, a central component to the ‘nation’ is in the 1980 platform’s account of America as
“steeped in Judeo-Christian ethic and in Anglo-Saxon theories of law and right.” This appeal has
a specific ethnic and religious-cultural origin story. Yet the platform goes on to qualify the
message in ideas of a system of government over which power derives from “the people of
multifarious heritage.” In any case, hybrid themes in the 1980 Republican party platform, differ
from later platforms, like those in the identitarian category in the content analysis.
Hybrid appeals from the 1980 Republican party platform tend to recite subgroups among
“all Americans” as well as unity in common aspirations, e.g., for “blacks and whites,” “women
and men,” “rural and urban,” “ethnic,” “cultural” and “regional diversity of our people,” and so
on. The 1980 Republican party platform stresses that the answer to economic issues for “black
Americans” is the same for “all Americans,” which includes “equality of rights for all citizens,
regardless of race.” It explicitly recognizes the Hispanic American population as a burgeoning
minority group of Americans, and “one of the major pillars in our cultural, social, and economic
life” within a proud heritage that enriches the “American melting pot.” The 1980 Republican
party platform also underscores that the values of Americans with “Eastern, Central, and
Southern Europe[an]” and Asian-American heritage should no longer face neglect, i.e., given
praise only in election years, and instead made an “integral part of government” (see Table 5).
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Table 5. Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms*
1980 (3%)
1992 (1%)
2004 (3%)
2016 (5%)
our nation of immigrants
continues to welcome those
our nation has been
immigrants are making
seeking a better life…this
enriched by immigrants
vital contributions in every
reflects our past when
seeking a better life…
aspect of national
some newcomers fled
[who have] fled violence
life…their industry and
diversity fosters a
intolerance…some sought
and oppression searching
commitment to American
dynamism in American
prosperity…some came as
for peace and freedom,
values strengthens our
Common
society that is the envy of
slaves, stronger for our
suffered and sacrificed but
economy, enriches our
the world, diverse in
diversity, the Nation
hoped for a better future
culture, and enables us to
character
accepts immigrants and is
for their children in
better understand and more
enriched by their
America, our nation has
effectively compete with
determination and values
been enriched by their
the rest of the world, our
[but oppose illegal
determination, energy, and
nation
immigration in favor of a
diversity
secure border]
aspirations of all
social cohesion, in the
men and women…[who]
all are “endowed by their
Americans…blacks and
earliest American
vigilantly safeguard the
Creator” with the
whites, women and men,
communities, pioneers
security of America…the
inalienable right to life
young and old, rural and
would establish a church,
nation’s last line of defense …[including] the unborn
urban, ethnic, cultural, and then a school…virtually
and first hope in response, child, immigrant labor
regional diversity of our
every newly arrived
America’s role in leading
helped build our country in
people, answer to the
immigrant family thought
the world toward greater
the past, today’s legal
Variations economic problems of
of education as the
freedom, opportunity, and
immigrants are making
black Americans is the
American way…
prosperity…to expand the
vital contributions in every
same we make to all
Americans…believe that
reach of economic and
aspect of national life
Americans, equality of
only a country that
political freedom…
…their industry and
rights for all citizens,
successfully educates its
fostering religious liberty
commitment to American
regardless of race,
sons and daughters can
…reflects our national
values strengthens our
Hispanics…becoming the
count on a strong,
values and protects our
economy, enriches our
largest minority in the
competitive economy, a
national interests…[as]
culture, and enables us to
(Table Continues)
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1980 (3%)
country and are one of the
major pillars in our
cultural, social, and
economic life, proud in
heritage...[Hispanics] are
greatly enriching the
American melting pot,
handicapped persons must
be admitted into the
mainstream of American
society, millions of
Americans who trace their
heritage to the nations of
Eastern, Central, and
Southern have for too long
Variations
seen their values
neglected…time has come
to go beyond the ritual
election year praise given
to Ethnic Americans
…make them an integral
part of government
…[including] our AsianAmerican citizens from the
cultures of the Orient,
[nation] steeped in JudeoChristian ethic and in
Anglo-Saxon theories of
law and right, our legal and
political institutions have
(Table Continues)

Table 5. Continued
1992 (1%)
vibrant culture, and a solid
civic life, bigotry and
prejudice have no place in
American life…denounce
all who practice and
promote racism, antiSemitism, or religious
intolerance, character and
skill of our citizens, the
nation’s defenses

2004 (3%)
home to millions of
Christians, Jews, Muslims,
and people of many other
faiths who live in harmony
and contribute to our
culture, English as our
nation’s common
language…people from
every corner of the world
have come together to
build this great nation,
foundation of our
democratic republic…
commitment to conducting
free and fair elections…
[but concern with losing
the right to vote for many]
African Americans,
Hispanics, and others,
American is a stronger and
better nation because of the
hard work and
entrepreneurial spirit of
immigrants

2016 (5%)
better understand and more
effectively compete with
the rest of the world,
history of our nation
…patriotism exhibited by
our brothers and sisters in
the territories of Guam, the
Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and Puerto
Rico has often gone
unacknowledged,
independent individuals and
the institutions they create
together…families, schools,
congregations…to advance
their ideals and make real
their dreams, our future is
intimately tied to the future
of the Americas …family,
language, culture,
environment, and trade link
us closely with both Canada
and Mexico
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1980 (3%)
1992 (1%)
2004 (3%)
2016 (5%)
evolved over many
generations to form a
stable system that serves
free men and women
well…governs the people
Variations
of multifarious heritage
…faith and good will
…wisdom and confidence
of the people from whom it
derives powers
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with Variations in Hybrid ‘Universal-Identitarian’ American identity themes from
Republican party platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of units of analysis
(i.e., paragraphs) in the platforms of the Universal category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together
with consistency or variations in party messaging. The italics in Variations messaging indicate some common but inconsistent
messaging across the platforms. Source: Archives of the American Presidential Project.
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Themes in the hybrid category from the 1992 Republican party platform, again like that
found in identitarian themes as later shown, have some modifications since 1980. For example,
traditional “family” with “fathers and mothers in the home” are a “vital element of social
cohesion.” Hybrid messages, in general, are less prominent (down from 2.66% in 1980 to 1.45%
by 1992). The 1992 Republican party platform no longer recites different subgroups of minority
demographics in the de facto American community, who were subjects to hybrid as well as
identitarian appeals in the 1980 platform. Still, hybrid wording and phrases in the 1992
Republican party platform continue appeals to “a vibrant culture,” an America “stronger for our
diversity,” and an America as “a nation of immigrants [that] continues to welcome those seeking
a better life.” It repeats that American life rejects bigotry and prejudice.
By 2004, there is more salience in both hybrid and identitarian categories of messages in
the Republican party platform to concerns of American identity, or whose interests and what
values comprise ‘we the people’ of the United States. The hybrid themes in the 2004 Republican
party platform largely reflect an American ‘melting pot’ mythology that highlights the role of
immigrants in formation of the political community. For example, America is a story of how
“our nation has been enriched by immigrants seeking a better life.” Owing to their
“determination, energy, and diversity,” the “hard work and entrepreneurial spirit” of immigrants
makes the American ‘nation’ stronger and better. In addition to universal wartime appeals,
Republicans’ 2004 platform celebrates American promotion of “freedom, opportunity, and
prosperity” around the world because it reflects “our national values and protects our national
interest…[as] home to millions of Christians, Jews, Muslims, and people of many other faiths
who live in harmony and contribute to our culture.” The 2004 Republican party platform
distinguishes English as the common language of America, adding that it is a nation built by
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“people [who have come together] from every corner of the world.” It also raises some concerns
over lost voting rights for many “African Americans, Hispanics and others” in appeals to
America as a “democratic republic” committed to “free and fair elections.” Hybrid language and
phrasing in 1992 differs from 2004 such that there is no reciting of subgroups in the former,
while there is some mix of it in 1980, which suggests some fluctuation in messaging.
Unlike in 1992, the 2004 Republican party platform makes hybrid appeals to minorities
and various subgroups of Americans. In addition to earlier support for minority entrepreneurship,
the 2004 Republican party platform presses the “goal of increasing the number of minority
homeowners.” Women are also more prominently the subject of appeals with respect to
healthcare, particularly “our mothers, daughters, grandmothers, and granddaughters,” whose
needs are unique. The 2004 platform similarly rejects disparities in “health and health care based
upon race, ethnicity, socio-economic status, or geography” as unacceptable. It “encourage[s]
qualified minorities to enter the fields of science and medicine.” More so than 1992, the cultural
wedge issue of abortion continues in the 2004 Republican party platform. It declares opposition
to “destruction of human embryos,” which is more colorful language than the past. It likewise
expresses defense of religious organizations and groups facing “barriers that have prevented…
[them] from applying for government grants on an equal footing with secular organizations.” It
also appeals to end “discrimination against faith-based organizations.” The 2004 Republican
party platform further reiterates an extension of the “American dream” to Native Americans, in
preservation of tribal governments, culture, and lands.
The hybrid category of universal-identitarian appeals from Republican platforms peaks in
2016 for years in the content analysis over the 1980-2016 period. It is still relatively peripheral at
5.18%, up from 2.66% of paragraph units of analysis in 1980. Past language of a “melting pot”

110

and of immigrants “enriching” the American nation shows rewording. The appeals are instead to
“immigrant labor” for helping to “build our country in the past,” and specifically to “today’s
legal [emphasis added] immigrants…[for] making vital contributions in every aspect of national
life.” The 2016 Republican party platform underscores that immigrants’ “commitment to
American values strengthens our economy, enriches our cultures, and enables us to better
understand and more effectively compete with the rest of the world.” Moreover, the cultural
matter of abortion is again a feature of the Republican platform with hybrid appeals to “all,” who
are “endowed by their Creator” to the “right to life,” which is to include “the unborn child.” In
other words, the 2016 Republican party platform frames abortion as a universal issue to
safeguard life, while appealing to particular religious or cultural values against the practice. In
contrast to past years in the content analysis, there is noticeably less emphasis from hybrid
appeals as far as reciting subgroups and interests of American identity or community in the 2016
Republican party platform. As will be seen, the same is true of identitarian messaging from the
party. By comparison, it is also much less weight than hybrid appeals in the Democratic party
platform for the same year. The 2016 trends in hybrid messaging as far as expansive themes
from Republican party platforms are somewhat comparable to dampening of such appeals in
1992, despite a higher ratio in total paragraphs. This pattern may result from declining space to
neutral appeals (73.47% in 1980, 70.71% in 1992, 63.84% in 2004, and 59.38% by 2016).
To summarize for hybrid appeals from the 1980-2016 period for years in the content
analysis, common language of “diversity” as part of American identity evolves until it is not so
explicit in language by 2016. In 1980, diversity is a value fostering “dynamism in American
society,” in 1992 for making America “stronger,” and in 2004 for immigrants “seeking a better
life… [to enrich America] by their determination, energy, and diversity.” To be sure, the 2016
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message still appeals to immigrants as “making vital contributions in every aspect of national
life,” including that “…their industry and commitment to American values strengthens our
economy, enriches our culture, and enables us to better understand and compete more effectively
with the rest of the world.” Throughout all years except 1992, the Republican party platform
messaging in the hybrid category of appeals recites subgroups in American identity or
community in interests or belonging. Regardless, in the same year the party platform disavows
“bigotry and prejudice” as having “no place in American life,” and rejects “racism, antiSemitism, or religious intolerance.” In 1980, the Republican party platform stresses an American
“melting pot,” while in 2004 it appeals to “people from every corner of the world” as having
“come together to build this great nation.” In 2016, it continues to appeal to people of the
American territories. The words “people,” “heritage,” “women,” and “nation” appear frequently
in 1980. As for 1992, there is no distinct phrasing that appears more frequent than others in
hybrid appeals. By 2004, “freedom,” “nation,” “values,” and “American people” appear more so
in hybrid language and phrasing. Then in 2016, the words “family,” “culture,” and “future” are
frequent. The identitarian category further illuminates these changing messages over the 19802016 period for years in the content analysis. While hybrid messaging is relatively marginal
across all years, peaking only at 5.18% by 2016, the identitarian category is more prominent. It
starts at 7.90% in 1980 and fluctuates down to 5.82% by 2004, then peaks at 10.64% by 2016 in
total paragraph units of analysis. The changes may signal rising partisan-identity contestation.
Identitarian
In the identitarian category of language and phrases, the 1980 Republican party platform
makes particular appeals to subgroups. For example, it recites issue interests “…especially so for
blacks and Hispanics,” minorities, and women, from poverty and unemployment to new jobs and
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other opportunities. It similarly tailors a message to the “Hispanic community,” which is an
absent phrase in reference to subgroups for future platform years over the 1980-2016 period from
the content analysis. As other patterns hint at some changes, the 1992 and 2016 platforms in fact
completely skip any references to the word “Hispanic” altogether, while the 2004 platform is
more similar to the 1980 messaging towards subgroups in this way. Otherwise in 1980, the
Republican party platform calls for “elimination of discrimination against women,” and decries
problems of an “America today…[where] especially women must be stressed.”
Identitarian themes in the 1992 Republican party platform are distinct from Democratic
party counterparts. Taking a turn from 1980, the 1992 messaging more intricately ties
“traditional family” and “Judeo-Christian heritage that informs our culture” to the “American
people.” It stipulates that Americans are those who are “free men and women with faith in God,”
and that the ideal family is “built on…spiritual foundations.” Rather than reciting subgroups in
various appeals to interests or identity in the American community as it did in 1980, from “black
Americans” to “Hispanics,” the 1992 Republican party platform proclaims the American ideal
according to the party as “color-blind” in distinction from Democrats. Some could argue this
messaging may have better placement in the universal civic identity category. The 1992
Republican party platform from the identitarian category of the content analysis nevertheless
presents an overall message in cultural-political contestation over partisan-identity ideals to
American identity and community. For “our country’s Judeo-Christian heritage” and in standing
up for “family values,” it asserts opposition to abortion, same-sex marriage, and pornography. It
instead favors a set of “common moral values that bind us together as a nation.” The 1992
Republican party platform further expresses a clear stance for “exclusion of homosexuals from
the military as a matter of good order and discipline” (see Table 6).
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Table 6. Identitarian Identity Phrasing and Language in Republican Party Platforms*
1980 (8%)
1992 (7%)
2004 (6%)
2016 (11%)
women, serving minority
traditional marriage and
traditional family values,
and underserved patients
family…between one man
women, [oppose] programs
and their communities,
and one woman…
in public schools that provide
encourage qualified
foundation for a free
birth control or abortion
pledge to ‘all minorities’
minorities to enter the
society, marriage as the
services or referrals, [oppose]
of a brighter economic
fields of science and
union of one man and one
same-sex marriages,
future…today there are
medicine, destruction of
woman…[defer to]
continued progress of women human embryos [abortion],
more black Americans
authority of the states to
unemployed, minorities, in all fields of American life, integrating Americans with decide, oppose the use of
respect traditional family
women, especially
disabilities, make the
public funds to perform or
values [against abortion],
women, our commitment
American dream accessible
promote abortion or to
removing barriers [for
to Native Americans,
to Native Americans,
fund organizations…[that]
problems of inequality of Americans with disabilities]
activist judges are
provide or refer for elective
to full participation in our
redefining the institution of abortions or sell fetal body
the United States citizens
country’s life, disabled
of Puerto Rico, American
marriage, women, Native
parts, traditional family
Common
voters, preserve the culture
citizens resident in the
American Samoans efforts
values of the sanctity of
and languages of Native
United States territories
to preserve their culture
innocent human life
Americans and Hawaiians,
of the Virgin Islands and
and land-tenure system,
[abortion], a unique
minority business
self-government for the
government-to-government
Guam, right to life for
development programs…of
unborn
United States citizens of
relationship with and trust
special import to women,
children…[restrict]
the Virgin Islands, Puerto
responsibility for Indian
uphold the family…withhold Rico to be admitted to the
abortion, handicapped
Tribal Governments,
funds from organizations
people, needs of
Union, unique and special
American Indians, and
involved in abortion, greater
the…disabled, minority
union of one man and one
Alaskan Natives, tribal
participation…by Americans
Americans, traditional
woman which hast
governments as the voice
residing in Guam, the Virgin
family values
historically been called
of their communities, like
Islands, American Samoa,
marriage…the most
All Americans…American
the Northern Marianas, and
fundamental institution of
Indians want safe
Puerto Rico
civilization…[to redefine
communities for their
marriage] could have
families, ensure equitable
(Table Continues)
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1980 (8%)

Variations subsidized poverty and
(Table Continues)

Common

Table 6. Continued

Judeo-Christian heritage

1992 (7%)

unacceptable

2004 (6%)
serious consequences
throughout the country,
unborn children, oppose
abortion

2016 (11%)
participation in federal
programs by American
Indians…Alaska Natives
and Native Americans…to
preserve their culture and
languages that we consider
to be national treasures,
challenges facing all the
US territories, support the
right of the United States
citizens of Puerto Rico to
be admitted to the Union as
a fully sovereign state,
American family…the
foundation of civil
society…the cornerstone of
the family is natural
marriage, union of one man
and one woman, our laws
and our government’s
regulations should
recognize marriage as the
union of one man and one
woman and actively
promote married family
life as the basis of a stable
and prosperous society,
inherent rights of persons
with disabilities
ongoing attempts to
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1980 (8%)
manipulated dependency…
especially so for blacks and
Hispanics, black American
…long trail of broken
promises and broken
dreams, unemployment
rate for black teenagers is
once again rising sharply,
median income for black
families has declined to
less than 60 percent of
white family income, idle
promises to blacks and
other minorities, jobs of
black Americans, quality
Variations
of life for blacks, new
opportunities for black men
and women, [on federal
employment keep] a
careful eye for qualified
minority aspirants, desires
[of Hispanics] have not
always been fulfilled, the
Hispanic community,
elimination of
discrimination against
women, girls and young
women must be given
improved early career
counseling and job
(Table Continues)
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1992 (7%)
that informs our culture,
color-blind, American
people…free men and
women with faith in God,
families built on…spiritual
foundations, our moral
compass…religion and the
values religion
supports…our country’s
Judeo-Christian heritage,
sustain us as one Nation
under God, reject the
irresponsible position
of…corporations that have
cut off contributions to
such organizations [as Boy
Scouts of America] because
of their courageous stand
for family values, oppose
efforts by the Democrat
Party to include sexual
preference as a protected
minority receiving
preferential status under
civil rights statutes at the
federal, State, and local
level, time has come for a
national crusade against
pornography…[government
responsibility] to promote

2004 (6%)
discrimination against
Israel, [increased savings
which] allowed women
who take time off from
work to start a family to
catch up on their missed
retirement plan
contributions, goal of
increasing the number of
minority homeowners,
[historic levels of
education funding] focused
on neediest students,
including minorities and
children with special
needs, our mothers,
daughters, grandmothers,
and granddaughters
…women have unique
health care needs,
disparities in health and
health care based upon
race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or
geography are
unacceptable…African
Americans, Hispanics,
Asian Americans, Pacific
Islanders, American
Indians, and Alaska

2016 (11%)
compel individuals,
businesses, and institutions
of faith to transgress their
beliefs…misguided effort
to undermine religion and
drive it from public square,
support the display of the
Ten Commandments as a
reflection of our history and
our country’s JudeoChristian heritage, affirm
the rights of religious
students, freedom of
association for religious,
private, service, and youth
organizations to set their
own membership standards,
moral obligation to assist,
rather than penalize,
women who face unplanned
pregnancy, grateful to
thousands of new legal
immigrants… their
patriotism should
encourage all to embrace
the newcomers legally
among us, preservation of
heritage tongues and
support English as the
nation’s official language, a
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(Table Continues)

Variations

1980 (8%)
training, improve the
conditions of women
workers, elderly women,
black women, America
today…especially women
must be stressed, nondenominational prayer in
schools and other public
facilities, structural
unemployment problem
continues to fester among
minorities and young
people, repeal…standards
which hinder minorities,
opportunities of America’s
black people and other
minorities, black
perspective

Table 6. Continued
1992 (7%)
common moral values that
bind us together as a
nation, we support the
continued exclusion of
homosexuals from the
military as a matter of good
order and discipline

2004 (6%)
Natives, tear down barriers
that have prevented
religiously affiliated
groups from applying for
government grants on an
equal footing with secular
organizations, ending
discrimination against
faith-based organizations,
tribal governments are best
situated to gauge the needs
of their communities and
members, unique and
special vulnerability of
women and girls to HIV
…sex trafficking and
prostitution, [welfare
reform] especially
important for single women
and mothers

2016 (11%)
unifying force essential for
the advancement of
immigrant communities and
our nation as a whole, value
the right of America’s
churches, pastors, and
religious leaders to preach
and speak freely according
to their faith, [strong
families] depending upon
God and one another, loss
of faith and family life leads
to greater dependence upon
government, everyone
should be concerned about
the state of the American
family today, every child
deserves a married mom
and dad, English First
approach [in education],
[against use of 1972 Title
IX of Education by
bureaucrats and President]
to impose a social and
cultural revolution upon the
American people by
wrongly redefining sex
discrimination to include
sexual orientation or other
categories…an ideology
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1980 (8%)

1992 (7%)

2004 (6%)

2016 (11%)
alien to America’s history
and traditions, our nation’s
immigration and refugee
policies are placing
Americans at risk,
[religious] conscience of
healthcare professionals,
conscience of military
chaplains of all faiths,
Americans’ strong desire
for a relationship with no
daylight between America
and Israel, recognize
Variations
Jerusalem as the eternal and
indivisible capital of the
Jewish state, our historic
ties to the peoples of
Europe…based on shared
culture and values
…common interests and
goals…their endurance
cannot be taken for granted,
especially in light of the
continent’s economic
problems and demographic
changes
* The table pairs Common phrases and languages with possible Variations in Identitarian American identity themes from
Republican party platforms in the content analysis. The table header displays the platform year and percentage of paragraphs (i.e.,
units of analysis) in the Identitarian category for that year to highlight any changes in the ratio over time together with consistency
or variations in party messaging. The italics in Variations messaging indicate some common but inconsistent messaging across the
platforms. Source: Archives of the American Presidential Project.
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Among similarities in language and phrases from the Republican party platform in 1980,
the 1992 platform speaks to subgroups to the extent of “continued progress of women in all
fields of American life,” because women “uphold the family.” It also appeals to the subgroup of
Americans with disabilities. It further makes distinct calls to preserve “culture and languages of
Native Americans and Hawaiians.” It supports business development programs targeted at
minorities (in contrast to specifically “black” or “Hispanic” Americans like in 1980) and recites
American territories insofar as interests of Americans residing among them and support for
greater participation. The latter phrasing is common through 2016 for years in the content
analysis, and the former messaging to “minorities” continues in 2004 but is absent by 2016, with
subtle changes to subject matter in all. For example, the 2004 Republican party platform presents
interests that correspond to “serving minority and underserved patients and their communities,”
in addition to variations like the “goal of increasing the number of minority homeowners.” It also
underscores the need to eliminate health care disparities “based upon race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or geography” because they “are unacceptable.” These appeals around social
disparities are more comparable to 2016 Democratic party platform messaging than that of the
Republican party platform by 2016. Notably, this example shows a clear assimilationist or
inclusionary distinction of identitarian appeals versus the Republicans’ hegemonizing or
exclusionary messaging around “Judeo-Christian” heritage or ethic.
While phrases more clearly defining the American community in identitarian appeals
sharpen from 1980 to 1992, the 1992 Republican party platform maintains some space for
appeals to minorities and women as a proportion of text. The language and phrases are still
marginal by 1992, as the identitarian category of appeals in the content analysis from Republican
party platforms dips slightly from 7.90% in 1980 to 7.05%. This small change is comparable to
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the decline of hybrid appeals from 2.66% in 1980 to 1.45% by 1992. However, neutral
messaging from 1980 to 1992 platforms declines somewhat more from 73.47% to 70.71% over
the same period that universal civic appeals show growth (from 15.97% to 20.80%). The
narratives to American identity and belonging also appear to be changing.
There may be fluctuating narratives from the identitarian category over the 1980-2016
period for years in the content analysis. In one clear example, any reference to American “JudeoChristian heritage” from the Republican party platform—to which it alludes in 1980 and
expressly states in 1992—is absent by 2004. On the other hand, identitarian appeals from the
2004 Republican party platform claim staunch opposition to “discrimination against Israel.” Like
earlier years in the content analysis from the identitarian category, the 2004 Republican party
platform continues its appeals to women. For example, it stresses support for family-oriented
policies to help those who “take time off from work to start a family to catch up on their missed
retirement plan contributions.” Additionally, in combination with past positions, the 2004
platform rejects “activist judges” in America for “redefining the institution of marriage.” There is
similar messaging against same-sex marriage as in 1992, which is absent in 1980 among years in
the content analysis. A change in historical understanding of marriage “could have serious
consequences throughout the country,” warns the 2004 Republican party platform. As will be
seen, this phrasing and language towards sexual (as well as gender) identity becomes more
salient in the Republican platform by 2016 for years in the content analysis. By this time, it also
brings back the appeal to American “Judeo-Christian” roots.
Variations in Republican party platform messaging from 1980 and 1992 to 2004 may be
an indicator of developing contestation over belonging and values in meaning of the American
‘nation,’ identity, or political community. In comparison, differing weight between the parties to
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neutral and particular subgroup interests or identitarian appeals is evident from the content
analysis results in numbers. As a reminder, the 1980 Democratic party platform began with
78.70% in the neutral category, and the Republican party counterpart at 73.47% for total
paragraph units of analysis. They respectively decline by 2004 to 56.62% and 63.84%. In the
same year, universal appeals peak in the Republican party platforms and remain at a relative
highpoint among Democratic party platforms over the 1980-2016 period for years in the content
analysis (~27% and ~34%, respectively). Meanwhile, hybrid and identitarian categories of
messaging seem in flux from 1980 until 2004, before ascending their highest point in proportion
of platform paragraph units of analysis as evident by 2016, and as neutral messaging continues in
decline to its lowest point from both parties (i.e., [1] the identitarian category reflects 10.64% by
2016 in the Republican party platform, up from 7.90% in 1980, and 32.46% by 2016 in the
Democratic party platform, up from 10.62% in 1980; [2] the hybrid category reflects 5.18% by
2016 in the Republican party platform, up from 2.66% in 1980, and 14.37% by 2016 in the
Democratic party platform, up from 2.09% in 1980; [3] the neutral category reflects decline from
73.47% in 1980 to 59.38% by 2016 for the Republican party platform, and from 78.70% in 1980
to 36.57% by 2016 for the Democratic party platform; and [4] the universal category fluctuates
in platforms over the years from both parties, from 15.97% in 1980 to 24.79% by 2016 for
Republicans, and from 8.59% in 1980 to 16.60% for Democrats, with highpoints for each
midway over the 1980-2016 period, at 27.18% for Republicans in 2004 and at 34.18% for
Democrats in 1992).
Like the Democratic party platforms, identitarian appeals pick up as a proportion of party
messaging from the Republican party platform by 2016. It is clear in the extension of phrasing
and language that the 2016 Republican party platform leans into cultural-identity messaging and
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issues trending in the direction of appeals to American subgroups and identity interests in matters
of community and belonging. However, appeals contrast as less inclusionary (or more
exclusionary) than the Democratic party counterpart in terms of the de facto American
community with an increasingly multicultural and diversifying appeal to cultural and
demographic characteristics. In other words, narrower appeals to the meaning and composition
of American identity and values are more prominent by 2016 in the Republican party platform in
comparison to earlier years in the content analysis. For example, the platform hones into “JudeoChristian heritage,” support for the “traditional marriage and family…between one man and one
woman,” and defense of “faith” for businesses and institutions as well as sustaining religious
presence in the American “public square.” It further asserts party support for public display of
the “Ten Commandments as a reflection of our history” and American heritage in Christian faith.
Moreover, its defense of various religious freedoms is more conspicuous than prior years,
including protecting religious speech, “conscience of healthcare professionals,” and rights of
churches. The 2016 Republican party platform also declares ardent objection to abortion, in
favor instead of “traditional family values of the sanctity of innocent human life” in an appeal
that more readily implies a narrower idea of American family than prior years in the content
analysis. It distinguishes family tradition as built upon “natural marriage,” or the “union of one
man and one woman,” in evidence of contestation over sexual orientation matters of American
identity, community, and belonging., The 2016 Republican party platform laments that
“dependence upon government” is certain without such a family life and faith.
Likewise, in their 2016 party platform Republicans stress that the “state of American
family today” ought to be a universal concern. It is a concern that requires regulation to
recognize “traditional” marriage and “actively promote married family life as the basis of a
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stable and prosperous society.” Furthermore, the platform states clear opposition to imposition
by the then-current Democrat administration of a “social and cultural revolution upon the
American people by wrongly redefining sex discrimination to include sexual orientation or other
categories.” 6 It opposes Democratic party efforts “to reshape our schools—and our entire
society—to fit the mold of an ideology alien to America’s history and traditions.”
What was first evident by 2004 for years in the content analysis, the Republican party
platform by 2016 most prominently among years in the content analysis for the 1980-2016
period underscores Israeli-American ties. It stresses that having “no daylight” between the
United States and Israel is a “strong desire” of the American people. Such American values in
the 2016 Republican party platform include embracing recognition of “Jerusalem as the eternal
and indivisible capital of the Jewish state.” In a symbolic political appeal, this messaging on US
ties to Israel alludes to Judeo-Christian heritage and cultural significance to Americans from the
Republican party perspective. Lastly, the 2016 Republican party platform distinctly draws on the
American nation’s “historic ties to the peoples of Europe,” from culture and values to common
interests and goals. In short, language and phrases from the 2016 Republican party platform in
the identitarian category appeal to a narrower slice of the de facto increasingly multicultural and
diverse American population and identity representation since 1980.
Still, like the past among years in the content analysis, the 2016 Republican party
platform messaging maintains some weight in appeals to other subgroups. There are some
similarities and additional variations. For example, the 2016 Republican party platform briefly
appeals to American Indians, Alaska Natives and Native Americans in support of preserving
“their culture and languages that we consider to be national treasures.” It also appeals in small
In June 2020, the United States Supreme Court incidentally ruled against Republicans on the issue Title IX
protections for LGBTQ.
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part to citizens of the US territories for their patriotism, including to citizens of Puerto Rico in
support for full recognition of their territory as an American state. These sorts of appeals are
common over the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis. Moreover, 2016 platform
appeals to “legal immigrants” and “newcomers legally among us” are messages that continue to
stress American control over national borders for determining who is welcome to join the
political community. The 2016 platform phrasing of “legal immigration” is consistent with
messaging against “illegal aliens” in 2004, support for immigrants except for “[i]llegal entry” in
1992, and party opposition to aid for “illegal aliens” in 1980. In general, the 2016 Republican
party platform message that “America’s immigration policy must serve national interest of the
United States” is also consistent with the 1980 platform message that “United States immigration
and refugee policy must reflect the interests of our national security and economic well-being.”
In a similar way, the 1992 Republican party platform opposes “illegal entrants” as undermining
“the social compact on which immigration is based.” Likewise, the 2004 Republican party
platform states that immigration must be “structured to address the needs of national security.”
However, there is a qualifying message around immigration in support of diversity specifically
for fostering “dynamism in American society that is the envy of the world” (1980), for making
America “stronger” (1992), or as “a source of strength” (2004) in all years except 2016 over the
1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis. The word “diversity” is notably absent from
the 2016 Republican party platform in any such context (i.e., except unrelatedly in reference to
financial markets). The 2016 Republican party platform nevertheless concludes its immigration
message by describing America as “[f]rom its beginning…a haven of refuge and asylum.” Yet it
goes on to qualify this practice “should continue—but with major changes,” limiting the practice
to “political, ethnic or religious persecution” as a matter of national security. As a further
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message to immigrant subgroups, not unlike earlier years in Republican party platforms—i.e., for
all but 1992 for years in this content analysis—the 2016 Republican party platform reiterates
support for “English as the nation’s official language.” It stresses that English is a “unifying
force essential for the advancement of immigrant communities and our nation as a whole,” while
encouraging “preservation of heritage tongues” in an appeal to the “legal immigrants” for which
it is “thankful.”
Frequent phrases from the identitarian category of the content analysis from the 1980
Republican party platform consist of women, minority, black American, jobs, and Hispanic. By
1992, phrases shift in frequency with focus of identitarian appeals to recurrent language of
women and minorities, albeit bringing Christian heritage, God, family, religion, and nation to the
fore. The high-frequency words in 2004 show additional fluctuation in identitarian messaging
over the years for Republican party platforms as women, health, mother, and discrimination are
frequent. Lastly, recurrent words from the 2016 Republican party platform are faith, nation, and
values, without mention to racial categories of past Republican party platforms over the 19802016 period for years in the content analysis. These shifting themes in phrases and language
from Republican party platform messaging tend to correspond to trendlines from content analysis
results in numbers (i.e., [1] steady decline in neutral messaging from 73.47% in 1980, 70.71% in
1992, and 63.84% in 2004, to 59.38% by 2016; [2] steady increase in universal messaging from
15.97% in 1980, 20.80% in 1992, and 27.18% in 2004, before levelling out at 24.79% in 2016;
[3] a variable uptick in identitarian messaging from 7.90% in 1980, 7.05% in 1992, 5.82% in
2004, and peaking at 10.64% in 2016; and [4] a variable rise in hybrid messaging from 2.66% in
1980, 1.45% in 1992, 3.16% in 2004, and peak at 5.18% by 2016). Like Democratic party
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counterparts, the Republican party platforms generally expand on messages of American
identity, community, and belonging over the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis.
In all, the Republican party platform seems to sharpen a consistent message to historical
majoritarian appeals as far as American identity and (sub)group appeals by 2016. While its
universal themes correspond to a civic identity notion of American nation, community and
belonging, the hybrid and identitarian themes are somewhat consistent but expand over the years
on particular cultural and religious orientations of American identity. Features of the latter
categories consist of “Judeo-Christian heritage” and “traditional marriage and family…between
one man and one woman.” At the same time, these Republican party platform trends increasingly
contrast with those of the Democratic party. The latter shows expansion in identitarian appeals to
minority subgroups including in its universal appeals that differ from civic notions of American
identity from Republican party platforms through reciting various narrower identity categories.
The former maintains a civic identity message of American values in universal appeals, such as
recurrent language of “optimism,” equal rights before law, and “hopes and aspirations” of “the
people” or “nation.” Furthermore, the 1980, 1992, 2004, and 2016 Republican party platforms all
reject discrimination as a feature of American appeals. The 2016 Democratic party platform is
increasingly distinct in this messaging from the Republican party platform. It emphasizes various
forms of minority inclusion, and features phrasing against “systemic racism,” as the latter omits
“diversity” in any such context by 2016 for the first time over the 1980-2016 period for years in
the content analysis. The Republican party platform nevertheless shows consistency over the
years in underlying narratives with growing salience to universal, hybrid, and identitarian
appeals. For example, the language and phrases against “illegal” immigration in favor of a
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system in the national interest is common from 1980, 1992, 2004, and 2016 Republican party
platforms.
As identitarian appeals are highest in 2016, Republican party platform messaging
expands in similar ways that correspond to the Democratic party platform changes over the same
period. This trend is similar to corresponding rises from both parties in the hybrid category. The
universal categories for each party are more variable with fluctuations over the years, but
likewise follow the trend in rising prominence and expansive language and phrases. In short, the
content analysis suggests Republican and Democratic party platforms are each giving more
weight to partisan-identity appeals. Each party appears to hone its message over the 1980-2016
period for years in the content analysis to different poles of values, ‘nation,’ or belonging in an
increasingly salient ideal of American community. Whereas the Democratic party platforms most
of all in 2016 emphasize “diversity” and issues of “systemic racism,” the Republican party
platforms particularly stress “traditional” American values and ideas of belonging.
Deepening Partisan-Identity Polarization in Democratic and Republican Party Platforms
There are two key findings from the content analysis of Democratic and Republican party
platforms in support of the theoretical approach in this thesis to the issue of ‘pernicious’ or
severe partisan polarization. First, there are changing ratios of messaging from both major parties
towards a combination of universal or narrower conceptions of identity interests over the span of
1980, 1992, 2004, and 2016 platforms, accounting for every three election years in the 19802016 period, or every twelve calendar years. Crucially, the neutral category of platform
messaging shows clear decline from both parties’ formal presidential election year platforms.
Neutral messaging for both parties’ platforms was highest in 1980. The Democratic party
platforms show decline in proportion of paragraph units of analysis from 78.70% in 1980,
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58.16% in 1992, 56.62% in 2004, and 36.57% by 2016. They diminish with more intensity over
the years than Republican party platforms. By comparison, the latter declines under the same
measure from 73.47% in 1980, 70.71% in 1992, 63.84% in 2004, and 59.38% by 2016.
Furthermore, from both Democratic and Republican party platforms, the identitarian and hybrid
categories of American identity appeals are highest by 2016 for the 1980-2016 period for years
in the content analysis (i.e., [1] from 10.62% in 1980 to 32.46% by 2016 for identitarian text, and
from 2.09% in 1980 to 14.37% by 2016 for hybrid text for the Democratic party platforms; and
[2] from 7.90% in 1980 to 10.64% by 2016 for identitarian text, and from 2.66% in 1980 to
5.18% by 2016 for hybrid text for the Republican party platforms).
Secondly, the content analysis finds increasingly contrasting partisan-identity messages
in a deepening polarization between Democratic and Republican party platforms. In other words,
the two major parties’ narratives on American identity concerns are increasingly prominent while
diverging on universal, identitarian, and hybrid themes. For instance, Republican party platforms
consistently emphasize universal appeals to a civic form of American identity, in tandem with a
narrower conception of the American community. The Republican party platforms, most notably
by 2016, appeal to a historical majoritarian idea of what it means to be American by featuring
Judeo-Christian heritage and a traditional or conservative American culture around family, as
well as ideals of sexual identity in marriage and gender issues in American social life. In the de
facto increasingly diverse and multicultural American population or ‘community’ over the 19802016 period for years in the content analysis, the Republican party platform thereby increasingly
underscores a narrower slice of the American polity. By contrast, again most notably by 2016,
the Democratic party platforms increasingly appeal to a pluralistic message that recites various
subgroups in minority inclusion, as well as opposition to American “systemic racism” it claims
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the country must redress. The Democratic party platforms are relatively consistent in narratives
of “diversity” and American identity, except for 1992 where hybrid and identitarian messaging
were at low points for the 1980-2016 period for years in the content analysis (4.59% compared to
14.37% by 2016 for the former, and 3.06% compared to 32.46% by 2016 for the latter). For
Democratic party platforms, it is the expansiveness of these notions of identity and subgroup
interests that are most evident from the content analysis, with an extensive array of language and
phrases in American identity appeals especially in the identitarian category by 2016. Both major
parties may consequently be trending to narrower and conflicting subgroup appeals to American
identity, community, and belonging in their respective platforms over the 1980-2016 period
based on years in the content analysis.
Briefly, the Democratic party across all years in the content analysis maintains a
generally inclusive message in party platforms albeit increasingly enumerating differences of
political interests and identity among subgroups in the de facto American community. By
contrast, the Republican party directs a more exclusive idea on American community around
“traditional” American ‘nation’ or identity considerations. While such partisan-identity themes
from Republican party platforms are earlier apparent in 1992 for years in the content analysis,
they appear less salient in 1980 and 2004 party platforms, then show prominently by 2016. The
Republican party platforms seem to increasingly reproduce a historical majoritarian appeal on
religious-cultural or ethnic identity lines, whereas Democratic party platforms increasingly
contest the meaning of ‘American’ in more identitarian albeit inclusive in a multicultural sense
of community and belonging.
Accordingly, the findings are suggestive of a deepening trend in polarizing dynamics on
partisan-identity lines in American politics from the two major American parties. They further

129

support arguments that a ‘formative rift’ dynamic involving state identity and belonging as well
as grievances around race and culture may serve an important role in severe party polarization in
the United States case. The issue of partisanship is vast. Potential consequences may vary from
‘pernicious,’ or deep divisions spilling into ordinary and social life, to useful by occasionally
generative and participatory pathways for democracies. By engaging the issue of partisanship
through content analysis of major party platforms, this thesis informs in small part what could be
relevant to US trends in severe partisanship and challenges for the liberal democratic regime.
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION
This thesis has addressed the issue of partisan-identity polarization in the United States
through examination of Democratic and Republican party platforms from 1980-2016 in an
extensive content analysis. Its main goal was an empirical test of claims that partisanship on
identity lines has been increasing in American politics in recent decades. The results offer
support for such claims. As a key issue facing democracies today, polarization has coincided
with challenges for democratic governance. Accordingly, partisan-identity dynamics in the US
may be worthwhile to further explore and clarify implications for democratic erosion.
It was first important for this thesis to address why partisan-identity polarization matters.
In brief recap, the issue of partisanship is foremost a matter of party identification and thereby
loyalty to a political bloc, making it a key motivating factor in political participation, voter
behavior, and activism. Its dynamics continue to influence both elite and mass political ideals
and behavior in American politics. Elites play a key role in driving partisan polarization largely
by mobilizing popular support in partisan appeals to secure power. In severe cases of
partisanship or ‘pernicious’ polarization, these dynamics may cross-cut into social life and
feature a mutually exclusive division of politicized identity and interests between groups within
the polity. Political lines between once legitimate democratic opponents may harden to enemies,
unworthy and contemptable as adversaries, nor even acceptable as family and friends, which
could threaten social cohesion and ultimately democratic function. For example, consider an
earlier finding that Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) highlight in their book How Democracies Die:
In 1960, political scientists asked Americans how they would feel if their child married
someone who identified with another political party. Four percent of Democrats and five
percent of Republicans reported they would be “displeased.” In 2010, by contrast, 33
percent of Democrats and 49 percent of Republicans reported feeling “somewhat or very
unhappy” at the prospect of interparty marriage. Being a Democrat or a Republican has
become not just a partisan affiliation but an identity.
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Within these tensions, it may still be possible for these severe cases in partisanship to generate
democratic development. For example, new checks and balances may develop from tensions of
polarization in mutual distrust; political grievances over oppression may fuel a movement or
create space for democratic reforms. Conversely, opposing elites and loyal supporters in severe
polarization may pursue bending rules to their favor in a de-democratizing or deconsolidating
effect for the regime. Partisan-identity divisions may reach a point of rigid intolerance and
seemingly irreconcilable difference. These dynamics could degrade political stability under
polarizing conditions and generate a ratchet response of ‘autocratizing tendencies’ between
alternating blocs. Importantly, cases of severe partisanship featuring a ‘formative’ or ‘existential’
rift on ideas of national belonging may fuel democratic erosion through sustained and pernicious
polarization that seems intractable to resolve.
Against this context, the thesis unpacked its content analysis over the US case in a
thorough assessment of partisan messaging by tracing party platform devotion to universal,
identitarian, or hybrid universal-identitarian appeals in numerical proportions of paragraphs in
the texts and key words and phrases over the 1980-2016 period. In short, Democratic party
platforms are increasingly emphasizing pluralism around various forms of minority inclusion and
multiculturalism while against “systemic racism” in appeals to American nation or community.
In a divergent partisan message, Republican party platforms have given increasing weight in
messaging to historical majoritarian appeals but maintain a universal ideal of equal rights before
law. Over time, they reinforce a historical majoritarian understanding of American identity,
moral and group interests. Consequently, the two parties’ platforms for years in the 1980-2016
period of the content analysis suggest a deepening partisan-identity polarization in American
politics. Both parties’ platforms show neutral messaging that is agnostic to partisan-identity
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appeals at peak starting in 1980, with clear patterns of decline across all years in the analysis and
then lowest by 2016. Changing proportions are more intense from Democratic party platforms in
comparison to Republican party platforms (i.e., decline from 78.70% in 1980 to 36.57% by 2016,
and from 73.47% in 1980 to 59.38% in 2016, respectively). An explanation for this pattern may
be that the meaning of texts differs under varying social and political contexts, which could make
for variations in the content analysis. For instance, it is possible that “neutral” messaging from
Republican party platforms may truly reflect historical majoritarian appeals of the party’s distinct
partisan-identity politics, albeit in an implicit and therefore ostensibly neutral frame. Then again,
both parties’ platforms peak for identitarian and hybrid categories of partisan-identity appeals by
2016. It may be that the Democratic party platform peaked for both categories in 2016 at higher
proportions than the Republican party platform (i.e., 32.46% versus 10.64% identitarian, and
14.37% versus 5.18% hybrid, respectively) as a reflection of the party with America’s first
woman presidential candidate in history elevating partisan-identity contrasts against a
dramatically different and uniquely brash Republican opponent. The aggregate data variability
does not preclude the possibility that political differences in different contexts could drive such
percentage variations in the texts. Still, the fact that Donald Trump won the 2016 Republican
party presidential primary handily with 46.5% of the vote suggests his candidacy may be
representative of Republican voters’ preferred form of partisanship. The 2nd-place Republican
presidential primary candidate, Ted Cruz, received only 27% of the vote. By comparison, the
2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton won a more closely contested primary
with 52.8% of the vote against Bernie Sanders, who lost with 41.4% of primary voter support.
The content analysis of Democratic and Republican party platforms nevertheless suggests there
is a growing rift on partisan-identity lines of polarization between the parties. It demonstrates
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increasing emphasis in recent decades from both major party platforms on matters of ‘nation’
and belonging in the American community. Consequently, as the US case features a ‘formative’
or ‘existential’ rift around race and culture, these findings could be troublesome for the liberal
democratic regime under ‘pernicious’ or severe partisan polarization.
The future of American politics is obviously an unknown, as one cannot predict the
future. Theoretical implications from the findings of this thesis, which suggest possible
‘pernicious’ polarization in the US case, offer some ideas for paths ahead for democratic
governance. It could be that hardening political lines make it more clear for masses to choose
representatives as distinct among political choices. This result could arguably be democracyenhancing. For example, highly partisan voters may be more likely to participate in politics,
more prudent in their political choices, more inclined to behave coherently as partisans in pursuit
of a unified policy agenda with less ticket splitting, and more likely to have representatives who
reflect their views. Thus, it could be a boon for democratic constituents to choose candidates
between Democrats or Republicans. It is important to note, however, that stronger partisan
identities could also lead the opposite direction in terms of democratic function, i.e., if voters are
becoming less informed, more dogmatic, and much more inflexible and intolerant in their views
as partisan-identity devotees despite all evidence before them. On the other hand, there may also
be greater political activism and voter turnout in the US under dynamics of severe partisanidentity polarization. Both behaviors are at historic highs in recent decades; the 2020 presidential
election was the highest turnout since the 1960s. On a similar note, sustained conditions of
severe partisan-identity polarization may also motivate political elites to improve the political
system and encourage voter turnout. The polarization could also influence mass mobilization to
hold political power to account should one party overstep democratic rule. One such example
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may be the Women’s March on Washington on the day after Trump’s inauguration. Mass
protests in the US Capitol and around the world emphasized reproduction, immigration, and civil
rights issues against fears over the new administration’s actions once in office.
Still, it may be realistic to expect severe partisanship involving state identity and
belonging to be more enduring in ‘pernicious’ intergroup disputes and therefore difficult to
resolve. Political rivals in the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as trickling into social
life, could turn from banal democratic opponents to strident enemies. This dichotomy of partisan
tribes may come to experience alternate realities in politics and ordinary life. Politics may
increasingly become a moralistic concern of “good” and “evil,” or “us and “them” between
divergent value systems of partisan stalwarts. Mutual tolerance of political opponents may
decline to detrimental effect on democratic function. The political dynamics could be difficult to
reconcile. Already, the US has experienced legislative gridlock, elite incivility, rising income
inequality, political disengagement by voters who identify with neither party and/or distrust both,
and alienation between highly engaged ideological, partisan-identity camps all correlating with
polarization in recent years. There could be major political change if polarization drawn on
American identity factors encourages stronger biases and anger in American politics. Such
dynamics could diminish commitment to democratic principles in electoral decision-making
processes. Americans could choose partisan loyalty, ideology, and preferences in candidate
orientations over what may be ideal in a democratic regime. The US case in severe partisanship
could be more problematic under its ‘formative rift’ in polarization of mutually exclusive
narratives over what comprises the American polity and national ideals. The exclusivity of one
ideal system of values versus another, and who belongs, may make for substantial difficulties
going forward for the regime. There may be greater likelihood for episodes of violence and
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gradual democratic erosion. If either Democrats or Republicans have the upper hand in a power
imbalance, the polarization may find resolve albeit possible lasting exclusion of opposition or
marginalized groups.
Outcomes of severe partisan-identity polarization could be deleterious for the democratic
regime because of how its dynamics may bolster popular support for authoritarian behaviors or
policy actions of elites. Political actors may be most influential as agents to determine dedemocratizing outcomes if their polarizing political appeals are rampant in pursuit of objectives
to secure power or enact policies. A Republican party alternative example of recent mass
mobilizations under Trump’s leadership occurring near the end of his tenure after losing reelection alludes to the potential of this scenario. The Stop the Steal rally turned US Capitol riots,
“insurrection,” “coup attempt,” or otherwise known as “storming of the capitol” on January 6,
2021, featured a loosely organized albeit zealous mass of partisans who violently sought to stop
congressional certification of the 2020 presidential election after then-President Donald Trump
repeatedly claimed election fraud at incendiary rallies. 7 It were as though Trump-backing
partisans hitherto earnestly took his word, believing that opponents had rigged the election
against him to the point of necessary and direct mass intervention against elected leaders in US
government. Then-President Trump underscored dire circumstances to his audience earlier that
day: “We’re gathered together in the heart of our nation’s capital for one very, very basic and
simple reason: To save our democracy.” Notably, the former president and possible 2024
presidential election contender continues to discredit democratic institutions. For instance, he
recently asserted without evidence that a recall election for California governor and Democrat
Gavin Newsome was “probably rigged” ahead of the vote. He explains in an interview that
See, e.g., reporting of FBI evidence on scant coordination around the US Capitol attack (Hosenball and Lynch
2021).
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the ballots are mail-out, mail-in ballots…I guess you can have a case where you can
make your own ballot. When that happens, nobody’s going to win except these
Democrats…the one thing they’re good at is rigging elections, so I predict it’s a rigged
election, let’s see how it turns out (Joyella 2021).
Ratcheting effects of such ‘pernicious’ polarization may stem from one bloc of party elites
reciprocating with similar strategies or otherwise ways that fail to neutralize polarizing rhetoric
and behavior of the other. Polarizing appeals against counter-appeals in rhetoric may amplify
partisan biases. A likely outcome could be democratic erosion more than widespread violence or
regime breakdown, driven by elite cues and actions, including influence on mass views and
behavior. Subtle but no less consequential results could be continuing gridlock and policy
wavering between parties in power, and further decline in trust for governing institutions or
between groups. Lastly, a reasonable expectation from these dynamics may be backlash to new
or prior marginalized groups reaching political power. Depending on how opponents reciprocate,
results may indeed be gainful or concerning for US democracy.
For future research, it would be interesting to explore party polarization as it relates to
American life. This thesis has shed light onto partisan-identity dynamics of polarization from
elite appeals between the two major parties through analysis of their platforms. Researchers
might find ways to investigate similar dynamics albeit among ordinary Americans rather than
looking to major party actors or platforms. Some related issues worth investigating may be
possible consequences of declining political legitimacy and social cohesion. For example, there
are worsening Cohesion Indicator Trends for the US from 2006 to 2021 according to the Fragile
State Index (2021a). 8 Furthermore, national political flashpoints in recent years offer support to
The Cohesion Indicator Trends altogether consider three indicators. These are (1) Security Apparatus, (2)
Factionalized Elites, and (3) Group Grievance. The Fragile State Index builds the indicators using a threefold mix of
content analysis, quantitative data sets, and qualitative research methods. First, the Security Apparatus indicator
accounts for any security threats to the state. Factors may include the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the
relationship between security and citizenry, police brutality in use of force, and arms control. Second, the
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the idea of rising partisan-identity tensions of polarization extending into daily life and social
relations. A partisan split was palpable during summer 2020 uprisings and widespread protests
against police brutality after the killing of George Floyd, including violent street clashes between
Black Lives Matter opponents and Blue Lives Matter supporters of police, plus the pro-Trump
rally-turned-riot on January 6, 2021, with masses ‘storming’ the US Capitol in a failed attempt to
stop congressional certification of the 2020 presidential election after President Donald Trump
frequently claimed election fraud. A close look at identity fracturing in American social life from
non-party elite, including media, and the masses could contribute to greater understanding of the
depth and severity in any partisan-identity rift and its implications. It would also be interesting to
further explore possible underlying issues that might contribute to polarization around identity
and belonging like the work of Inglehart and Norris (2016), i.e., the ‘demand’ side for why
partisan-identity appeals may have a receptive mass audience at certain times and not others. A
deep-dive into single country cases of apparent partisan-identity polarization from the US to
Latin America or Eastern Europe using qualitative research or mixed methods may compliment
their comparative survey and statistical analysis.
Will partisan elites and voters increasingly view US elections as illegitimate under
pernicious polarization? If congressional gridlock continues in the US, could policy careening

Factionalized Elites indicator looks at fragmentation of state institutions on identity lines (e.g., ethnicity, class,
racial, or religious) or between ruling elites. The indicator also accounts for the rhetoric of ruling elites, whether
nationalistic, xenophobic, or of longing for return to a “greater” period or communal solidarity. It may reflect
representation flaws such as wider components of citizenry rejecting the state’s governing leadership as legitimate,
i.e., popular perceptions of illegitimacy towards the ruling class. Factors may include representation, identity,
resource distribution, and equality and equity in law. Not least, the Group Grievance indicator considers
fragmentation and rifts between different groups in the society, including social or political. It accounts for present
or even historical grievances influencing society and intergroup relations. There may be grievance factors over lack
of autonomy, self-determination, or political independence, as well as possible persecution or repression of certain
groups by the state or from dominant groups in society. Factors may include post-conflict response, resource
equality, divisions including tolerance levels and intergroup relations, and communal violence such as vigilante
justice or episodes of mass violence (Fragile State Index 2021b)
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from one party in power to another contribute to further troubles for trust in government?
During the 2020 presidential elections, President Trump repeated that the only way he would
lose re-election is if the ‘radical Democrats’ rigged it. By contrast, Democrats worried that mailin ballot delays in transit and vote counts might propel Trump to victory. It was unclear that
either side could conceive of the other’s fair win. Potential for destabilizing or weakening effects
of partisan-identity polarization on the quality of democracy is palpable. The actions of party
elites and those in power may determine whether tensions tighten in a ratchet response of
growing severity in partisanship.
Diffusing tension around partisan-identity polarization may mean that leaders must find
ways to reaffirm tolerance of political opponents and opposing viewpoints, including among
neighbors, friends, and family, etc. Disagreement in democratic society is healthy, after all; it
means mutual acceptance in agreeing to disagree and forging a path forward with understanding
of shared interests. Party elites should avoid demonizing the ‘other,’ whether as irredeemable,
“deplorable,” as a “threat” or an “enemy of the people.” The Republican party could be more
accepting towards invariably changing norms, and the Democratic party could be more
understanding that generational values are slower to adapt to change, otherwise both parties may
face backlash in countermovements and possible consequences in furthering the polarization.
Likewise, the Democratic party’s recent stress on “systemic racism” may be counterproductive.
It alludes to a certain oikophobia of American civic identity. Opposing elites and less receptive
masses may perceive such appeals as anti-American. Both parties nevertheless hold major stakes.
Somehow, those in power will need to find ways to reconcile differences between sides in
seemingly intractable politics of identity and belonging that runs deep in terms of the American
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‘nation’ or community. The incentives to reciprocate against political opponents (“enemies”)
may alas be too appealing, at democracy’s peril.
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APPENDIX A: CODING RUBRIC
Coding Rubric: Identitarian and/or Universal Messaging in US Major Party Platforms
Coders address each paragraph (unit of analysis) with a central question:
Does the paragraph imply or explicitly express some notion of American polity, whether universal,
identitarian or sub-group (i.e., narrow, exclusive, or individual over the collective), or both? If yes,
coders (minimum x2) record the categorization, and the researcher notates context plus any associated
key words.
Code
11111

Category
Universal

Coding Rules (addressed
against central question)
Includes an expression of
common purpose or
collective identity,
universality; civic identity
and/or common interests
emphasized.
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Data Examples
Our platform is uplifting and visionary. It reflects the
views of countless Americans all across this country
who believe in prosperity with a purpose — who
believe in Renewing America’s Purpose. Together.
The twenty-fifth man to receive our party’s nomination
is equal to the challenges facing our country. After a
period of bitter division in national politics, our
nominee is a leader who brings people together. In a
time of fierce partisanship, he calls all citizens to
common goals. To longstanding problems, he brings a
fresh outlook and innovative ideas and a record of
results.
We seek to be faithful to the best traditions of our
party. We are the party that ended slavery, granted
homesteads, built land grant colleges, and moved
control of government out of Washington, back into the
hands of the people. We believe in service to the
common good — and that good is not common until it
is shared.
The highest hopes of the American people — a world
at peace, scientific progress, a just and caring society
— cannot be achieved by prosperity alone, but neither
can they be fulfilled without it. Yet prosperity is not an
end in itself. Rather, it is the means by which great
things can be achieved for the common good. Our
commitment to the nation’s economic growth is an
affirmation of the real riches of our country: the works
of compassion that link home to home, community to
community, and hand to helping hand. This is the
foundation of America, and that foundation is sound.
Even though our economy, and that of the world to
which we are now so closely tied, has been utterly
transformed over the last two decades, Americans
remain true to the faith of our founding fathers.
They’re why we fought to reclaim the value of treating
all Americans with dignity and respect. And they’re
why President Barack Obama has ended one war and is
responsibly drawing down another. They’re why we’re
restoring our alliances and image around the world and
pursuing a foreign policy that’s making us safer.

22222

Identitarian Following the definition of
identity politics from
Merriam-Webster
dictionary: “politics in
which groups of people
having a particular racial,
religious, ethnic, social, or
cultural identity tend to
promote their own specific
interests or concerns without
regard to the interests or
concerns of any larger
political group,” this
category captures narrower
or more exclusive, identityinclined messaging;
emphasis is placed on subgroup or the individual
interests rather than the
collective society on
universal and inclusive
grounds; identity bases are
not class/economic, rather it
is religious, ethnic, gender,
sex, and/or cultural
affiliations emphasized.
Further explained: This
category is not meant to
capture platform messages
speaking to sub-group or
narrower interests on
class/economic bases of
representation, such as
appeals to/against/for
specific job titles, industries,
students, millionaires,
billionaires, etc. While these
messages may not be
speaking to the universality
of the polity, neither do they
reflect identity politics or
identity-based messaging as
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We support the public display of the Ten
Commandments as a reflection of our history and our
country’s Judeo-Christian heritage and further affirm
the rights of religious students to engage in voluntary
prayer at public school events and to have equal access
to school facilities. We assert the First Amendment
right of freedom of association for religious, private,
service, and youth organizations to set their own
membership standards.
Education is much more than schooling. It is the whole
range of activities by which families and communities
transmit to a younger generation, not just knowledge
and skills, but ethical and behavioral norms and
traditions. It is the handing over of a cultural identity.
That is why American education has, for the last
several decades, been the focus of constant controversy,
as centralizing forces from outside the family and
community have sought to remake education in order to
remake America. They have done immense damage.
The federal government should not be a partner in that
effort, as the Constitution gives it no role in education.
At the heart of the American Experiment lies the
greatest political expression of human dignity: The selfevident truth that “all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness.” That truth rejects the dark view
of the individual as human capital — a possession for
the creation of another’s wealth.
We emphatically support the original, authentic
meaning of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. It affirmed that “no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” That language opened up for girls and
women a world of opportunities that had too often been
denied to them. That same provision of law is now
being used by bureaucrats — and by the current
President of the United States — to impose a social and
cultural revolution upon the American people by
wrongly redefining sex discrimination to include sexual
orientation or other categories. Their agenda has
nothing to do with individual rights; it has everything
to do with power. They are determined to reshape our
schools — and our entire society — to fit the mold of
an ideology alien to America’s history and traditions.
Their edict to the states concerning restrooms, locker
rooms, and other facilities is at once illegal, dangerous,
and ignores privacy issues. We salute the several states
which have filed suit against it.

33333

Both

defined by the scope and
background of this project,
and hence coders should
categorize them as “none of
the above” (00000), unless
there includes some
emphasis or notion of
common polity (11111),
sub-group identity(ies)
(22222), or both (33333).
Reflects common American
identity or universality while
simultaneously
incorporating appeal(s) or
messaging to/including
narrow/sub-group identities
or addressing the individual
above and beyond the
collective/civic.
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Persons with disabilities are nearly twice as likely to be
self-employed as the general population. To encourage
their entrepreneurship, it makes sense to include them
in the Small Business Administration’s 8(a)
certification program, which opens up federal
contracting for emerging businesses. Any restructuring
of the tax code should consider ways in which
companies can benefit from the talent and energy of
their disabled employees.
We recognize the importance of small business to
women, people of color, tribes, and rural America and
will work to help nurture entrepreneurship.
We offer not only a new agenda, but also a new
approach — a vision of a welcoming society in which
all have a place. To all Americans, particularly
immigrants and minorities, we send a clear message:
this is the party of freedom and progress, and it is your
home.
Democrats are strongly committed to enacting
comprehensive immigration reform that supports our
economic goals and reflects our values as both a nation
of laws and a nation of immigrants. The story of the
United States would not be possible without the
generations of immigrants who have strengthened our
country and contributed to our economy. Our
prosperity depends on an immigration system that
reflects our values and meets America’s needs. But
Americans know that today, our immigration system is
badly broken - separating families, undermining honest
employers and workers, burdening law enforcement,
and leaving millions of people working and living in
the shadows.
President Obama and the Democrats fought for the
DREAM Act, legislation ensuring that young people
who want to contribute fully to our society and serve
our country are able to become legal residents and
ultimately citizens. Although this bill has a long history
of bipartisan support, Republicans decided to play
politics with it rather than do the right thing. So the
Obama administration provided temporary relief for
youth who came to the United States as children,
through no fault of their own, grew up as Americans
and are poised to make a real contribution to our
country.
No one should face discrimination based on disability
status. President Obama and the Democratic Party will
continue to lead efforts to facilitate the access of
Americans with disabilities to the middle class,
employment opportunities, and the ability to lead full,
productive, and satisfying lives. The administration and
the Democratic Party are committed to assisting the
approximately 50 million people in this country living
with disabilities, assuring their full integration into
society.

00000

None

None of the above, other;
neutral/silent in regard to
emphases of what comprises
the American polity or it
does not specifically address
common or subgroup/individual interests.
Calculated by {total
paragraphs} minus three
discrete category totals
above; coders do not record
none/neutral units of
analysis.
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We believe in an America where everybody gets a fair
shot and everybody plays by the same set of rules. At
the core of the Democratic Party is the principle that no
one should face discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, language, religion, gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability status.
Democrats support our civil rights statutes and we have
stepped up enforcement of laws that prohibit
discrimination in the workplace and other settings. We
are committed to protecting all communities from
violence. We are committed to ending racial, ethnic,
and religious profiling and requiring federal, state, and
local enforcement agencies to take steps to eliminate
the practice, and we continue to support enforcement of
Title VI.
We commit ourselves to rebuilding the American
military and returning to a foreign policy of strength
and purpose and a renewed commitment to our allies.
We will deploy defenses against ballistic missiles and
develop the weapons and strategies needed to win
battles in this new technological era.
We believe that from freedom comes opportunity; from
opportunity comes growth; and from growth comes
progress and prosperity.
Affordable housing is in the national interest. That is
why the mortgage interest deduction for primary
residences was put into the federal tax code, and why
tax reform of any kind should continue to encourage
homeownership. At the same time, a balanced national
housing policy must recognize that decent housing
includes apartments, and addresses the needs of all
citizens, including renters.
We support the right of the people to conduct their
businesses in accordance with their religious beliefs
and condemn public officials who have proposed
boycotts against businesses that support traditional
marriage. We pledge to protect those business owners
who have been subjected to hate campaigns, threats of
violence, and other attempts to deny their civil rights.
In the international arena, a weak Administration has
invited aggression. The results of the Administration’s
unilateral approach to disarmament are already clear:
An emboldened China in the South China Sea, a
resurgent Russia occupying parts of Ukraine and
threatening neighbors from the Baltic to the Caucasus,
and an aggressive Islamist terror network in the Middle
East. We support maintaining and, if warranted,
increasing sanctions, together with our allies, against
Russia unless and until Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity are fully restored. We also support
providing appropriate assistance to the armed forces of
Ukraine and greater coordination with NATO defense
planning. All our adversaries heard the message in the
Administration’s cutbacks: America is weaker and
retreating. Concomitantly, we honor, support, and

thank all law enforcement, first responders, and
emergency personnel for their service.

155

APPENDIX B: INTERCODER RELIABILITY
Intercoder Reliability Measures*
Democratic Party
Cohen’s Kappa**
1980
0.286
Fair agreement
1992
0.553
Moderate agreement
2004
0.416
Moderate agreement
2016
0.596
Moderate agreement
Percentage Agreement***
1980
74.13%
1992
75.51%
2004
66.67%
2016
70.90%

Republican Party
0.337
0.495
0.127
0.346

Fair agreement
Moderate agreement
Slight agreement
Fair agreement

71.35%
76.04%
54.26%
61.62%

*Two coders, Democratic party and Republican party platforms (1980, 1992, 2004, 2016).
**<0: Poor agreement; 0.000-0.20: Slight agreement; 0.21-0.40: Fair agreement; 0.41-0.60: Moderate
agreement; 0.61-0.80: Substantial agreement; 0.81-1.00: Almost perfect agreement (Landis and Koch 1977).
***Number of agreements divided by total frequencies, then multiplied by 100 for a percentage calculation.
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APPENDIX C: DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CODER 1 AND 2 COMPARISON

Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Coder 1
90.00%
80.00%

78.51%

70.00%
63.25%

61.22%

60.00%
50.00%

43.66%

40.00%
27.55%

30.00%

26.92%

27.24%

20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

11.50%
7.32%
2.67%
1980
Universal

7.14%
4.08%

5.56%
4.27%

1992

2004

Identitarian

Both

15.67%
13.43%
2016
None/neutral

Democratic Party Platforms 1980-2016, Coder 2
90.00%
80.00%

78.89%

70.00%
60.00%

55.10%

50.00%

50.00%

40.82%

40.00%

40.17%

30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

37.69%
29.48%

9.86%
9.74%
1.51%

2.04%

5.56%
4.27%

1980

1992

2004

Universal

Identitarian
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Both

17.54%
15.30%

2016
None/neutral

APPENDIX D: REPUBLICAN PARTY, CODER 1 AND 2 COMPARISON

Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Coder 1
80.00%
70.00%

75.22%

74.07%

70.15%

68.07%

60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

10.80%
10.09%
3.89%
1980
Universal

19.07%

16.48%
8.13%
1.32%

7.46%
3.32%

1992

2004

Identitarian

Both

16.81%
12.89%
2.24%
2016
None/neutral

Republican Party Platforms 1980-2016, Coder 2
80.00%
70.00%

71.71%

60.00%

57.50%

55.10%

50.00%

50.70%

40.82%

40.00%

35.33%

32.77%

30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

21.17%

5.69%
1.42%
1980
Universal

2.04%
2.04%
1992

8.40%
8.12%

4.17%
3.00%
2004

Identitarian

158

Both

2016
None/neutral

